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INTRODUCTION 
Products liability law is salient as never before. Recent develop-
ments in products liability and in markets affected by products liability 
have engendered spirited debate about the efficacy of tort law in regu-
lating consumer product risks and about the need for products liability 
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reform. Manufacturer associations, 1 insurance companies,2 and con-
sumer groups, 3 in addition to lawyers, policy analysts, and scholars, 
have taken sides.4 Since January 1989, at least half a dozen bills have 
been introduced in Congress in an effort to reform the products liabil-
ity system - evidence of the extent to which products liability has 
come into the national policymaking spotlight. 5 Such bills have been 
common in recent Congresses; in the final months of the 102d Con-
gress, S. ~.the "Products Liability Fairness Act," backed by moder-
ate Senate Democrats, came within two votes of escaping a :filibuster. 6 
1. See. e.g., Stephen Labaton, Product Liability's "Quiet Revolution." N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 
1989, at D2 (describing reaction of manufacturers and their insurers to insurance crisis and at-
tributing recent changes in products liability law to the influence of manufacturers and insurers). 
2. See. e.g., American International Group (AIG) Issues Forum, Why Reforming the Liabil-
ity System is Essential if America Is To Succeed in Overseas Markets, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1990, 
at 32-33. 
3. See, e.g., CoNSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, THE BENEFITS OF THE MODERNIZA-
TION OF THE TORT LAW IN THE CoNTEXT OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR IMPROVED 
SAFETY AND QUALITY IN THE NATIONAL EcoNOMY (1987). 
4. Members of the medical community also have joined the discussion. See Stephen L. Isaacs 
& Renee Holt, Drug Regulation. Product Liability and the Contraceptive Crunch, 8 J. LEGAL 
MED. 533 (1987). Even the candidates in the most recent presidential election weighed in. See 
infra note 6. See generally Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alter-
native Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5-8 (1991) 
(describing salience of products liability debate). 
5. See. e.g., Congress Tackles Products Liability-Again. NATL. L.J., Aug. 5, 1991, at 5, 23. 
For examples of bills, see S. 1400, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (''To regulate interstate com-
merce by providing for a uniform product liability law, and for other purposes"); S. 1100, 101st 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (''To provide greater certainty in the availability and cost of liability 
insurance, to eliminate the abuses of the tort system, and for other purposes"); H.R. 359, lOlst 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (''To regulate interstate commerce by providing for uniform treatment of 
selected product liability problems, and for other purposes"); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, 
What is a Tort Claim? An Interpretation of Contemporary Tort Reform, 51 Mo. L. REv. 172, 172 
(1992) (stating that proposed and adopted tort reforms, including products liability reforms, are 
of scope and magnitude ''unparalleled in the history of tort law"); James A. Henderson, Jr. & 
Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal 
Change, 31 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990) (providing evidence that courts have been quietly moving 
toward more traditional products liability rules since the mid-1980s); Joseph Sanders & Craig 
Joyce, "Off to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process. 27 Hous. L. REv. 
207, 218-23 (1990) (summarizing provisions of tort reform legislation adopted in 48 jurisdictions 
between 1985 and 1988). 
6. See Senate Kills Legislation To Curb Liability Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1992, at D4. 
The Bush administration strongly supported tort reform. See generally George Bush, Excessive 
Tort Litigation Costs Vaporize Profits, NATL. L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 15; Dan Quayle, Civil Justice 
Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 559 (1992). Although Bill Clinton's election victory, as well as the 
electoral defeat of Senator Robert Kasten (R-Wis.), S. 640's chief proponent, seem likely to slow 
the tort reform movement, see Margaret C. Fisk, The Reform Juggernaut Slows Down, NATL. 
L.J., Nov. 9, 1992, at 1, it is not at all clear that the new administration will be unfriendly to 
moderate reform measures, see, e.g., William Fay, Invisible ":Lawyers Tax," WASH. TIMES, July 
24, 1991, at G3 (noting bipartisan backing of S. 640, whose sponsors included Senators Jay 
Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) and John Danforth (R-Mo.)); Greg Rushford, Fewer Hassles for the Tas-
sels: Tort-Reform Efforts May Be Dead in the Water, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at 24 (Victor 
Schwartz, counsel to the Product Liability Alliance, predicting that Clinton will not be knee-jerk 
tort reform opponent, and Stuart Rickerson, Vice President of the Keene Corp., a major asbestos 
defendant, stating that he looks forward to working with the Clinton administration on tort 
reform); Alessandra Stanley, Selling Voters on Bush, As Nemesis of Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
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While the heightened salience of products liability is no doubt a 
source of excitement for students of the subject, it brings controversy 
and confusion. Ongoing debates involve such complicated issues as 
the extent to which consumers are informed of product risks, 7 the effi-
ciency of awarding punitive damages8 and pain-and-suffering dam-
ages,9 the relative merits of various substantive standards of tort 
liability such as strict liability and negligence, 10 the relative advantages 
of first-party and third-party insurance systems, 11 the efficiency of 
31, 1992, at Al (explaining that products liability reform is not entirely partisan issue and noting 
support for reform by Senate liberals). In fact, in the vice-presidential debates between Al Gore 
and Dan Quayle, Gore referred approvingly to Arkansas' tort reform. Meanwhile, many states 
have passed tort reform measures, see, e.g., The Tort Movement's Progress Across the Nation, 
NATL. L.J., Nov. 9, 1992, at 35 (outlining tort reform measures state by state), and the American 
Law Institute has named James Henderson and Aaron Twerski as reporters for what will become 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts, with a primary focus on products liability, see Henry J. Reske, 
Experts Tackle Tort Restatement, 78 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 18. 
7. Compare WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OP 
TORT LAW 280-81 (1987) (arguing that contracting and information costs render inaccurate 
consumer estimations of product risks) with Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Re-
form: A Theoretical Synthesis, 91 YALE L.J. 353, 379 (1988) (arguing that no hard evidence 
demonstrates that consumers systematica11y underestimate risk) (discussed infra text accompa-
nying notes 134-38). 
8. Compare ROBERT CoO'rnR & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcoNOMICS 391-96 (1988) (ar-
guing that punitive damages provide efficient deterrence when only a subset of all injured parties 
bring suit) with PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CoNSEQUENCES 
155-61 (1988) (arguing that imposing punitive damages results in useful products' being with-
drawn from the market). The Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue. See Pacific Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991) (rejecting constitutional attack on punitive 
damages). 
9. Compare STEVEN SHAVELL, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OP ACCIDENT LAW 229-30 (1987); 
George L. Priest, The Cu"ent Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1553 
(1987); and Schwartz, supra note 7, at 364-65 (all arguing that from an insurance perspective 
damages for nonpecuniary losses are inefficient because consumers do not demand such insur-
ance) with Croley & Hanson, supra note 4, at 59-67 (arguing that as a theoretical matter whether 
consumers demand insurance against nonpecuniary losses is unclear); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. 
Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
authors) (arguing that consumers demand some amount of insurance against nonpecuniary 
losses); and Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A 
Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 19 VA. L. REv. 91 (1993) (questioning use of 
insurance theory as meaningful guide to injured individuals' compensation preference for nonpe-
cuniary losses). 
10. Compare LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 293-94; RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 166 (3d ed. 1986); and Schwartz, supra note 7, at 392-404 (all arguing in 
favor of strict liability under certain circumstances) with RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY LAW 40-48 (1980); HUBER, supra note 8, at 36-44; and Priest, supra note 9, at 
1534-39 (all arguing against strict liability). These scholars' positions are discussed Infra sections 
III.B and III.C. 
11. Compare George Priest, Understanding the Liability Crisis, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIA· 
BILITY LAW 196, 204-05 (Walter Olson ed., 1988) (arguing that first-party insurance is more 
efficient than manufacturer-provided insurance) with Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The 
First-Party Insurance Extema/ity: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 16 CoR· 
NELL L. REv. 129, 137-59 (1990) (arguing that manufacturer-provided insurance may be more 
efficient than first-party insurance). 
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product warranties, 12 the ability of courts and juries to assess dam-
ages, 13 and the effect of products liability on the country's economy.14 
Some of these issues reflect the far more fundamental question of what 
social institution or collection of social institutions - including the 
tort system, administrative agencies, and the marketplace - can most 
efficiently allocate the risk of personal injury from consumer product 
accidents. 
Products liability is unique. From its inception, modem products 
liability has occupied an uncertain position between contract law and 
tort law. Indeed, as this article will show, both the evolution of prod-
ucts liability and the ongoing debates over the efficiency of modem 
products liability are, at bottom, driven by the question of where be-
tween tort and contract consumer product transactions are most aptly 
located. On one hand, the relationship between manufacturer and 
consumer seems much like that between injurer and victim in the pro-
verbial tort case, in which the costs of contracting are prohibitively 
high and parties encounter one another only by accident - as when 
12. Compare EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 53-54; HUBER, supra note 8, at 224-27; and George 
L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Wa"anty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981) (all arguing 
that product warranties allocate product ~ks efficiently) (discussed infra text accompanying 
notes 144-50, 187-90, 405-12) with LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 280; POSNER, supra note 
10, at 166; and William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Prod-
ucts Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 544 (1985) (all arguing that warranties are unlikely to 
allocate some product-caused personal injury risks efficiently) (discussed infra text accompany-
ing notes 215-18). 
13. Compare HUBER, supra note 8, at 50-51, 185-87 (arguing that juror sympathy leads to 
incoherent outcomes and excessive damages) with W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product 
Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or Capricious Awards?, 8 INTI.. REV. L. & EcoN. 203 
(1988) (concluding that pain-and-suffering awards are not generally random or capricious). 
14. Compare Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: 
Myths and Realities, in To1n LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 127, 149 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 
1991) ("The effects of the tort system should not be examined through the lens of trade policy. 
Once exchange rates have adjusted, liability has no effect on the aggregate trade balance.") and 
Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim ·at the American Legal System: The Council on Competitive-
ness's Agenda far Legal Reform, 15 JUDICATURE 244 (1992) with Gregory B. Butler & Brian D. 
Miller, Fiddling While Rome Burns: A Response to Dr. Henslf!r, 15 JUDICATURE 251 (1992) and 
American International Group (AIG) Advertisement, Why Reforming Our Liability System is 
Essential if America is To Succeed in Overseas Markets, WASH. Posr, Nov. 2, 1989, at A24 ("The 
proliferation of generous liability awards has made competing very tough."). For a recent articu-
lation of a common complaint, see WALTER K. OLSON, THE LmGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT 
HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991): 
Lawsuits over allegedly defective products have been another great area of growth for 
the litigation business, with results equally inimical to the welfare of society. In each manu-
facturing industry to come under sustained courtroom assault - prescription drugs, vac-
cines, contraceptives, sporting equipment, small planes, small cars, insulation materials -
products that represent a valuable choice over some of the remaining alternatives have been 
either driven off the market or not introduced for fear of liability, with increasingly tragic 
results for the public health. 
No other country's legal system operates remotely like ours. 
Id. at 6-7. 
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one car collides with another. 15 Understood in this way, a manufac-
turer's liability disclaimer in its product warranty is analogous to a car 
owner's bumper sticker that disclaims liability for all injuries that she 
might cause. No court is likely to enforce a bumper sticker disclaimer. 
On the other hand, products liability may be more aptly characterized 
as contract, in light of the fact that some preaccident relationship does 
exist between the manufacturer and consumer: namely, the market. 
If no significant market imperfections impede consumer product mar-
kets, those markets will, as legal economists commonly emphasize, 
yield efficient results. Consumer preferences will determine the safety 
and quality of products and the terms of product warranties. So long 
as markets work, courts should permit manufacturers and consumers 
to contract around products liability laws. One's position, therefore, 
on whether courts should treat products liability law as contract or as 
tort - that is, whether courts should permit manufacturers and con-
sumers to contract around a liability standard or, instead, the liability 
standard should be mandatory - turns on one's view of whether con-
sumer product markets work. 
Other things equal, legal economists typically prefer freedom of 
contract over immutable liability standards.16 By most accounts, an 
15. Because one motorist cannot affordably negotiate with all other motorists over how to 
allocate liability in the event of a future accident, tort law picks up where contract law leaves off. 
See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); LANDES & POSNER, 
supra note 7, at 29-53. As Landes and Posner explain: 
When the costs of voluntary market transactions are low, the property approach is economi-
cally preferable to the liability ap[p]roach because the market is a more reliable register of 
values than the legal system. But when the costs of voluntary market transactions are high, 
the property approach is inferior because it will prevent resources from being shifted to their 
most valuable uses. 
Id. at 31. Tort law can thus be understood as a set of implied contract terms that the parties 
would have agreed to had the transaction costs of contracting not been so high. To be sure, 
implied terms are an important element of contract law as well. See generally Ian Ayres & 
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 
YALE L.J. 87 (1989). In fact, the Uniform Commercial Code can be understood as a set of gap-
filling rules to which contracting parties are bound unless the parties expressly contract around 
them. See ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. Sc01T, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 166 (1982). 
The same has been said of state corporate law. See generally Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law 
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542 (1990). In this respect, tort 
and contract have much in common. The crucial difference between the two, of course, is that 
most contract rules are default rules, whereas tort rules are usually immutable by contract. 
16. For example, Anthony Kronman, in his 'capacity as legal economist, has written: 
[Ejx ante arguments for the efficiency of a particular legal rule assume that individuals 
remain free to contract around that rule, and a legal system that denies private parties the 
right to vary rules in this way will tend to be less efficient than a system that adopts the same 
rules but permits contractual variation. 
Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 351, 370 (1978); see also 
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 31 ("the market is a more reliable register of values than the 
legal system"); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 88 ("Immutability is justified only if unregu-
lated contracting would be socially deleterious because parties internal or external to the contract 
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immutable liability rule is justified if and only if it prevents some sig-
nificant negative extemality or other market failure. For example, 
most legal economists agree that manufacturers should not be permit-
ted to avoid liability when their products injure third-party bystanders 
(as opposed to the purchasing consumers themselves).17 In such cases, 
neither a price nexus nor anything approximating a contractual rela-
tionship binds the manufacturer and the injured party. Thus, without 
manufacturer liability, the costs of such accidents would be external-
ized upon third parties. Few dispute, therefore, that the rules allocat-
ing liability to manufacturers for third-party injuries should be 
mandatory. 18 Because claims brought by third parties constitute only 
a tiny percentage of all products liability cases, however, the difficult 
questions articulated above remain unanswered with regard to the vast 
majority of products liability cases. . 
Judges and scholars who have contributed to the evolution of 
products liability have inevitably, though often Unknowingly, taken 
positions regarding, first, whether the liability standard should be a 
default or a mandatory standard (the mutability dimension) and, sec-
ond, which liability standard is preferable among (a) absolute con-
sumer liability, (b) negligence, (c) strict liability, and (d) absolute 
manufacturer liability (the liability-standard dimension ).19 By locating 
classic products liability cases and influential products liability schol-
ars in a matrix defined by these two dimensions, 20 this article illus-
trates how products liability scholarship and the eventful history of 
products liability law are best understood - indeed, can be properly 
understood only - in terms of those two dimensions. · 
In so doing, this article attempts to shed light on products liability 
at several levels. Close to the surface, this article provides an accessi-
ble framework, the Products Liability Matrix, for understanding the 
rich products liability literature and jurisprudence - a primer both to 
the current, heated debates in the products liability literature and to 
cannot adequately protect themselves."); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protec-
tion, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977): 
Where a private transaction imposes no substantial cost on society or third parties, the 
parties to it should be allowed to arrange their affairs in a way that satisfies them rather than 
some distant official; they should, 'in short, be given freedom to "make their own deal." 
Government intervention should be limited to enforcement of private bargains and, where 
feasible, to reducing the costs of bargaining (transaction costs) ...• 
Id. at 253. 
17. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 59; Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 550-51; 
Schwartz, supra note 7, at 369 n.27. 
18. The law appears to comport with that consensus. See EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 59. 
19. These liability standards are defined infra section J.B. 
20. See infra section II.A. 
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products liability law generally.21 But that largely pedagogic benefit is 
merely the happy· byproduct of this article's other goals, which include 
challenging the contemporary wisdom regarding the reasons that, and 
ways in which, products liability should be reformed. 
Broadly speaking, the trend in products liability law over recent 
decades has been to treat products liability cases more and more as 
tort rather than as contract cases.22 Yet the bulk of current scholarly 
wisdom now sees this increased reliance on tort law as harmfully mis-
guided. Indeed, a common theme uniting one of the two main camps 
of products liability scholars - the contractarians - is that manufac-
turers should be permitted to contract around standards imposed by 
products liability law through product disclaimers, warnings, and war-
ranties. 23 This camp of scholars would entrust allocation of consumer 
product risks largely to contract law. Scholars comprising the other 
main camp - the regulators - do not share the contractarians' faith 
that contractual allocations of consumer product risks will yield effi-
cient results, but most nevertheless join the contractarians in advocat-
ing a curtailed role for tort law. Those regulators urge that consumer 
product risks be largely relegated to administrative regulation.24 Both 
the contractarians and the regulators have voiced their prescriptions 
with increasing urgency of late. Judges and legislators, now persuaded 
that modem products liability law is to blame for the liability insur-
ance crisis25 and in part for the nation's apparent inability to compete 
successfully with foreign manufacturers,26 are taking action.27 This 
article reveals fundamental tensions within the arguments and reform 
proposals of scholars in both camps. Those tensions emerge, in large 
21. This article does not examine the scholarship of all of the participants in the products 
liability debate, but rather a representative sample of them. We do not consider the work of such 
prominent scholars as Kenneth Abraham, Patricia Danzon, James Henderson, Jeffrey 
O'Connell, David Owen, Robert Rabin, David Rosenberg, Gary P. Schwartz, Michael Trebil· 
cock, Aaron Twerski, and Paul Weiler, among others. We also do not address the arguments 
contained in the excellent two-volume Reporters' Study of the American Law Institute on enter· 
prise liability. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL 
INJURY (1991). We do, however, examine the positions of two of its primary contributors, Alan 
Schwartz and W. Kip Viscusi, whose views are substantially reflected in the relevant chapters of 
the study. In part because a major goal of this article is to stimulate dialogue among products 
liability scholars, we chose to narrow our attention to those with whom subsequent dialogue wns 
possible. 
22. See infra Part II. 
23. See infra section 111.B.2. 
24. See infra section 111.C.2. 
25. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 4, at 5-8 (explaining critics' characterizations of the 
"crisis"). 
26. See supra note 14. 
27. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (reviewing recent prodefendant trends in prod· 
ucts liability). 
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part, from the fact that products liability scholars have failed to appre-
ciate fully either the significance of, or the relationship between, the 
mutability dimension and the liability-standard dimension of products 
liability. In a more constructive vein, this article also makes an affirm-
ative case for a particular products liability regime, a regime that both 
camps in the current debate strongly oppose: enterprise liability.28 
The article proceeds as follows. Part I defines important terms and 
introduces the two-by-four Products Liability Matrix by explaining 
the eight possible positions that might be taken with respect to the 
mutability and liability-standard dimensions of products liability. Part 
II provides a backdrop for the current products liability debate, first 
by setting out a capsule history of the evolution of the modem prod-
ucts liability regime, and then by explaining the arguments offered by 
the "first generation"29 of products liability scholars to justify ex-
panded manufacturer liability. Part II also illustrates the utility of the 
Products Liability Matrix by locating many of the landmark products 
liability cases within it. (Readers already familiar with the history of 
products liability may want to skip Part II, though they may find that 
examining classic cases in terms of the Products Liability Matrix offers 
some novel insights into an otherwise familiar area.) 
Having provided the necessary framework in Parts I and II, the 
article in Part III analyzes the current products liability debate by cri-
tiquing individual members of the contractarians' and regulators' 
camps. Part III first sets forth the contractarians' seemingly success-
ful rejection of the first generation's rationales for expanded manufac-
turer liability. Part III then uses the Products Liability Matrix to 
show how scholars in both the contractarians' and the regulators' 
camps have taken positions in one dimension of the Matrix that are in 
tension with the positions they take in the other dimension. Part III 
further explains why the current products liability debate is 
unsatisfying. 
Part IV provides an affirmative case for enterprise liability by artic-
28. See infra note 37 and accompanying text (defining enterprise liability). 
29. To give some sense of the short history of the scholarship, we refer to the most influential 
product scholars as belonging to one of two groups~ the first generation and the present genera-
tion. Although this dichotomy is broad and imperfect, the first generation of products liability 
scholars includes those whose influence peaked in the decade surrounding the promulgation of 
§ 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts - that is, from 1960 to 1970. These include schol-
ars such as Guido Calabresi, Fleming James, Jr., W. Page Keeton, Friedrich Kessler, William 
Prosser, and John Wade. See infra section H.B. Some refer to this group, perhaps disparagingly, 
as the founders or framers. See HUBER, supra note 8, at 73; George Priest, Modem Tort Law and 
Its Refonn, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. l, 5 (1987). The present generation consists of tort scholars 
whose influence in this area has peaked within the past five or ten years, including, among others, 
Richard Epstein, Peter Huber, William Landes and Richard Posner, George Priest, Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Alan Schwartz, Stephen Sugarman, and W. Kip Viscusi. See infra Part III. 
692 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:683 
u1ating the market failures that necessitate regu1ation. By offering new 
arguments on behalf of the old justifications for the expansion of man-
ufacturer liability, Part IV revives the legacy of the first generation, 
whose instincts Part IV argues were correct but whose arguments 
lacked economic sophistication and thus provided an easy target for 
the present generation of products liability scholars. 30 
I. INTRODUCING THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY MATRIX 
A. A Taxonomy of Product Accidents 
There are two broad categories of product-caused accidents: (1) 
preventable accidents, which can be cost-justifiably prevented through 
care-level investments31 and (2) unpreventable accidents, which are not 
preventable (as defined here).32 Further, there are two broad types of 
preventable accidents: (a) initially preventable accidents, which are 
preventable by manufacturers at least cost and (b) residually preventa-
ble accidents, which are preventable by consumers at least cost. Fi-
nally, secondarily preventable accidents comprise that subset of 
residually preventable accidents that are preventable by manufacturers 
(but not at least cost). 
B. A Taxonomy of Liability Rules 
Accident costs are necessarily borne by either manufacturers or 
consumers. 33 In general terms, there are four possible standards for 
allocating liability for those costs. Scholars and judges can thus be 
classified according to which liability standard among the four they 
prefer. The possibilities are: (1) absolute consumer liability; (2) negli-
gence; (3) "strict" liability; and (4) absolute manufacturer liability. As 
30. For complementary parts of this larger project, see Croley & Hanson, supra note 9; Cro-
ley & Hanson, supra note 4; Hanson & Logue, supra note 11. 
31. Legal economists agree that an efficient products liability regime would accomplish two 
economic goals. First, it would encourage parties to prevent all accidents that can be efficiently 
prevented: the dete"ence goal Second, it would efficiently allocate the risk of unprevented acci· 
dent costs: the insurance goal See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Clifford Winston, Economic Aspects of 
Liability Rules and Liability Insurance, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 16 (Robert 
E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988); Priest, supra note 9, at 1537. A liability regime can have 
two principal deterrent effects: the activity-level effect and the care-level effect. The activity-level 
effect is the change in the total costs of accidents resulting from a change in the frequency with 
which the parties engage in an activity, holding care levels constant. The care-level effect is the 
change in the costs of accidents resulting from a change in the amount of care taken by the 
parties, holding activity levels constant. 
32. We do not mean by unpreventable either that an accident could not be cost-justifiably 
prevented through activity-level investments or that the accident could not be prevented through 
care-level investments that are not cost-justifiable. 
33. That is, in the absence of social insurance schemes, which impose the costs on society as a 
whole. 
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none of these terms is self-defining, 34, a brief definition of each is 
necessary. 
Under absolute consumer liability, sometimes referred to as no lia-
bility, all of the costs of product accidents are borne by consumers, 
irrespective of manufacturers' behavior. 
Negligence, sometimes referred to as the Learned Hand Test, is the 
legal standard according to which a manufacturer is liable for injuries 
if and only if the manufacturer failed to exercise "due care," where 
due care requires taking all cost-justified care-level precautions that 
the manufacturer can take at least cost. Put differently, a negligence 
rule places liability on the defendant manufacturer if and only if the 
accident was initially preventable. The consumer bears losses result-
ing from accidents that are not initially preventable. 
Strict liability, or the reverse Learned Hand test, in contrast, places 
liability on the manufacturer for all but residually preventable 
accidents. 35 
Finally, under absolute manufacturer liability, all of the costs of 
product accidents are borne by manufacturers, irrespective of consum-
ers' behavior - that is, including residually preventable accidents.36 
Absolute manufacturer liability is thus the inversion of absolute con-
sumer liability, just as strict liability is the inversion of negligence. En-
terprise liability denotes a particular subspecies of absolute 
34. Indeed, several of the terms have been used to denote several different things. See, e.g., 
infra notes 35, 37. 
35. To legal economists, strict liability means that a defendant shall be liable for injuries 
caused by the defendant's behavior even when the defendant had met or exceeded some measure 
of due care and even when the plaintiff failed to exercise some measure of due care. Often, legal 
economists use this term interchangeably with absolute liability and enterprise liability. See, e.g., 
SHA VELL, supra note 9, at 4-32. The term has also been employed to mean that a manufacturer 
shall be liable for injuries resulting from product defects only if the manufacturer failed the test 
for any one of three types of defects - design defects, manufacturing defects, and inadequate 
warnings. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 369-70. Finally, strict liability is sometimes used to 
denote that a liability standard is immutable by contract. This article uses the term strict liability 
to denote a particular standard of liability, not immutability of a given liability standard by 
contract. Moreover, by holding consumers liable for residually preventable accidents, strict lia-
bility, as this article defines it, includes the equivalent of a contributory negligence defense. 
36. For simplicity, this article will ignore possible variations on these four rules. Little is lost 
in failing to consider a negligence rule that includes a defense of contributory negligence, or other 
such variations. As Landes and Posner have emphasized, there are no efficiency benefits to be 
had from adding the defense. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 73-77. The definitions of 
negligence and of strict liability are the two versions of Priest's general cost-benefit standard, 
which holds that "liability should be placed on the party for whom marginal prevention costs are 
lower, •.. as long as marginal prevention costs are lower than the marginal benefits of preven-
tion." George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY: PERSPEC-
TIVES AND POLICY 196-97 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988). The only difference 
between a negligence rule and a strict liability rule has to do with who pays for unpreventable 
accidents. Under negligence the consumer pays, whereas under strict liability the manufacturer 
pays. With both of these two possibilities represented, considering the general cost-benefit stan-
dard under additional names would needlessly complicate the analysis. 
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manufacturer liability - absolute manufacturer liability that is immu-
table by contract. 31 
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TABLE 1 
THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY MATRIX 
POSSIBLE LIABILITY REGIMES 
DEGREE OF MUTABILITY 
(Column 1) (Column 2) 
Default Mandatory 
--
(Row 1) (Box 1) (Box 2) 
Absolute 
---Consumer 
Liability 
(Row 2) (Box 3) (Box 4) 
Negligence 
(Row 3) (Box 5) (Box 6) 
Strict Liability 
(Row 4) (Box 7) (Box 8) 
Absolute 
---Manufacturer 
Liability 
37. Enterprise liability, like strict liability, carries different meanings in different contexts. See 
supra note 35. Legal economists typically use the term synonymously with absolute liability. 
See, e.g., CooTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 436; George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise 
Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 461, 505-19 (1985). Sometimes, however, courts use the term interchangeably with mar-
ket share liability. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal. 1980). Again, in 
this article enterprise liability denotes a special case of absolute manufacturer liability: immuta-
ble absolute manufacturer liability. 
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Each of the four liability standards can be either mutable by con-
tract or mandatory. Thus, as the Products Liability Matrix (Table 1) 
illustrates, there are eight possible products liability regimes. The 
eight regimes, represented by Boxes 1-8, include all possible combina-
tions of answers to the two questions that define its two dimensions: 
(1) Should the liability standard be mutable or immutable by contract 
- that is, should the relationship between manufacturer and con-
sumer be viewed as one in contract or as one in tort? - and (2) What 
should the liability standard be? 
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF PRODUCfS LIABILITY 
Over the past century, products liability has shifted from the 
northwest comer, Box 1, toward the southeast comer, Box 8, of the 
Products Liability Matrix. 38 That is, products liability ha8 moved 
from absolute consumer liability toward absolute manufacturer liabil-
ity and, at the same time, from contract to tort. The first generation of 
products scholars supported this movement, but, as explained below, 
the present generation widely criticizes it. Section II.A describes the 
most important stages of the movement. Section II.B explains the ar-
guments that motivated it. 
A. Moving Through the Matrix: The Classic Cases 
In products liability cases at the end of the nineteenth century, 
American courts recognized the "privity rule," which originated in the 
famous English case, Winterbottom v. Wright. 39 On August 8, 1840, 
Coachman Winterbottom boarded a royal mail coach to deliver mail 
from Hartford to Holyhead. On the way to Holyhead, the mail coach 
collapsed, injuring Winterbottom as he was thrown to the ground. He 
sought recovery in negligence for his injuries from defendant Wright, 
who had contracted with Winterbottom's employer, the Postmaster 
General, to keep the mail coaches in operating condition. 
According to the privity rule, the negligent supplier of a defective 
product was only liable to those with whom he had directly dealt in 
the supply contract. Lord Albinger, the judge in Winterbottom, rea-
soned thus: 
There is no privity of contract between [the plaintiff and the defendant]; 
and if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing 
38. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 4, at 1-6 (describing four stages of the "shift away from 
principles of contract and negligence, toward the principle of enterprise liability"). See generally 
WILLIAM KIMBLE & ROBERT o. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY chs. 1 & 2 (1979) (discussing 
development and theories of products liability). 
39. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). 
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along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might 
bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts 
as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outra-
geous consequences, as to which I can see no limit, would ensue.40 
Albinger's strong protection of manufacturers and service providers 
reflected a legal tradition that was to last throughout the Industrial 
Revolution, a tradition that Justice Holmes often receives credit for 
confirming in his famous Harvard lecture, in which he noted that 
"[t]he general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie 
where it falls."41 The privity rule protected manufacturers from the 
claims of injured consumers. Where the consumer was not in "privity 
of contract" with the manufacturer, the consumer could not recover 
from the manufacturer or service provider even when the manufac-
turer's negligence was directly and foreseeably the cause of injury.42 
Instead, consumer recovery was only available by virtue of express or 
implied warranties.43 
The Winterbottom court explicitly recognized the implication of 
the rule it articulated. Acknowledging that a rule that excluded man-
ufacturers from liability would mean consumers would have to bear 
accident costs, Lord Albinger wrote: "It is, no doubt, a hardship upon 
the plaintiff to be without a remedy, but by that consideration we 
ought not to be influenced."44 The products liability regime of a cen-
40. 10 M. & W. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405. 
41. o.w. HOLMES, JR., THE CoMMON LAW 94 (1881). Holmes also expressed an alterna-
tive view: "[T]he safest way to secure care is to throw the risk upon the person who decides what 
precautions shall be taken." Id. at 117. In a forthcoming book on Holmes, David Rosenberg 
provides a scholarly and provocative reinterpretation of Holmes' theory of tort law. DAVID 
ROSENBERG, HOLMES AND THE THEORY OF TORTS (forthcoming 1994). Rosenberg challenges 
the conventional wisdom that Holmes opposed strict liability and favored negligence. Rosenberg 
reviews the entire Holmesian corpus on tort law and concludes that Holmes actually favored 
strict liability - though, according to Rosenberg, Holmes would have required a showing of 
foreseeability as well as a showing of causation - and that Holmes was not motivated by the 
goal of subsidizing the industrial revolution. 
42. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TwERSKI, PRODUCI'S LIABILITY: 
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 12 (1987). 
43. See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 
645, 654-55 (1985); Priest, supra note 37, at 461; see also George L. Priest, Strict Products Liabil· 
ity: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2301 (1989): 
[L]egal requirements limited injured consumers to suits against retailers under the implied 
warranty of merchantability. Consumer suits against manufacturers were constrained either 
because the consumer was not in privity with the manufacturer or because the manufac-
turer's express warranty (the existence of which was typically sufficient to create privity) 
explicitly excluded coverage of consequential personal injury damages. 
Id. at 2305. There were also "notice" requirements constraining the ability of injured consumers 
to sue manufacturers. Id.; see EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REAsONING 
11-27 (1962). 
44. 10 M. & W. 109, 116, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842). Grant Gilmore later described 
historical contract theory: ''The theory seems to have been dedicated to the proposition that, 
ideally, no one should be liable to anyone for anything." GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF 
CoNTRAcr 14 (1974). 
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tury ago can thus be characterized as an absolute consumer liability 
standard mutable by contract (Box 1 of the Products Liability 
Matrix).45 
In 1916, Judge Cardozo mounted a landmark assault upon the 
privity rule. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 46 the New York 
Court of Appeals held Buick Motor Company liable for injuries to the 
plaintiff, MacPherson, whose car had collapsed because of defective 
wooden wheels.47 MacPherson had purchased his car from a dealer 
rather than directly from Buick. 
MacPherson was important in two respects. First, it dealt a serious 
blow to the privity rule by allowing a person other than the immediate 
purchaser to recover from a manufacturer.48 According to Cardozo, 
"[t]here is nothing anomalous in a rule which imposes upon A., who 
has contracted with B., a duty to C. and D. and others according as he 
knows or does not know that the subject-matter of the contract is in-
tended for their use."49 Second, it moved the liability standard away 
from absolute consumer liability toward negligence by significantly ex-
panding the application of the negligence standard beyond only those 
cases that involved "imminently dangerous" products. 50 
The new standard remained mutable by contract, however, at least 
as it applied to purchasers. Thus, MacPherson can be understood as 
simply a change in the liability standard. Before MacPherson, manu-
facturers were generally not liable for negligence unless they opted out 
of the liability standard by expressly assuming liability through prod-
uct warranties. After MacPherson, if manufacturers did not disclaim 
liability in their warranties, they could be liable for negligence. In 
Cardozo's words: "We have put aside the notion that the duty to safe-
guard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be fore-
seen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source 
of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in the 
45. We have found no examples of manufacturers contracting around that default. See also 
infra notes 183, 190 and accompanying text. 
46. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
47. 111 N.E. at 1051. 
48. 111 N.E. at 1053. 
49. 111 N.E. at 1054. 
50. 111 N.E. at 1052. Judge Cardozo cited a line of cases to which he offered MacPherson as 
an "extension": Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063 (N.Y. 1909); Devlin v. Smith, 
89 N.Y. 470 (1882); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). Those rulings had employed a 
negligence standard when the purchaser had been injured by an "imminently dangerous" prod-
uct. MacPherson held that the liability standard would not be limited to "imminently danger-
ous" products but applied whenever "the nature of a [product] is such that it is reasonably 
certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made." MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053 
(emphasis added). 
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law."S1 MacPherson thus shifted the products liability regime toward 
Box 3 of the Products Liability Matrix. 
ButMacPherson was only the beginning. In 1944, Justice Traynor 
prepared the way for a shift from Box 3 to Box 5 in his prescient 
concurrence in Esco/a v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. sz In that case, wait-
ress Gladys Escola was seriously injured when a bottle she was putting 
into a refrigerator exploded in her hand. The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Ms. Escola, based 
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. s3 Because defendant Coca-Cola 
Bottling Company had exclusive control of the object, and because the 
accident was "of such a nature that it ordinarily would not occur in 
the absence of negligence by the defendant,"54 the Court held that res 
ipsa loquitur was properly applied. 
Justice Traynor urged a different route. Citing MacPherson, ss and 
advocating its expansion, Traynor wrote: 
I believe the manufacturer's negligence should no longer be singled out 
as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover in cases like the present one. 
In my opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs 
an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market, 
knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect 
that causes injury to human beings. 56 
Justice Traynor argued in favor of "absolute"S7 liability - that is, of 
holding manufacturers of consumer goods "responsible for their qual-
51. 111 N.E. at 1053. 
52. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
53. The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself") did not 
mean that manufacturers would be liable for an accident regardless of whether they had taken 
due care. Rather, it meant that the victim did not have the burden of proving that the manufac-
turer had not taken due care. In effect, a product-caused injury was deemed to be prima facie 
evidence of negligence where negligence would have been difficult for the victim to prove, and the 
manufacturer had the burden of proving that there was no negligence. See generally HENDER· 
SON & TwERSKI, supra note 42, at 18; Fleming James, Jr., Proof of Breach in Negligence Cases, 
37 VA. L. REv. 179 (1951); Page Keeton, Products Liability - Proof of the Manufacturer's 
Negligence, 49 VA. L. REv. 675 (1963). Of course, when the manufacturer cannot cost-justifiably 
prove that it took due care, this doctrine is equivalent in effect to the absolute manufacturer 
liability standard. But, likewise, where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applied, proving 
that a manufacturer was negligent may be cost-prohibitive for an injured consumer - in which 
case the negligence standard is equivalent in effect to an absolute consumer liability standard. 
The question of who has the burden of proof is clearly very important (indeed, potentially out-
come-determinative), but it must be separated from the issue of what the underlying liability 
standard is. This article focuses on the latter. 
54. 150 P.2d at 438. 
55. 150 P.2d at 442 (Traynor, J., concurring) ("[MacPherson] paves the way for a standard of 
liability that would make the manufacturer guarantee the safety of his product even when there is 
no negligence."). 
56. 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
57. Traynor did not use absolute liability in the same way the term is used in this article. He 
explicitly excluded from the scope of manufacturer liability accidents that did not occur in the 
course of a product's "normal and proper use." 150 P.2d at 444 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
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ity regardless of negligence"58. - on the ground that public policy de-
manded it, inasmuch as consumers were uninformed of product 
risks. 59 Such responsibility was rooted in manufacturers' implied war-
ranty of fitness for proposed use and merchantable quality, a warranty 
not grounded in contract but rather implied by law.60 Thus, what 
Traynor was advocating was strict liability - a shift down into Row 
3. 61 But he was to wait another decade and a half. 
The shift Traynor called for came in 1960, in Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors. 62 Clause Henningsen bought a Chrysler Plymouth 
from dealer Bloomfield Motors as a Mother's Day present for his wife, 
Helen. Ten days later, while Helen Henningsen was driving her new 
Plymouth, something went wrong with the steering gear and the car 
made a sharp right turn into a wall, injuring her. The Henningsens 
sued and recovered both from Bloomfield Motors and from Chrysler. 
Whereas MacPherson had dealt privity a serious blow by allowing 
someone other than the immediate purchaser to recover against the 
manufacturer, Henningsen razed the privity of contract requirement 
altogether by allowing a direct buyer or subsequent purchaser to re-
cover from both the manufacturer and the dealer.63 But doing away 
with the privity requirement was only the second most important de-
velopment that Henningsen brought about. More important, the Hen-
ningsen court decided that an implied warranty of merchantability 
could not be contracted around by an express warranty that purported 
to override any other express or implied warranties. 64 The court re-
fused to enforce such a provision, stating that, with respect to "dis-
claimers or limitations of the obligations that normally attend a sale, it 
58. 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
59. See infra text accompanying note 90. 
60. See 150 P.2d at 442 (Traynor, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (''This warranty is not 
necessarily a contractual one, for public policy requires that the buyer be insured at the seller's 
expense against injury."). 
61. Traynor did not address whether Coca-Cola Bottling could contract around liability -
that is, whether the liability standard was mutable. 
62. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
63. 161 A.2d at 99-100; see also William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to 
the Consumer), SO MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966). Dean Prosser attributed "the fall of the citadel of 
privity" to Henningsen: 
[T]he date of the fall of the citadel of privity can be fixed with some certainty. It was May 
9, 1960, when the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced the decision in Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. The leaguer had been an epic one of more than fifty years. The 
sister fortress of negligence liability had fallen, after an equally prolonged defense, in 1916. 
Id. at 791. 
64. The purchase order Mr. Henningsen signed contained the following sentence: "It is ex-
pressly agreed that there are no warranties, express or limited, made by either the dealer or the 
manufacturer on the motor vehicle, chassis, [or] parts furnished hereunder except as follows." 
161 A.2d at 74. The sentence was in fine print. 161 A.2d at 74. 
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seems sufficient at this juncture to say that they are not favored. "65 
Thus, the liability standard allocating product risks was immutable -
a matter not of contract, but of tort. Because Chrysler's liability was 
strict, not dependent upon a showing of manufacturer negligence, 66 
Henningsen in effect moved products liability law to Box 6 of the 
Products Liability Matrix. 
A short time later, in 1963, Justice Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc. 61 confirmed the trend that he, Judge Cardozo, 
and the New Jersey Supreme Court had started.68 Greenman involved 
a suit against the manufacturer of a home power tool. In 1955 Wil-
liam Greenman received as a Christmas gift from his wife a "Shop-
smith" - a combination power tool that, with the proper 
attachments, could be used as a saw, drill, and wood lathe. In 1957, 
Mr. Greenman bought the attachments necessary to use the tool as a 
lathe. While he was working on a piece of wood with those attach-
ments, the wood flew out of the machine and hit him in the head, 
injuring him seriously, whereupon he brought suit against the retailer 
and the manufacturer, Yuba Power Co. Following a jury verdict 
against Yuba, the manufacturer appealed to the California Supreme 
Court. 
In an opinion by Justice Traynor, the California Supreme Court 
affirmed a jury verdict against both the retailer and the manufacturer . 
. Citing Esco/a, Henningsen, and a host of products liability cases in 
which he said strict liability had been extended beyond food products 
to apply to manufacturers of other consumer goods, Traynor stated 
that the court "need not recanvass the reasons for imposing strict lia-
bility on the manufacturer [because] [t]hey have been fully articulated 
in the [cited] cases."69 Beyond simply adopting strict liability as the 
65. 161 A.2d at 77-78. 
66. 161 A.2d at 77 ("Recovery of damages does not depend upon proof of negligence or 
knowledge of the defect."). 
67. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
68. Prosser later called Greenman, "along with the Henningsen case, one of the twin 
landmarks" of the strict liability revolution, Prosser, supra note 63, at 803, while Dean Wade 
called it the "leading case" imposing strict liability. John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Man-
ufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 9 (1965). 
69. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901. Shortly after Greenman, Justice Traynor explained more 
fully what he considered the bases for expanding manufacturer liability: (1) lack of consumer 
information about product defects, (2) loss spreading, and (3) the difficulty of determining which 
injuries are attributable to product defects. Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defec-
tive Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965). The third basis is equivalent to 
the justification used for the adoption of res ipsa loquitur. See supra note 53. That is, given the 
proof problems and the likelihood that the manufacturer was negligent anyway, to dispense with 
proof of defect by simply making the manufacturer liable is less costly overall. 
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applicable liability standard, Traynor further held that this standard 
was now immutable: 
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the 
theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer 
to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract be-
tween them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agree-
ment but imposed by law, and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to 
define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products make 
clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warran-
ties but by the law of strict liability in tort. Accordingly, rules defining 
and governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs of com-
mercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufac-
turer's liability to those injured by their defective products unless those 
rules also serve the purposes for which such liability is imposed. 70 
Whereas Henningsen marked the law's arrival at Box 6, Greenman 
anchored it there. 
Soon after Greenman, the American Law Institute (ALI) promul-
gated the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 71 Section 402A of the Second 
Restatement set forth the new strict liability doctrine. 72 Section 402A 
both reflected and reinforced changes that had been taking place on a 
somewhat piecemeal basis. 73 Although understanding the exact scope 
of section 402A has proved difficult, 74 the section can fairly be placed 
70. 377 P.2d at 901 (citations omitted); see also 377 P.2d at 901 ("Sales warranties serve ["to 
insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers 
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to 
protect themselves"] ••• fitfully at best."). 
71. The Second Restatement was published in 1965, two years after Greenman. As a member 
of the ALI, Justice Traynor likely had seen drafts of what was to come. 
72. § 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer. 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual 
relation with the seller. 
R.Es'l'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
73. But see Priest, supra note 37, at 512-17 (arguing that any changes were minor and vastly 
overstated by William Prosser, the Reporter for the Restatement, in order to convince members 
of the American Law Institute to adopt section 402A). 
74. See Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 
(1973) (arguing that § 402A provides a nebulous test); Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: 
The Case Against Comment k and/or Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853 (1983) (argu-
ing that the intent behind § 402A and its comments is unclear and should not be given dispositive 
weight in determining liability); Priest, supra note 37, at 521 (arguing that text of§ 402A decided 
few cases and that its explanatory comments proved vague); Dominick Vetri, Legislative Codifi-
cation of Strict Products Liability Law in Oregon, 59 OR. L. REv. 363, 366 (1981) ("To call 
section 402A ambiguous is almost too kind."). But cf. John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort 
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in Boxes 4 and 6 of the Products Liability Matrix. According to the 
express terms of 402A, a manufacturer of an unreasonably dangerous 
product will be held liable for injuries caused by its product whether 
or not the manufacturer was negligent - that is, even if "the seller has 
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct."75 Nevertheless, the fact that the product must be "unreasonably 
dangerous" or "defective" reveals that the product must meet some 
standard that, in effect, may be equivalent to holding the manufacturer 
to a negligence standard. 76 In any case, section 402A does not extend 
to Box 8 - absolute manufacturer liability. The rule articulated in 
section 402A was not meant to hold manufacturers liable for injuries 
from products that are well known to be dangerous, such as "good 
whiskey."77 Nor were manufacturers to be liable for injuries caused 
by products that are "unavoidably unsafe"78 or for injuries resulting 
from products posing dangerous risks where consumers are "warn[ed] 
against them. "79 
Indeed, while the classic cases such as Esco/a, Henningsen, and 
Greenman, as well as section 402A, did much to move manufacturer 
liability away from the absolute consumer liability regime of 
Winterbottom, the products liability revolution stopped well short of 
absolute liability.80 As Traynor explained in 1965: 
Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 830 (1973). Wade argues that what § 402A and its 
comments seek to convey with the terms "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" is that 
the product must be harmful or unsafe because of something wrong with it. The "something 
wrong" may have come about quite unintentionally because of a miscarriage in the manU· 
facturing process, so that the product was not what it was intended to be; it may, on the 
other hand, have come about, even though the product was exactly as it was intended to be, 
because of a poor design •••. 
Id. at 830. 
75. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
76. Cf. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 283 ("much of what is called strict products 
liability really is negligence liability"); Gary Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Lia· 
bility, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435 (1979) (apparently the first to clearly point out this similarity be· 
tween negligence and strict liability); see also Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 
(Or. 1974) (en bane). 
77. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965); see Continuation of Discus-
sion of the Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, 38 A.L.I. PROC. 87-88 (1961); Prosser, supra 
note 63, at 807-11 (explaining intent of drafters); Wade, supra note 74, at 830-31 (same). 
78. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
79. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965). 
80. Much of the expansion occurred not in the substantive standard but in the types of de· 
fects to which the standard was applied. Courts in the 1970s expanded the concept of defect to 
include, in addition to manufacturing defects, design and warning defects. See generally Priest, 
supra note 43. Note that insofar as courts hold some manufacturers liable for failure to provide 
adequate warning even where the product is not in a defective condition and even where the 
injured consumer was careless in handling the product, the liability standard can be character· 
ized as absolute liability that is mutable (Box 7). Manufacturers can contract out of liability by 
providing an adequate warning. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 222-31 (describing Landes 
and Posner's view of warnings as implied disclaimers). 
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It should be clear that the manufacturer is not an insurer for all inju-
ries caused by his products. A bottling company is liable for the injury 
caused by a decomposing mouse found in its bottle. It is not liable for 
whatever harm results to the consumer's teeth from the sugar in its bev-
erage. A knife manufacturer is not liable when the user cuts himself 
with one of its knives. When the injury is in no way attributable to a 
defect there is no basis for strict liability.81 
Dean Wade made the same basic observation: "Strict products liabil-
ity clearly does not require a perfectly safe product. A simple instru-
ment like a hammer, for example, will not infrequently smash a finger 
or thumb if used unskillfully. It could probably be designed to make 
this possibility less likely, but at the cost of impairing its usefulness."82 
In short, the early years of the products liability revolution moved the 
law from Box 1 to Boxes 4 and 6 without moving it all the way to Box 
8. 83 More recently, the expansion toward Box 8 has ceased. Indeed, 
81. Traynor, supra note 69, at 366-67. 
82. Wade, supra note 68, at 16 (footnote omitted). 
83. However, some more recent cases might be said to constitute the products liability 
revolution's last offensive, pushing the law yet closer to Row 4. Whereas Row 3 places liability 
upon consumers for residually preventable accidents, these cases hold manufacturers liable for 
injuries even where plaintiffs were determined to be contributorily negligent - that is, injuries 
from accidents that may have been residually preventable. 
McCown v. International Harvester Co., 342 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1975), is one example. In Mc-
Cown, the court disallowed a contributory negligence defense against a strict liability claim. Re-
lying on § 402A, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that manufacturers make better 
insurers of the costs of accidents, perhaps even residually preventable accidents: 
The strict liability of Section 402A is founded in part upon the beliefthat as between the 
sellers of products and those who use them, the former are the better able to bear the losses 
caused by defects in the products involved. This greater loss-bearing capacity is unrelated to 
negligence in the manufacture or marketing of products. Indeed, retail and wholesale sellers 
of chattels are themselves often in no position to discover or avoid defects in their inven-
tories, even by the exercise of a high degree of care. Thus, defendants in Section 402A 
actions are subjected to liability without fault. It is a proper corollary to this principle that 
the lesser loss-bearing capacity of product users exists independently of their negligence or lack 
ofit. 
342 A.2d at 383 (Pomeroy, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Applying this 
reasoning, the McCown court held International Harvester strictly liable for injuries caused by a 
"defectively" designed steering mechanism on the company's tractor, where plaintiff's negligent 
driving of his tractor into a guardrail caused the steering wheel to spin rapidly. The court re-
quired not simply that a product cause an injury but that a defective product cause it, though the 
court's use of the term is unclear. Thus, the McCown standard cannot necessarily be character-
ized as absolute manufacturer liability. Nevertheless, McCown is significant in that the court 
allocated to the manufacturer the costs of a product accident even though those costs might well 
have been residually preventable, in which case under the strict liability standard they should 
have been allocated to consumers. 
A few courts have similarly pushed the law toward, but not squarely into, Row 4 by holding 
manufacturers strictly liable for their products even where the accident might have been residu-
ally preventable. See, e.g., Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 171-72 (La. 1985) ("The 
contributory negligence defense would permit the manufacturer to breach his duty to manufac-
ture a reasonably safe product and escape liability simply because the fault of the user of the 
defective product contributed to the accident."); see also Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 
149 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying § 402A to disallow contributory negligence defense to strict liabil-
ity); Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1973) (finding contributory negligence 
not a bar to recovery from manufacturer under strict liability), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974); 
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there is evidence that the tide has turned - that, at the urging of 
contemporary scholars, courts have shifted the liability standard back 
toward negligence. 84 
Table 2 summarizes the evolution of products liability law by lo-
cating the discussed cases in the Products Liability Matrix. 
Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 471 A.2d 15 (N.J. 1984) (holding contributory negligence not 
a defense to strict liability action). These courts may simply be taking the position that, where an 
accident is preventable by both the consumer and the manufacturer and where the court cannot 
easily determine whether the accident was initially or residually preventable, the court will as-
sume that the accident was initially preventable. 
84. See, e.g., Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 5. 
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TABLE 2 
THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY MATRIX 
THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 
DEGREE OF MUTABILITY 
(Column 1) (Column 2) 
Default Mandatory 
--
(Row 1) (Box 1) (Box 2) 
Absolute 
---
Winterbottom (1842) 
Consumer 
L Liability 
I 
A 
B 
I (Row 2) (Box 3) (Box 4) 
L 
I Negligence MacPherson (1916) § 402A (1965) 
T 
y 
s (Row 3) . (Box 5) (Box 6) 
T 
A Strict Liability Escola (Traynor) (1944) 
N Henningsen (1960) 
D Greenman (1963) 
A § 402A (1965) 
R 
D 
(Row4) (Box 7) (Box 8) 
Absolute § 402A (1965) 
---Manufacturer 
Liability 
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Not surprisingly, shifts in the law brought about by cases such as 
Esco/a, Henningsen, and Greenman attracted considerable attention. 
For instance, the following appeared in 1963 in a national newspaper 
article: 
In earlier, simpler times when a man bought a horse he was apt to 
look at the animal's teeth, trot him around a field, and put his money on 
the barrel head, mindful of the age-old doctrine of caveat emptor, "let the 
buyer beware." If the horse proved to be a chronic stumbler and the 
owner was thrown and severely injured, well, too bad. The buyer should 
have discovered that for himself before closing the deal. 
Caveat emptor is far from dead, but since about 1915 the tide of the 
law has been shifting heavily toward protection of the buyer or "con-
sumer'' ... it's now the manufacturer who'd better beware if his prod-
ucts prove defective. He'll be sued - hard. 85 
As section II.B below discusses, the scholarly commentators of the 
Henningsen decade welcomed the trend toward caveat vendor: let the 
seller beware. 
To round out the history of products liability and, more impor-
tantly, to provide a backdrop for the current debate - for much of the 
current scholarship explicitly rejects the arguments that justified the 
movement through the Matrix86 - it is necessary to consider briefly 
the original justifications for expanded manufacturer liability. 
B. The First Generation's Case for Enterprise Liability 
The first generation of products liability judges and scholars be-
lieved that an immutable strict liability standard would overcome 
what they perceived as undesirable features of consumer product mar-
kets. Three principal justifications propelled the expansion of manu-
facturer liability outlined in the cases discussed above: imperfect 
consumer information, exploitative manufacturer market power, and 
risk distribution. 87 
85. The Suing Grows over Products that Are "Faulty," NATL. OBSERVER, Jan. 14, 1963, at 
21. 
86. See infra section 111.B.1. 
87. Because the first generation's arguments were, by the standards of contemporary eco· 
nomic analysis, overlapping and even muddled, it is possible to organize them in more than one 
way. Priest organizes the justifications for expanded manufacturer liability into three main cate-
gories partly different from those above. See Priest, supra note 37, at 520. Schwartz organizes 
the justifications for strict liability into six basic assumptions. See Alan Schwartz, The Case 
Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 819, 821-22 (1992). This section presents what we 
consider to be the three principal justifications for expanded manufacturer liability, justifications 
that capture most if not all of the first generation's specific arguments and at which the present 
generation has taken aim. 
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1. Imperfect Consumer Information 
The first generation justified the expansion of manufacturer liabil-
ity in part on the ground that consumers lacked information about, 
and systematically underestimated, product risks. Consumers lacked 
adequate information about product risks, the first generation be-
lieved, in part because manufacturers, whose incentive was to foster 
consumer "optimism,"88 actively misled them. 89 In Esco/a, for exam-
ple, Traynor justified strict liability partially on that ground: 
The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for 
himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a 
sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady 
efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and mar-
keting devices such as trade-marks.9° 
In the unregulated market, consumers lulled by manufacturers' ploys 
could not make well-informed purchasing decisions. 
The Henningsen court gave even greater emphasis to this aspect of 
consumer product markets: "[A] modem manufacturer ... not only 
processes [its product] and dresses it up so as to make it appear appe-
tizing, but he uses the newspapers, magazines, billboards, and the ra-
dio to build up the psychology to buy and consume his products."91 
Moreover: "Under modem conditions the ordinary layman, on re-
sponding to the importuning of colorful advertising, has neither the 
opportunity nor the capacity to inspect or to determine the fitness of 
an automobile for use; he must rely on the manufacturer who had 
control of its construction. " 92 Like Traynor, the Henningsen court be-
lieved both that consumers lacked the information required to make 
well-informed consumption choices and that manufacturers exacer-
bated the lack of information with advertising and marketing tech-
niques designed to lure consumers without informing them. 
88. "Optimistic" consumers systematically underestimate product risks and therefore de-
mand less insurance and product safety than they would if fully informed. See GUIDO CALA-
BRESI, THE Cosrs OF ACCIDENTS 56 (1970); Schwartz, supra note 87, at 827; Michael Spence, 
Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REv. EcoN. STUD. 561, 
563 (1977). 
89. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161A.2d69, 77, 83-84 (N.J. 1960); William L. Pros-
ser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1123 
(1960); W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 
12 (1974) (arguing that standardized contracts are instruments of fraud). 
90. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring). 
91. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 82; see also 161 A.2d at 84 ("Judicial notice may be taken of the 
fact that automobile manufacturers, including Chrysler Corporation, undertake large scale ad-
vertising programs over television, radio, in newspapers, magazines and all media of communica-
tion in order to persuade the public to buy their products."); 161 A.2d at 73-74 (noting small 
print used for parts of purchase order executed by Claus Henningsen). 
92. 161 A.2d at 83. 
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Holding manufacturers liable for product injuries would solve this 
information problem, the first generation thought, by forcing manu-
facturers to provide greater safety and to be more forthcoming about 
product risks. Because manufacturers would have to pay for accidents 
caused by their defective products, manufacturers would be unable to 
profit from consumer ignorance. Consequently, uninformed consum-
ers forced to "rely on the manufacturer'' to make all cost-justified 
safety investments in the design and construction of its products 
would receive the benefit of safer products. 
2. Exploitative Manufacturer Market Power 
Manufacturers' seemingly overwhelming market power over con-
sumers provided the second principal justification for expanded manu-
facturer liability. Because "adhesive" contracts accompanied 
consumer products,93 the first generation believed that manufacturers 
exploited consumers by writing contract (warranty or disclaimer) pro-
visions that were unfavorable to consumers and by disclaiming liabil-
ity for inefficiently unsafe products.94 
According to Professor Priest, the ascent of the theory of exploita-
tive contracts is attributable almost exclusively to the scholarship of 
Friedrich Kessler. In his classic "Contract of Adhesion" article,95 
Kessler indicted the increasingly widespread use of standardized 
contracts: 
Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong bargain-
ing power. The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is fre-
quently not in a position to shop around for better terms, either because 
the author of the standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) 
or because all competitors use the same clauses. His contractual inten-
tion is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the 
stronger party, terms whose consequences are often understood only in a 
vague way, if at all. Thus, standardized contracts are frequently con-
tracts of adhesion . . . . 96 
Although Kessler did not address products liability specifically, the 
93. Kessler used the term adhesive contracts in his famous article. See Friedrich Kessler, 
Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REV. 629 
(1943). He credited Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. 
REv. 198, 222 (1919), with the introduction of the term into the legal vocabulary. See Kessler, 
supra, at 632 n.11. · 
94. See Priest, supra note 12, at 1297 (''The view of the warranty as an exploitative device 
has provided crucial support to the policy of enterprise liability and the replacement of contract 
principles with tort principles in product defect cases."); id. at 1302-03 n.37 (citing authorities); 
see also Schwartz, supra note 87, at 821-22. 
95. Kessler, supra note 93. 
96. Id. at 632; see also id. at 640 ("Freedom of contract enables enterprisers to legislate by 
contract ...• "). 
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first generation of products liability scholars and judges found Kess-
ler's arguments relevant and persuasive. Priest explains: 
[T]his narrative of Kessler's had tremendous influence on the success of 
enterprise liability. The narrative persuaded the courts that the nine-
teenth-century notion of independent and equal merchants had disap-
peared and had been replaced by a twentieth-century notion of product 
consumers who, because lacking in bargaining power, are uninformed, 
unable to influence manufacturer behavior, and thus totally dependent 
on courts for protection. It follows directly that nineteenth-century con-
tract law must also be replaced with law more responsive to modem 
problems. 97 
Replacing outdated contract law was precisely what Kessler pre-
scribed, and precisely what the first generation aimed to do.98 
The Henningsen court, perhaps more than any other, emphasized 
the problem of consumer powerlessness. In an opinion epitomizing 
the first generation's perception of manufacturer market power, the 
Henningsen court observed: 
The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of parties who 
are brought together by the play of the market, and who meet each other 
on a footing of approximate economic equality. In such a society there is 
no danger that freedom of contract will be a threat to the social order as 
a whole. But in present-day commercial life the standardized mass con-
tract has appeared. It is used primarily by enterprises with strong bar-
gaining power and position.99 
As Priest points out, the Henningsen court "cites Kessler extensively 
and excerpts large sections from Kessler's ... work,"100 including his 
"Contracts of Adhesion" article.101 Borrowing from Kessler and ap- . 
97. Priest, supra note 37, at 494-95. 
98. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) ("[The] 
rules defining and governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs of commercial 
transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability to those injured by 
their defective products • • • . "). 
99. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960). For a variation of this 
story that contemplates collusion on the part of manufacturers, see 161 A.2d at 87 ("Because 
there is no competition among the motor vehicle manufacturers with respect to the scope of 
protection guaranteed to the buyer, there is no incentive on their part to stimulate good will in 
th[e] field of public relations."). 
100. Priest, supra note 37, at 509. 
101. Kessler, supra note 93; see Priest, supra note 37, at 509. Others have noted Kessler's 
influence. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Products Liability Law, 
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2193 (1980): . 
Heavily influenced by the "contract of adhesion" writing that dominated academic circles in 
the 1940s and 1950s, Henningsen concluded that private limitations on warranties served no 
useful social purpose, and were therefore an attempt by manufacturers to distance them-
selves from the harmful consequences of the defective products they had placed into the 
stream of commerce. 
Id. at 2200-01 (footnote omitted). 
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pealing to "instinct,"102 the Henningsen court painted a picture of 
"gross inequality of bargaining position" between consumers and 
manufacturers.103 
Here again, the first generation believed that increased manufac-
turer liability provided the solution. By moving out of the mutable 
dimension of products liability, manufacturers would no longer be able 
to exploit consumers by adding contract terms to product warranties 
that insulated them from liability. Nor could manufacturers simply 
disclaim liability for accidents caused by products that consumers de-
manded. Rather, the first generation thought that immutable strict 
liability would, in effect, put consumers on a bargaining par with man-
ufacturers by prohibiting allocations of product risks to which only 
parties in inferior bargaining positions would agree. 
3. Risk Distribution 
The first generation also believed that leaving the burden of prod-
uct accidents concentrated on the few unlucky consumers who hap-
pened to suffer product-caused accidents was both unfair and 
inefficient.104 Accordingly, as contemporary products liability schol-
ars have observed, judges and scholars sought instead to spread those 
burdens across all consumers.105 
102. See Henningsen. 161 A.2d at 85 ("The language gave little and withdrew much •••• An 
instinctively felt sense of justice cries out against such a sharp bargain."). 
103. 161 A.2d at 87; see also 161 A.2ci at 95 ("grossly disproportionate bargaining power"), 
104. Whereas imperfect consumer information and manufacturer market power fit easily into 
the category of classic market failures, the absence of manufacturer-provided insurance against 
product accidents is not itself a market failure. Rather, the first generation more accurately 
characterized it as a possible symptom of the other two market failures: because ignorant con-
sumers did not know to demand it, and exploitative manufacturers would not voluntarily supply 
it, manufacturer-provided insurance against product accidents was nonexistent. The absence of 
such insurance, therefore, evidenced the magnitude of the other market failures and, hence, the 
need for strict liability. As revealed by their heavy reliance on risk distribution concerns, see 
infra note 106 and accompanying text, the first generation apparently could not imagine that 
well-informed consumers and well-behaved manufacturers would exclude insurance for product 
injuries from their warranties, especially given that first-party health insurance was less common 
at the dawn of the strict liability revolution than it is today. See Priest, supra note 37, at 478, 
479. 
105. The first generation simply assumed that manufacturers were almost always in a supe-
rior position to take precautions, see generally Priest, supra note 37, so that distributing risks to 
them would have the benefit not only of avoiding concentrated risks but also of c;reating incen-
tives for manufacturers to reduce accidents. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 
436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring): 
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed 
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective 
products that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some 
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. 
150 P.2d at 440-41. Manufacturers would prevent preventable accidents rather than raise their 
prices - and lose consumers - to cover the costs of inefficient damages. Although the assump-
tion has not been completely discredited, see Schwartz, supra note 87, at 827 ("Manufacturers 
often, but not always, have a comparative advantage at producing safety."), the first generation's 
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Professor Priest, for example, attributes the expansion of manufac-
turer liability in large part to the first generation's attempt to dis-
tribute risks. 106 According to Priest, what Kessler did for the theory 
of exploitative contracts, Fleming James did for the theory of risk dis-
tribution:107 "James promoted one principle - risk distribution -
above all others. . . . [H]e devised a program of research that, over 
time, came to exert a cumulative influence on tort law thinking that 
made the risk distribution principle central to the enterprise liability 
synthesis of the mid-1960s."108 James' influence, according to Priest, 
was remarkable.109 
Traynor's Esco/a concurrence, which Priest characterizes as "the 
most prominent antecedent of our modem regime,"110 captures the 
first generation's heavy reliance on risk distribution. Traynor wrote: 
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet 
its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health 
may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a need-
less one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and 
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. . . . Against 
such a risk there should be general and constant protection and the man-
ufacturer is best situated to afford such protection. 111 
In Greenman, Traynor, citing James, again justified the shift to strict 
liability on risk-distribution grounds. "The purpose of [strict] liability 
is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products 
are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market 
strong version of it downplayed the theoretical possibility that such a regime would leave con-
sumers with suboptimal incentives to prevent residually preventable accidents, because consum-
ers have less incentive to prevent accidents under strict liability than they did under the previous 
negligence regime. See CooTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 367; SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 5-32. 
106. Others also associate expanded manufacturer liability with the acceptance of the risk 
distribution theory. Professor Alan Schwartz explains that the propositions that "[u]tility is in-
creased if a concentrated loss is removed from one person and spread broadly over a universe of 
persons" and "[c]onsumers prefer to insure with product manufacturers rather than with market 
insurers" justify the adoption of strict liability. Schwartz, supra note 87, at 821. 
107. See generally Priest, supra note 37, at 469-83. Priest's central claim is that the modern 
regime is a product of Fleming James, Friedrich Kessler, and William Prosser. See Priest, supra 
note 37, at 464-65. For criticism of Priest's account, see David G. Owen, The Intellectual Devel-
opment of Modem Products Liability Law: A Comment on Priest's View of the Cathedral's Foun-
dations, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 529, 531 (1985) ("My guess is ... that Henningsen, Greenman, and 
§ 402A would have come to pass in any event, had James and Kessler never written a word 
.... "). 
108. Priest, supra note 37, at 470. 
109. Priest explains: "James's principal influence ..• was the increasing acceptance in legal 
scholarship of the relevance of risk distribution to the accident problem, the result of his unceas-
ing advocacy. . . • As the years progressed .•. risk distribution advanced to become a central 
consideration in the large majority of articles ••.. " Priest, supra note 37, at 480. 
110. Id. at 498. 
111. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring). 
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rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect them-
selves."112 The court in Henningsen reasoned similarly.113 
Applying elementary insurance principles, the first generation rea-
soned that manufacturers should be strictly liable for the costs of 
product injuries. Holding manufacturers liable for the cost of acci-
dents, they argued, would force manufacturers to spread accident 
costs thinly across the entire population of consumers, where costs 
could be borne more easily. In this way, manufacturer liability pro-
vided a form of insurance not otherwise available to many 
consumers.114 
Together, imperfect consumer information, exploitative manufac-
turer market power, and risk distribution went far to legitimate the 
shift toward enterprise liability. As Priest explains: 
The true foundation for the strict liability standard was ... the accumu-
lated effect of thirty years of scholarship that had created a consensus 
about the relatively inferior bargaining power of consumers, the impor-
tance of [overcoming the problem of imperfect information by] internal-
izing costs to manufacturers, and the benefits of spreading risks broadly 
through manufacturer insurance. These propositions at the time were 
uncontroversial, and enterprise liability follows inescapably from 
them.115 
Several others among the present generation of products scholars also 
have recognized that the inevitable conclusion of the first generation's 
premises was expanded manufacturer liability.116 The problem, many 
now argue, is that those premises were false. Many of the present gen-
eration of product scholars argue, in other words, that the first genera-
tion's arguments were valid but not sound. Part III turns to the 
contractarians' rebuttal. 
112. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (citing, inter nlia, 
2 FOWLER V. liARPER&F'LEMINGJAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS§§ 28.15-28.16, at 1569-74 
(1956)). 
113. "[The consumer] has the least individual ability to bear the[] disastrous consequences 
[of product failure]." Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 87 (N.J. 1960) (quoting 
LAWRENCE VOLD, THE LAW OF SALES 447 (2d ed. 1959)). 
114. See Priest, supra note 37, at 478-80. 
115. Id. at 517. As comment c of section 402A makes clear, the ALi's preference for the 
expanded standard was motivated by all three of these considerations. In language almost echo-
ing Traynor, the drafters of section 402A explained that 
the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for 
which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; 
that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products •• , be 
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that 
the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of 
someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products. 
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965). 
116. See infra note 353 and accompanying text. 
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Ill. THE CURRENT PRODUCTS LIABILITY DEBATE 
Using the foundation provided in Parts I and II, this Part critically 
analyzes the current products liability debate. Section III.A sets forth 
the contractarians' arguments that the current products liability re-
gime, like the "first generation" of products liability scholarship that 
helped create it, is based on a set of false assumptions. Section III.B 
shows how the positions that contractarians take on one dimension of 
the Products Liability Matrix do not square with the positions they 
take on the other. Section 111.C scrutinizes the arguments proffered 
by the regulators. It shows that the regulators at times seem dubious 
of their central assumption that markets fail, calling into question 
their justification for regulation in the first place. Finally, section 
111.D steps back to consider the debate taken as a whole, and con-
cludes that, owing to uncertainty about whether and how consumer 
product markets fail, the debate has been largely unilluminating. 
A. Introduction to the Debate: The Consumer Sovereignty Norm 
Legal economists presently engaged in the products liability debate 
all seem to adopt, in one form or another, the "consumer sovereignty 
norm," which holds "that the law should reflect the preferences of 
competent, informed consumers regarding risk allocation."117 The 
preferences of informed, competent consumers cannot be assessed in a 
laboratory, however, so legal economists have relied on either or both 
of two imperfect methods. Some scholars have observed real-world 
markets where consumers are thought to reveal their preferences. Un-
fortunately, this method requires data that are often unavailable and, 
moreover, depends on there being no significant market imperfections 
that might distort the market and, in effect, conceal consumer prefer-
ences. Alternatively, some legal economists have turned to theoretical 
models, which can be helpful in predicting consumer behavior under 
117. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 355; see also w. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCI'S LIA-
BILITY 2 (1991) ("Ideally, the social value pl!lced on risk reductions should reflect the value of 
these improvements to those who will be protected.''); id. at 66 ("The purpose of products liabil-
ity is to fill the gaps left by market imperfections and to replicate the incentives that would have 
been generated had markets been functioning perfectly.''); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 89-
91; Priest, supra note 29, at 6 ("tort liability can enhance consumer welfare if it is directed in an 
informed manner''); Session One: Discussion of Paper by Richard Epstein, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 
2227, 2238 (1989) (lawmakers should "figure out what people do in ordinary commerce and 
imitate it") (statement of Richard Epstein) [hereinafter Session One]. A majoritarian view seems 
implicit: to the extent that the preferences of informed consumer regarding risk allocation may 
vary, a possibility that none of these scholars considers, scholars would probably want a rule that 
appealed to the broadest number of such consumers. Cf Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of 
Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 607-08 (1990) (justifying 
majoritarian versus individualized default rules). 
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different conditions.118 Under either or both methods, scholars em-
ploy the consumer sovereignty norm to locate what they believe to be 
the optimal liability standard - the standard that competent, in-
formed consumers would most prefer. On that issue, as discussed be-
low, scholars have reached a variety of conclusions. But, as Professor 
Richard Epstein has observed, "[f]or a wide range of products, the 
larger battle is not over [liability standards] but over the right to con-
tract out of them."119 In this larger battle, scholars divide into two 
main camps: the contractarians and the regulators. 
The contractarians believe that there are no significant impedi-
ments to optimal contracting between consumers and manufacturers 
in product markets. 120 That view implies that the products liability 
standard should be mutable - in other words, products liability law 
should be treated more like contract law and less like tort law. Ep-
stein's view epitomizes the contractarians' position: 
The modem faith in regulation should not ... be allowed to obscure 
the strong impact of market incentives. Each firm when acting in its 
own self-interest will improve safety levels even in the absence of expo-
sure to products liability suits. . . . Complacent firms run the risk of 
displacement and bankruptcy at the hands of competitors who provide 
better and safer products to their customers. . . . Individual parties, 
firms, and unions all have sufficient competence that it is unlikely that 
they will patiently tolerate institutional arrangements that do not mini-
mize the various costs associated with product-related accidents.121 
Expressly challenging those who would regulate the allocation of 
product risks, the contractarians counsel reliance on market forces to 
satisfy the consumer sovereignty norm. 
The regulators, in contrast, are skeptical of the market's ability to 
satisfy the deterrence and insurance goals of products liability law. 
Thus, they imply that consumer product markets should be regulated 
- whether by tort or other regulatory institutions. While these legal 
118. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 12, at 1307-08 (developing theory of warranties by imagin-
ing "that all products are manufactured under conditions of perfect competition, so that each 
characteristic of a product - including warranty terms - serves to optimize the welfare of some 
dominant class of consumers," and then asking, "What would be the terms of product warran-
ties?"); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 356. See generally Jason S. Johnston, Law, Economics, and 
Post-Realist Explanation, 24 LAW & SocY. REV. 1217, 1228-29 (1990) (book review) (describing 
the "model of precautions" which most legal economists adopt in some form). 
119. Epstein, supra note 101, at 2204. A very similar debate is taking place in corporate law. 
See Black, supra note 15, at 543 ("A central debate in corporate law concerns whether virtually 
all of corporate law should be waivable by contract among the relevant parties, or whether some 
rules should be nonwaivable, and if so, which ones."); id. at 549-50 (describing the various views 
taken by corporate law scholars). 
120. See infra section III.B.1. 
121. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 89-90. 
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economists generally might prefer freedom of contract, 122 they make 
an exception in this context because they believe that one or more im-
perfections in consumer product markets render consumer-manufac-
turer contracts inefficient.123 That is, the regulators' position rests on 
the assumption that an unfettered market generates avoidable ineffi-
ciencies and thus does not satisfy the consumer sovereignty norm. 
They therefore seek to regulate the allocation of product risks by one 
or both of two means - common law liability rules and public law 
administrative regulations.124 
Influential representatives from these two main camps are consid-
ered in tum. 
B. The Contractarians: Faith in Market Forces 
1. The Counte"evolution 
To endorse freedom of contract, the contractarians have had to 
explain why none of the original arguments justifying the trend toward 
enterprise liability withstand close scrutiny. In light of the first gener-
ation's endorsements of the common law developments highlighted in 
Part II, scholars advocating a return to contract often complain that 
the tide against them seems irreversible. As Professor Schwartz ex-
plains, "complete reversion to a regime of freedom of contract for 
product-related risks may be a reform that history has foreclosed." 125 
Professor Epstein laments: "Contractual freedom is dead ... " 126 
Peter Huber adds: "There [is] no doubt whatever about that. The 
122. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Im-
perfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 635 (1979). 
123. See infra section 111.C.1. 
124. That is, the label regulators denotes not only those scholars who favor executive-branch 
regulation, but also those who favor common law governance of product risk allocation. See 
POSNER, supra note 10: 
[Market failures] are conventionally viewed as failures of the market's self-regulatory mech-
anisms and therefore as appropriate occasions for public regulation. But this way oflooking 
at the matter is misleading. The failure is ordinarily a failure of the market and of the rules 
of the market prescribed by the common law. Pollution, for example, would not be consid-
ered a serious problem if the common law remedies, such as nuisance and trespass, were 
efficient methods of minimizing the costs of pollution. The choice is rarely between a free 
market and public regulation. It is between two methods of public control - the common 
law system of privately enforced rights and the administrative system of direct public con-
trol - and should depend upon a weighing of their strengths and weaknesses in particular 
contexts. 
Id. at 343; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Role of the Legal System in Responses to Public 
Risk, 119 DAEDALUS 229 (1991); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Ton Law as a 
Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 417 (1984); Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, Ton Law i'n the Regulatory State, in TORT LA w AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 
supra note 14 (all stating that private law and public law are alternative means of regulation); 
Schwartz, supra note 7, at 384 (using word "regulation" to include what courts and juries do). 
125. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 356. 
126. Epstein, supra note 101, at 2221; cf. HENDERSON & TwERSKI, supra note 42, at 109 
716 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:683 
register of its burial [was] signed by the clergyman, the clerk, the un-
dertaker, and the chief mourner. In matters touching on health and 
safety, contract [is] dead as a doornail."127 Finally, Professor Priest 
states: ' 
This is the hardest problem for products liability now. It is going to 
require another revolution to come even close to market-oriented ideas. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that in most of these cases courts pre-
sume consumers are powerless to avoid the injury, powerless to choose 
the product, powerless even to appreciate what the risks are in advance. 
It is a profoundly antimarket, antifreedom approach. It really has to be 
overturned, but it will be very difficult to convince the courts.128 
These scholars overstate their obstacles. The products liability 
literature now contains a barrage of powerful criticisms of the first 
generation's arguments. By debunking the original justifications for 
strict liability,129 contractarian reformers have acquired tremendous 
momentum. As one commentator observes: "[T]he critics of enter-
prise liability have turned the system's own premises against it. Tort 
law's new paradigm of social welfare has been turned into an indict-
ment of tort law and a justification for abandoning the system."130 In 
short, we appear to be on the verge of a counterrevolution in products 
liability if we are not already in the midst of one.131 
a. Imperfect consumer information. Some scholars now doubt 
that consumers systematically underestimate product risks. 132 Indeed, 
("[I]t would appear that for all practical purposes the disclaimer is a dead letter as a defense to a 
personal injury claim."). 
127. Peter Huber, Flypaper Contracts and the Genesis of Modem Tort, 10 CARDOZO L. Rllv. 
2263, 2285 (1989). 
128. Session Three: Discussion of Paper by George L. Priest, 10 CARDOZO L. Rllv. 2329, 2337 
(1989) (statement of George L. Priest) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Session Three]. 
129. See id. at 2330 ("My ambition ••• is not purely to get the record straight. I hope to 
delegitimate the regime by showing the mundane sources of the revolution. The revolution owed 
its origin to ideas that ought to be reconsidered. We [sh]ould reanalyze the principles, doctrines, 
and empirical assumptions that propelled the reformers.") (statement of George L. Priest). 
130. Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. 
Rllv. 184, 189 (1987); see also George L. Priest, The Best Evidence of the Effect of Products 
Liability Law on the Accident Rate: Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1386 (1982): 
Upon closer view, a flat world becomes round, and the Martian canals are shown to be 
illusions. [The first generation's] ideas have dominated our thinking about contractual rela-
tions ••• between manufacturer and consumer, and have transformed the law of products 
liability. Unfortunately, the suppositions upon which their ideas are based are unsupported 
by the evidence. The time has come for a new view of the world. 
Id. at 1400 (footnote omitted); supra note 5 (outlining judicial and legislative efforts to return to 
more traditional products liability doctrines). 
131. See supra note 5 (describing reform efforts). See generally Henderson & Eisenberg, 
supra note 5; Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modem 
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. Rllv. 601 (1992); Theresa M. Schwartz, Product Liability Reform 
by the Judiciary, 27 GoNz. L. Rllv. 303 (1991-1992). 
132. Cf. Priest, supra note 12, at 1298 ("However plausible this assumption as a general 
matter, consumer perceptions are very difficult to identify or to measure. A!; a consequence, 
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' 
Epstein characterizes the imperfect-information argument as 
"flawed," "badly misguided," and "wholly misguided."133 Schwartz' 
critique134 of this once uncontroversial claim - the most complete 
and probably the most influential - charges that it lacks both empiri-
cal and theoretical support. Schwartz concedes that some consumer 
misperception of product risks is inevitable, but he denies that that 
fact justifies interfering with the market. In his view, "[t]he evidence 
fails to show that consumers misperceive risk levels to the extent that 
undesirable equilibria exist."135 Schwartz finds it intuitively plausible 
that consumers would wrongly estimate the expected costs of product-
caused injuries, but not systematically. Individual estimates should be 
distributed normally about the true expected costs.136 According to 
Schwartz, if consumer estimates are unbiased in this way, manufactur-
ers will behave as if all consumers are perfectly informed. That is, 
product and warranty quality will reflect the demand of the average 
consumer, who, by hypothesis, adds the appropriate risk premium to 
the product price. Furthermore, Schwartz and Wilde argue also that, 
even if the costs of information lead many consumers to ignore the 
terms in product warranties, so long as a critical mass of consumers -
perhaps as few as thirty percent - is well informed, manufacturers 
will behave as though all consumers are well informed.137 In essence, 
the investments of consumers who shop for warranties create a posi-
tive extemality for other, not-so-well-informed consumers.138 Conse-
quently, all consumers enjoy efficient warranties and optimally safe 
products. 
b. Exploitative market power. Schwartz and Wilde have, on theo-
retical grounds, also challenged the assumption that manufacturers 
would exercise market power over consumers by reducing the quality 
of their products or warranties.139 Their basic argument is easily illus-
trated. Suppose Acme Incorporated is the only manufacturer of wid-
gets and that, until today, widgets had sold for $100 apiece and had 
hypotheses concerning the relationship between perceptions and specific warranty provisions are 
highly speculative and essentially nonfalsifiable."). 
133. Epstein, supra note 101, at 2204. 
134. See generally Schwartz, supra note 7, at 374-84. 
135. Id. at 379. 
136. Id. at 375; Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Reme-
dies. 100 YALE L.J. 369, 394 (1990) ("[T]here is no reason to think that promisee errors are 
systematically high or low."). 
137. See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for 
Contract Terms: The Examples of Wa"anties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1402-
20 (1983). Professor Priest has made a similar argument. See infra text accompanying note 408. 
138. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 137, at 1416-19. 
139. Id. at 1402-20. 
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cost Acme $50 apiece to manufacture.140 Suppose further that today 
Acme discovered a safety device that could save the consumer $50 in 
expected accident costs per widget and that would cost Acme Incorpo-
rated only $20 per widget to produce.141 The Henningsen court would 
have presumed that Acme - monopolist that it is - would not install 
the safety device even though doing so could yield a net savings to 
consumers of $30 per widget. But Schwartz and Wilde point out that 
this presumption has no economic basis. Acme could increase its prof-
its by installing the device for any amount between the $20 cost and 
the $50 consumers are willing to pay. The $30 difference represents 
the range of potential bargains. Market power affects only the fraction 
of that $30 that Acme keeps as profit. For instance, if Acme can keep 
half, then widgets would cost $70 to produce and would sell for 
$135.142 Acme's net profit per widget would increase from $50 to $65. 
Hence, regardless of market power, if Acme is a rational profit maxi-
mizer, Acme will install the safety device. Precisely the same reason-
ing explains why manufacturers. with market power would provide 
optimal warranties. Schwartz explains: 
The question facing a firm is whether it will do better - maximize prof-
its - by selling the contract clauses consumers want at excessive prices, 
or by selling clauses that consumers do not want at excessive prices. If 
consumers have a noticeable preference for a particular clause - in eco-
nomic terms, have a significant willingness to pay - firms will do better, 
other things being equal, by satisfying this preference: the greater each 
consumer's willingness to pay, the fewer consumers each firm needs to 
recover costs and make profits. On the other hand, if the cost to a firm 
of supplying a particular clause is high in relation to consumers' willing-
ness to pay for it, the clause may not be supplied. . . . Therefore, the 
likely response of firms to a lack of consumer shopping is to offer con-
sumers the contract clauses they prefer, though at excessive prices. 143 
Accordingly, all contract terms, with the exception of price, should be 
efficient even when the manufacturer has significant market power. 
Priest provides empirical support for Schwartz' theoretical argu-
140. That is, Acme enjoyed $50 in monopoly profits per Widget sold. 
141. To keep things simple, the example assumes that consumers are risk-neutral. 
142. This might be the case, for example, if a price of $136 or more would attract other 
manufacturers into the widget market. 
143. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 373; see also Priest, supra note 12: 
· A principal weakness of the exploitation theory is that it provides no theoretical link 
between market power and product warranty terms. Why would a firm with market power 
maximize its returns by offering one-sided warranty terms rather than by manufacturing 
shoddy goods or by charging a monopoly price? Generally, monopoly profits are maxi· 
mized by selling a product identical in all respects (except price) to the product offered 
under competition. Thus, in theory, a monopolist (or a group of conspiring firms) will gain 
the greatest return by offering the consumer an optimal warranty, but at a price that exceeds 
marginal costs. 
Id. at 1321 (footnote omitted). 
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ment. Priest argues that, as an empirical matter, product warranties 
are not exploitative.144 The first generation's "exploitation theory," as 
it has come to be called, predicts "that manufacturers will limit their 
legal obligations to consumers as much as possible."145 Priest argues 
that the evidence instead is consistent with his "investment theory" of 
warranties. According to the investment theory, "[a] warranty is ... a 
contract that optimizes the productive services of goods by allocating 
responsibility between a manufacturer and consumer for investments 
to prolong the useful life of a product and to insure against product 
losses."146 The theory predicts that "the terms of warranty contracts 
are determined solely by the relative cost to the parties of these invest-
ments."147 Although Priest tested his theory against warranty provi-
sions involving only the risk of product failure, he maintains that his 
conclusions would apply equally to provisions involving the risk of 
personal injury.148 Most legal economists who have addressed the is-
sue agree.149 Moreover, others have demonstrated that the same types 
of warranty provisions that the first generation deemed exploitative of 
consumers are commonly found in contracts between equally sized 
commercial entities.150 It seems difficult to imagine that Firestone is 
exploiting General Motors. 
c. Risk distribution. The contractarians now argue that volun-
tary manufacturer-provided insurance against the risks of product-
caused personal injuries has been unavailable because, very simply, it 
is inefficient. According to this view, fully informed consumers do not 
demand insurance against pecuniary losses, especially in light of the 
fact that first-party health, life, and disability insurance is widely avail-
able and comparatively inexpensive to administer; and fully informed 
consumers do not demand nonpecuniary loss insurance as revealed by 
144. See Priest, supra note 130; Priest, supra note 12. 
145. Priest, supra note 12, at 1301. 
146. Id. at 1298. 
147. Id. For further description of the investment theory of warranties, see infra text accom-
panying notes 187-90; see also infra section IV.B.2 (arguing that tlie investment theory does not 
necessarily imply that warranties are not exploitative). 
148. Priest, supra note 12, at 1350-51. 
149. Legal economists infer from this indirect evidence that contracts between manufacturers 
and consumers allocating the risk of personal injury, assuming they were enforceable, would also 
be efficient. See generally CoOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 422-30 (summarizing literature on 
this issue); HENDERSON & TwERSKI, supra note 42, at 109-16; SCHWARTZ & SCOTI, supra note 
15, at 189-94; Epstein, supra note 43, at 656-58 (relying on Priest's study of consumer product 
warranties); Epstein, supra note 101, at 2201 (Contracts should work just as well in products 
liability contexts "when the plaintiff's injury moves from product failure to personal injury or 
property damage."); Priest, supra note 12; Priest, supra note 130; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 371-
72; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 137, at 1392-93. 
150. Session One, supra note 117, at 2247 (statement of Richard Epstein); Schwartz & Wilde, 
supra note 137, at 1397. 
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the fact that such insurance is not generally available through first-
party insurance markets. 151 Hence, the absence of voluntary manufac-
turer-provided insurance for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary risks 
evidences the efficacy, not the failings, of consumer product mar-
kets.152 The liability "crisis" is the price that society has had to pay 
for the fact that common law judges forced manufacturers to provide, 
and consumers to accept, grossly inefficient insurance through the tort 
system. 
Furthermore, scholars now believe that the courts responsible for 
the shift toward enterprise liability were wrong to assume that con-
sumers have no significant role in accident prevention, an assumption 
on which manufacturer risk spreading depended.153 Epstein, for ex-
ample, asks: 
[W]hy should manufacturers, out of possession of the product at the 
time of injury, be conclusively and universally presumed to be in a better 
position to avoid loss than "helpless" consumers in possession of the 
goods? There is little reason to think that this odd balance of prevention 
capabilities has ever been true in the general case - possession gives 
both control and information.154 
For another example, Priest emphasizes that, given the "growing em-
pirical evidence that . . . the consumer's role in accident prevention 
swamps any effects of differential technological investments by provid-
ers,"155 there is reason to believe that expansions in manufacturer lia-
. bility have caused an increase in product accidents.156 Manufacturer 
risk spreading is inefficient, many believe, in part because it removes 
consumers' incentives to prevent accidents. Compared to first-party 
insurance, manufacturer-provided insurance cannot easily cope with 
moral hazard - that is, with consumers' reduced incentive to take 
151. See infra section IV.B.3. As one co=entator observes, proponents of tort law ignored 
"the fact that tort law was, as an insurance mechanism, simply a disaster: cumbersome, arbi· 
trary, dilatory, wasteful, and needlessly expensive." Jeffrey O'Connell, Foreword to STEPHEN D. 
SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY wrra PERSONAL INJURY LAW ix (1989). 
152. See authorities cited supra note 149. 
153. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 12, at 1311-12; Priest, supra note 29, at 12-13; Schwartz, 
supra note 7: 
The imperfect information rationale for today's strict liability assumes that consumers can· 
not make rational investments in safety. This assumption is incorrect; consumers need to 
know fewer and simpler things to behave carefully than they need to know to choose among 
contract clauses allocating product risks. It is therefore a mistake to relax consumers' obli-
gation to take care. 
Id. at 356. 
154. Epstein, supra note 101, at 2205. 
155. Priest, supra note 29, at 13. 
156. See id. at 5-6 ("modem tort law .•• does a scandalously poor job of controlling the 
accident rate ••• "); see also VISCUSI, supra note 117, at 212; Priest, supra note 130, at 1400-01. 
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efficient precautions to prevent accidents whose costs they will not 
have to bear. 
Together, these new arguments have successfully discredited what 
had become an ethos of distrust of consumer product markets.157 Re-
jecting the original justifications for strict liability, much of the current 
scholarly literature now favors contract. As described below, those 
scholars who continue to recommend regulation of consumer product 
markets have yet to address, much less successfully rebut, the prima 
facie case made by the contractarians. The regulators simply assume 
that regulation in some form is necessary and largely ignore the muta-
bility dimension of the Products Liability Matrix. The contractarians, 
in contrast, devote much of their attention to the mutability dimen-
sion, and most reach the same procontract conclusion. Still, among 
the contractarians, there remains disagreement over the liability-stan-
dard dimension - that is, over what the optimal default liability stan-
dard is. 
2. Choosing the Optimal Liability Regime 
a. Peter Huber. 
i. Mutability dimension. Peter Huber, the obstreperous voice in 
the contractarian choir, 158 has delivered the freedom-of-contract 
message to important audiences outside academia.159 His position can 
be easily summarized: The first generation got it backwards; Ameri-
cans would be much better off if courts shifted away from tort back to 
contract in products liability cases. Huber is relentless: 
Mustering all the dense prose, arcane jargon, and elaborate methodology 
that only the very best academic economists muster, [the first genera-
tion] set about proving on paper that the whole new tort structure was 
157. A similar development has occurred in other areas of the law - perhaps reflecting the 
appeal of the Coase Theorem to legal thinkers over the past two decades. See, e.g., Robert C. 
Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 
1703, 1705 (1989) ("[T)he modem contractual theory of the firm ..• now dominates the thinking 
of •.• most econo~cally oriented corporate law scholars who focus at all on the theory of the 
corporation."); id. at 1717-18 (describing the rise of "contractualist" views). 
158. Page notes that Huber's book "makes no pretense at being scholarly." Joseph A. Page, 
Deforming Tort Reform, 18 GEO. L.J. 649, 659 (1990) (reviewing HUBER, supra note 8); see also 
Milo Geyelin, Tort Bar's Scourge.· Star of Legal Reform Kindles Controversy But Collects Critics, 
WALL. ST. J., Oct. 16, 1992, at Al (describing the severe criticisms of Huber's book by legal 
academia). 
159. For example, in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991), in which 
the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional attack on punitive damages, Justice O'Connor dis-
sented, agreeing with the insurance industry and business groups that punitive damages violate 
due process, and cited Huber's book to support the proposition that punitive damages have 
harmed American business. 111 S. Ct. at 1056 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Vice President Dan 
Quayle relied on Huber's work to support the claim that the competitiveness of American indus-
try depends on reforming tort law. See Geyelin, supra note 158. 
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an efficient and inevitable reaction to failures in the marketplace. 160 
The(y] promised the world that [strict liability] ... would bring measur-
able progress toward ... protecting life and limb, and helping the injured 
when accidents do happen .... [But their] record is a mountain of 
pretentious failure. 161 
The doers, the makers, and the providers of this world [have been] pur-
sued and worried at every turn by a hound-like legal profession . . . . As 
the tort system expanded, innovation was suppressed, not encouraged. 
Safety was set back, not advanced. And the consumer ended worse off, 
even in his personal security, than he would have been bad the legal 
system been slower to rush to his rescue. 162 
The legal system, often as random and capricious as the accident itself, 
yields less insurance and - perversely - still more accidents .... A cure 
is at hand, if we can find judges willing to administer it. . . . 
What's to be done? ... [For] fundamental change, we must rebuild 
the law of accidents around ancient time-tested principles of consent, 
cooperation, and a robust law of contract. 163 
It is never too late to admit that a wrong road has been taken. This is 
particularly true when the road leads to a poisonous swamp.164 
Huber's allegiance to contract is unmistakable. 
ii. Liability-standard dimension. As for what the liability stan-
dard should be, in contrast, Huber expresses no clear preference. He 
explains: 
[Freedom of contract] is the only battle I am fighting. Any set of legal 
presumptions the courts want to prescribe on silence is okay with me, 
provided one bas a real law of disclaimer to bring things back to a mar-
ket optimum. Free contracting will then restore an optimal state of af-
fairs, in the same way it would if there were a silly presumption like "all 
cars can survive collisions with Sherman tanks."165 
For Huber, the choice between absolute manufacturer liability and ab-
solute consumer liability makes little difference, so long as liability can 
be disclaimed. As suggested in the previous quotation and, more gen-
erally, throughout Huber's book, 166 however, Huber clearly believes 
manufacturers and consumers would, given the chance, privately con-
tract to an absolute consumer liability standard (Box 1). He does not 
expressly advocate that particular standard, presumably because he is 
160. HUBER, supra note 8, at 6. 
161. Id. at 11. 
162. Id. at 154. 
163. Peter Huber, Insurance, Not Lawsuits, for the Accident Prone, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 
1988, at 24; see HUBER, supra note 8, at 224-27. 
164. HUBER, supra note 8, at 18. 
165. Session Three, supra note 128, at 2339 (statement of Peter Huber). 
166. HUBER, supra note 8. 
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confident that the contracting costs under his proposed regime would 
be small. So long as contracting is permitted, the Coase Theorem can 
do the rest.167 
Yet, while Huber expresses a strong faith in the efficiency of unreg-
ulated consumer product markets, he inexplicably argues that some 
form of regulation of consumer product markets is necessary. For in-
stance, Huber proposes a "law of warning," which would impose upon 
product manufacturers a duty of "reasonably full disclosure of safety-
related information."168 According to Huber, risk information from 
warnings would assist consumers in the contracting process.169 The 
question that Huber does not answer, however, is why a law of warn-
ing is necessary.17° Why would manufacturers (or, perhaps, third par-
ties) not respond via market mechanisms to consumer demand for risk 
information? By calling for a law of warnings, Huber implicitly con-
cedes that consumer product markets do fail. 171 But once the possibil-
ity is allowed that consumers may be poorly informed and that the 
market may not fill consumer demand for information, questions arise 
concerning why and to what extent consumers are uninformed, and 
whether a law of warning would sufficiently overcome this potential 
source of market inefficiency.172 Huber's apparent doubt. as to the ex-
tent to which manufacturers will respond to consumer demand for 
product risk information renders dubious his otherwise sanguine view 
of consumer product markets. To put the point another way, if Huber 
does not trust the market for product risk information, perhaps he 
167. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). Far simplicity, 
we have placed Huber in Bax 1, even though he claims ta be arguing only that the law should 
move ta Column I. We suspect that Huber would, if pressed, choose absolute consumer liability 
aver the alternatives, in part because Huber believes that parties would otherwise contract ta Bax 
1. Thus, adapting Bax 1 saves those transaction casts. See infra text accompanying note 325 
(describing reasons why the cantractarians should choose absolute consumer liability as the 
default). 
168. HUBER, supra note 8, at 213. Arguably, Huber's warning requirement places him in 
Box 7. See infra note 173. 
169. Huber seems to argue that, so long as consumers are informed of product risks, free 
contracting will yield efficient outcomes. Under certain assumptions, this is a well-accepted re-
sult. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 52-53; Croley & Hanson, supra note 4, at 74-75. 
170. Presenting a similar puzzle, Huber seems ta envisage some role for administrative regu-
lation. See HUBER, supra note 8, at 46-51 (arguing that manufacturers who have complied with 
agency standards should, for that reason, be exempt from tart liability). Cf. generally Peter 
Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 
CoLUM. L. REv. 277 (1985) (arguing that administrative regulators are better suited than courts 
to manage "public risks" - i.e., mass torts). 
171. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 26 (1982) ("In well-functioning 
markets, one would expect to find as much information available as consumers are willing to pay 
for in order to lower the cast or improve the quality of their choices."); see also infra text accom-
panying notes 343-45. This interpretation of Huber's position is strengthened by the fact that he 
offers no examples of pre-Henningsen, voluntarily provided, product-risk warnings. 
172. See infra notes 343-45 and accompanying text and sections IV.B.1 and IV.C.l. 
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should not trust the market for product safety.113 How these two sides 
of Huber - the side that insists on freedom of contract and the side 
that calls for regulatory intervention - can be reconciled is unclear. 
b. Richard Epstein. 
i. Mutability dimension. Professor Epstein's views are, in one di-
mension, indistinguishable from Huber's. Like Huber, Epstein exhib-
its a deep faith in the market and in contract. According to Epstein, 
"[t]he common law restrictions on freedom of contract are not justi-
fied by any concern with externalities, or with duress, fraud, and in-
competence of individual consumers."174 He further states: "It is 
very difficult to identify either the externality or the lack of informa-
tion : . . that would justify overriding private consensual arrange-
ments. "175 In short, interference with contractual allocations of 
product risk is not justified. 
ii. Liability-standard dimension. In contrast to Huber, however, 
Epstein is not indifferent among possible default liability standards.176 
In Epstein's view, contracting costs can be saved by choosing the de-
fault standard that most informed and competent parties would 
want. 177 Because of his confidence that free markets produce efficient 
173. Huber's failure to explain why a law of warning is needed seems especially egregious 
given that his proposed law of warning would likely recreate many of the same problems that his 
proposal is supposed to eliminate. To enforce a law of warning, a jury would presumably have to 
determine the adequacy of the warning in light of the product's risks and the plaintiff's injuries. 
It is not clear that this task is any less cumbersome and costly than the tasks that the juries must 
undertake in the current regime and that Huber believes are the source of the liability crisis. 
Moreover, Huber does not specify what liability standard would apply in the event that a 
manufacturer was held not to have met its duty to warn. That is, Huber's discussion fails to 
make clear whether a manufacturer would be liable for the costs of injuries about which the 
manufacturer had not provided adequate warning. For the law of warning to be effective, some 
standard more strict than absolute consumer liability would have to be employed. Indeed, the 
only standard that would induce manufacturers to inform consumers of unpreventable and 
residual risks would be absolute manufacturer liability. See infra notes 420-22 and accompany-
ing text (explaining why warning proposals often translate to a Box 7 regime). Perhaps warnings 
are what Huber has in mind when he at one point refers to "[c]ontract •.• with a more human 
face." HUBER, supra note 8, at 226. However, to the extent that Huber believes any standard 
more strict than absolute consumer liability yields inefficiencies, he needs to explain why the 
benefits of his warning requirements more than offset those inefficiencies. 
174. Epstein, supra note 101, at 2214. 
175. Session One, supra note 117, at 2230 (statement of Richard Epstein). 
176. Additionally, Epstein does not recommend a law of warning. 
177. "Default provisions are surely important, if only because they influence the cost of con-
tracting to the proper social position." Epstein, supra note 101, at 2203. This view of default 
rules is common. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 82; Clark, supra note 157, at 1706; Schwartz, 
supra note 7, at 361. But see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15 (arguing that the "would have 
wanted" approach to gap-filling can yield inefficient results); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Stra-
tegic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992); 
Jason S. Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contractual Default Rules, 
100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). 
The purported savings in transaction costs may not be a very strong justification for picking a 
default rule in products liability law, where the contracts are written in large quantities via war-
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contracts, Epstein recommends that courts adopt a default liability 
standard that mimics the market:178 "[P]roducts liability rules should 
imitate to the extent possible the patterns observed in voluntary trans-
actions."179 Furthermore, Epstein stresses that, under his proposal, 
free contracting would probably produce a wide assortment of warran-
ties, depending on the specific conditions of different markets, 180 and 
that the optimal liability standard - given that it would mimic the 
market - would vary accordingly. According to Epstein, 
the anticontractual bias of [recent judicial developments] has proved to 
have devastating long-term consequences for the soundness of the prod-
ranties rather than on a transaction-by-transaction basis. Either all manufacturers would agree 
to the same warranty provisions under what would be the optimal default rule or they would not. 
If they did, copying someone else's warranty would be very simple. Copying involves no large 
transaction costs. If not, then they would write their own contracts, which they would also do 
were that the mutable default rule. 
178. Choosing a default rule that informed, competent consumers would want may not mini-
mize transaction costs if consumers are not, in fact, informed or competent. Uninformed or 
incompetent consumers may contract around the efficient rule to an inefficient rule. By adopting 
a mimic-the-market approach, however, Epstein ensures that transaction costs will be minimized 
even if consumers act counter to their own interests. Of course, some might criticize the mimic-
the-market approach on the ground that it reflects the choices of uninformed or incompetent 
consumers and ensures that they will continue to contract to an inefficient result. Epstein evades 
that criticism, however, by gainsaying the possibility. In his view, consumers are well informed 
and competent, and market outcomes cannot be improved upon. See supra text accompanying 
notes 174-75. For an illuminating and more general critique of the view that contractual alloca-
tions are presumptively efficient, see Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and 
Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSI'RA L. R.Ev. 711, 739-70 (1980). 
179. Epstein, supra note 43, at 669. But cf. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 203-04 (1973) (apparently concluding that the rules of strict liability 
better "define the boundaries of individual liberty" than do rules based on negligence). See, e.g., 
Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 12 J. PROD. LIABILITY 383, 383-
84 (1989) (describing Epstein as the proponent of "a corrective justice-type theory of strict 
liability"). 
180. Epstein argues that products liability insurance is appropriate if the market P.rovides 
insurance against the particular risk at issue. He observes, for example, that commercial airline 
passengers can and often do purchase flight insurance, and that such insurance is available be-
cause that setting presents minimal moral hazard. Epstein argues that products liability insur-
ance against these risks should be provided because the moral hazard problem would not burden 
that market. See Epstein, supra note 43, at 666-67. But this position seems puzzling insofar as 
Epstein's recommendation allows consumers to purchase products liability insurance to protect 
only against risks for which they already have, or can obtain, market-provided insurance. In 
other words, Epstein's position seems to be that, if consumers cannot obtain first-party insurance 
for a given product or service risk, product-liability insurance is inappropriate; but if consumers 
can themselves obtain first-party insurance, then products liability should provide it. Why prod-
ucts liability insurance should ever be provided is unclear. It would simply be redundant. For a 
similar criticism, see Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Comments on Epstein, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 670, 673 
(1985); see also infra note 182. Perhaps Epstein thinks that market failures besides moral hazard 
plague first-party insurance markets and that consequently insurance provided through products 
liability is an appropriate gap-filling measure for consumers who cannot or do not buy sufficient 
first-party coverage. If so, however, that calls into question Epstein's premise that insurance 
provided through products liability is appropriate only where market-provided insurance is avail-
able. If first-party insurance markets do not provide optimal insurance, then possibly products 
liability insurance should be available even where first-party insurance is not. See infra section 
IV.C.3.b. 
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ucts liability system. The system of products liability was stripped of its 
powers of self-correction. In essence, [those developments] reserved to 
the courts a legal monopoly to fashion the relevant terms and conditions 
on which all products should be sold in all relevant markets. The cen-
tralization of power . . . leads to a legal regime that is unresponsive to 
changes in demand or technology. The judicial standard form becomes a 
Procrustean bed into which all private transactions have to fit at their 
peril. It may well be the case that certain uniform provisions are appro-
priate for the full range of products liability cases. But if the optimal 
solution is one that cuts off the tort liability for consequential damages, 
then a judicial rule that renders tort liability nonwaivable will not only 
be uniform, but also wrong in every case. More likely, in practice there 
may be important variations in the kinds of terms that are appropriate 
for certain classes of products and defects. Strict liability on manufac-
turers for contamination of products sold in sealed containers may make 
good sense, but far more complex allocation of risks may be appropriate 
in design and warning cases . . . . Yet here, too, all efforts to find better 
ways to sell and market products are cut off before they are born, so that 
new information about products liability terms cannot be generated by 
voluntary transactions. Today all doctrinal innovation has to come from 
the courts, where the technical lags and information deficits are at their 
highest. Yet there is no alternative forum, save legislation, in which to 
override judgments when they have proved mistaken; indeed, there is no 
way to find out whether they are mistaken at all.181 
Epstein's discussion is perplexing. On one hand, he stresses that a 
wide variety of warranties would likely exist under his proposed mar-
ket-mimicking approach; he even goes so far as to suggest that under 
certain conditions "you [c]ould see contractS that create a strict liabil-
ity rule."182 Elsewhere, however, Epstein (like Huber) seems to recog-
nize that there would most likely be but one default rule: absolute 
181. Epstein, supra note 101, at 2202-03. Epstein never explains how sealed food is suffi-
ciently different from other consumer products to justify a rule of strict liability in markets for 
sealed food. If Epstein believes that some sort of market failure (e.g., imperfect consumer infor-
mation) hinders the market for sealed food, he does not explain why the presence of that failure 
would not render contracts between manufacturers and consumers of sealed food inefficient. 
182. Session One, supra note 117, at 2237 (statement of Richard A. Epstein). Epstein sug-
gests that a strict liability regime would be efficient in commercial aviation markets because, in 
"voluntary markets," "the purchase of commercial flight insurance is a routine activity." Ep-
stein, supra note 43, at 666-67. Again, his general argument is "that products liability rules 
should imitate to the extent possible the patterns observed in voluntary transactions,'' id. at 669, 
and - because insurance is routinely available through the market against the risks of commer-
cial airline accidents - a strict liability regime would not be inefficient for allocating the risks of 
commercial airline accidents. But Epstein's argument poses a problem for his more general con-
clusion that there would be "no consequential damages and complete reliance on first-party in-
surance" in an efficient products liability regime. Session One, supra note 117, at 2245 (statement 
of Richard A. Epstein). What Epstein apparently does not realize is that accidental death and 
dismemberment insurance is widely and routinely available in voluntary markets. See Croley & 
Hanson, supra note 4, at 60 n.200. Thus, under the mimic-the-market approach he prescribes, it 
is not clear how Epstein can conclude that consumers, who demand market-provided insurance 
against consequential damages, should not be compensated for the consequential damages result-
ing from product accidents. 
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consumer liability. He knows that prior to 1960, when disclaimers 
and exculpatory clauses were typically enforced, all manufacturers 
disclaimed liability for the costs of personal injuries in their warran-
ties.183 Although Epstein recognizes the implications this fact has for 
his proposed default rule, he maintains his allegiance to contract: "If 
the uniformity of contractual terms governing manufacturers' liability 
for personal injury indicates that one solution - [absolute consumer 
liability] - dominates all others, then one can make an even stronger 
argument that the change from no liability for personal injuries to to-
tal expectation-measured damages [has been] momentous."184 Ep-
stein's position is thus clear: no matter what their terms, all consumer 
contracts based on market preferences are efficient.18s Although Ep-
stein argues that courts should mimic the market, his prescription 
translates to a proposal that courts should return to Box 1 - to a 
standard approaching Lord Albinger's rule in Winterbottom. 
More important, if Epstein is correct that contracting costs are 
high enough to justify selecting a particular liability standard as the 
default (as opposed to just picking any default at random, as Huber 
suggests), then it is not clear how Epstein can be confident that mar-
kets will have arrived at the efficient standard given those contracting 
costs. If markets have not arrived at the optimal standard, then mim-
icking markets will yield inefficient law. Thus, some tension exists be-
tween Epstein's justification for adopting a particular default and his 
method of choosing it.186 
183. See, e.g., Session One, supra note 117, at 2245 (statement of Richard A. Epstein) 
("When you tum to products liability, you should ask the question: to what extent does the 
scheme that we now impose deviate from the market? The market solution says no consequential 
damages and complete reliance on first-party insurance. The reformers got things backwards 
and enacted the opposite."); id. at 2232. 
184. Session One, supra note 117, at 2234 (statement of Richard A. Epstein). 
185. Epstein and his fellow contractarians share the implicit but inexplicable premise that all 
markets work perfectly except one: the market for liability insurance. Cf. Epstein, supra note 43, 
at 648. 
186. Several more general problems confront Epstein's proposed mimic-the-market ap-
proach. First, if Epstein were correct that warranties would vary depending on the market con-
text, then a single default rule would not significantly lower transaction costs given that so many 
manufacturers would still need to contract around it. See_ supra note 177. If Epstein instead 
expects courts to create a highly tailored set of default rules to match the different and changing 
markets, then he needs to explain just how they would go about it. Epstein offers no concrete 
suggestions for how liability rules would differ for different product types. Existing contracts, to 
which lawmakers would be forced to turn, were written under the current regime. Those con-
tracts therefore reflect the preferences of only the parties who thought opting out of the current 
default provisions was worthwhile. In short, examining existing contracts might provide no indi-
cation of what default liability standard most parties would want. Perhaps those parties who 
have been silent - who have not attempted to contract around the current liability standard -
would prefer the current default to any possible alternative. The costs of opting out of the cur-
rent standard, however, may be high enough to prevent some parties who would prefer a differ-
ent standard from opting out. (This is analogous to Epstein's argument that we do not see 
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c. George Priest. 
l Mutability dimension. Unlike Huber and Epstein, Professor 
Priest does not fit easily into the contractarian camp, notwithstanding 
the facts that ~e purports to be a champion of contract and that his 
powerful "investment theory" of warranties forms the foundation of 
the contractarian position.187 Again, that theory holds: 
A warranty ... is the instrument that expresses consumer prefer-
ences for allocative [i.e., preventive] or insurance investments. It is a 
contract that divides responsibility for allocative investments and insur-
ance between the consumer and the manufacturer. The content of the 
contract is determined by the respective costs to the two parties of allo-
cative investments or insurance. According to this approach, a manufac-
turer makes investments ... up to the point at which the marginal costs 
of such investments equals the marginal benefit. A manufacturer, then, 
offers market insurance for those losses or items of service for which 
market insurance is less costly than insurance or allocative investments 
by the consumer himself. 
To the extent that a manufacturer disclaims liability or excludes or 
limits its warranty coverage, however, it shifts to the consumer the obli-
gation to make allocative investments to preserve the product or to self-
insure for its loss. A disclaimer or an exclusion of coverage is the func-
tional equivalent of provisions, common in other contracts, that explic-
itly require one of the parties to take certain actions to prevent breach or 
to insure for losses fr9m uncertain events. The theory predicts that dis-
claimers of liability and exclusions of coverage will be observed in con-
sumer product warranties for those specific allocative or insurance 
investments that the consumer can provide more cheaply than the manu-
facturer. In this view, disclaimers and exclusions can be said to be de-
manded by consumers because of the relative cheapness of consumer 
allocative investments or of self-insurance.188 
According to Priest, then, courts should uphold a warranty as if it 
were an arms-length contract between two fully informed and rational 
parties. If contracting were freely permitted, he suggests, the warran-
ties between manufacturers and consumers would allocate all conse-
quential damages, including the costs of personal injuries, to 
consumers. In Priest's words: "The contracts that were in force prior 
personal injury warranty disclaimers because courts typically do not enforce them.) Thus, it is 
not obvious that lawmakers could ascertain the optimal default liability standard by examining 
existing arrangements. 
187. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text. 
188. Priest, supra note 12, at 1313. Priest's description of his investment theory of warran-
ties contains the argument that disclaimers or exclusions of coverage may be the "functional 
equivalent" of common contractual provisions that explicitly require certain acts on the part of 
the parties to prevent breach. These implicit counterparts in warranty "contracts," however, 
must be, other things equal, inferior. Otherwise, other contracts would not commonly include 
explicit provisions. No matter how much Priest and others may characterize warranties as "con-
tracts," this simple observation might make one skeptical at the outset that warranties can be or 
should be understood or treated as common contracts. 
February 1993] Enterprise Liability 729 
to the present regime added up to no liability for consequential dam-
ages, none whatsoever. I am certain that this is the contractual opti-
mum. "189 Priest thus appears to share Huber's and Epstein's 
complete faith in contracts. Moreover, he appears to join their call for 
a return to Row 1.190 
il Liability-standard dimension. On the liability-standard di-
mension, however, Priest parts company with Huber and Epstein, as 
when he admonishes Huber for unrealistically overstating the role of 
contract in products liability: "Peter, I think the contractual optimum 
is so radically different from the current regime that thinking you can 
achieve it by just allowing an opening for contract is just pie in the 
sky."191 Apparently Priest believes contracting costs are high enough 
to prevent parties from contracting around an inefficient default. 192 
For Priest, therefore, initial entitlements matter in a way that they do 
not for Huber and Epstein. Huber believes that contracting costs are 
trivial and that therefore the choice of legal standards has no great 
efficiency consequences.193 Epstein apparently believes that con-
tracting costs are significant, though not so significant that they stifle 
efficient transactions, and that therefore lawmakers can save transac-
tion costs by choosing the correct standard.194 In contrast to both, 
Priest's position implies that the choice of a legal rule can significantly 
affect the allocation of resources. 
In light of his view that warranties are efficient contracts that 
courts should uphold, Priest seems to have taken two contradictory 
positions. One might anticipate that Priest would advocate absolute 
-consumer liability. After all, he recognizes that product warranties 
universally contracted to that standard before courts prohibited manu-
189. Session Three, supra note 128, at 2339 (statement of George L. Priest);_ see also Priest, 
supra note 12, at 1350-51. 
190. See Session One, supra note 117 (statement of George L. Priest): 
I agree with [Richard Epstein] entirely that private contracting is in fact efficient •••. 
• • . [But i]n no product warranty that I have seen written before 1960 - and certainly 
none written after that date - was provision ever made for liability for personal injury. In 
every products liability case, the judges saw, consequential damages were excluded by con-
tract. •.• 
• • • Once you have a broader view of how warranties operate, you see why it might be in 
the rational long·term interests of consumers for manufacturers to disclaim liability for per-
sonal injury across the board. Consumers were not bargaining for this type of protection, 
and manufacturers never contracted to accept liability for personal injury. 
Id. at 2232. 
191. Session Three, supra note 128, at 2339 (statement of George L. Priest). 
192. Although he never makes this belief explicit, it is consistent with his view that warran-
ties are standardized to save transaction costs. See Priest, supra note 12, at 1307. 
193. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. 
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facturers from disclaiming liability for personal injuries.195 If a con-
sumer was injured, the manufacturer of the product that caused the 
injury could at most be liable for replacement or repair of the defective 
good. The injured consumer bore the balance of the costs, including 
medical expenses, lost income, and all nonpecuniary losses. Thus, 
Priest's studies of warranties suggest that an absolute consumer liabil-
ity standard is the rule to which consumers and manufacturers would 
contract if only they could. Moreover, many of Priest's arguments 
about how the current regime caused the liability "crisis" also lead to 
the conclusion that courts should adopt a regime of absolute consumer 
liability. 196 
For reasons not entirely clear, however, Priest urges courts to 
adopt not a mutable absolute consumer liability rule (Box 1), but 
rather a mandatory negligence standard (Box 4), under which manu-
facturers would be liable for all initially preventable losses: 
Controlling the accident rate is a very simple proposition. There is now 
a voluminous literature in the law and economics field unanimous in its 
conclusion that the accident rate can be reduced to the level optimal for 
the society by asking at trial one simple question: Is it possible to iden-
tify any specific cost-effective action that either the injurer or victim 
could have taken which would have prevented the accident? If so, then 
liability should be placed on the party that could have prevented the 
accident most effectively in order to create incentives to take such ac-
tions in the future.197 
Priest's reliance on ·the "voluminous literature" in law and economics 
to justify his proposed negligence standard is misplaced. As Priest has 
himself emphasized, that literature makes clear that any liability stan-
dard will, if markets work, yield the same efficient result. 198 Thus, 
although Priest's arguments strongly suggest that courts should adopt 
a mutable, absolute consumer liability regime (Box 1),199 he neverthe-
less inexplicably concludes that courts should adopt a mandatory neg-
ligence standard (Box 4).200 
195. See supra note 190. 
196. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 4, at 19 n.76. See generally id. at 12-50. 
197. Priest, supra note 29, at 20-21. 
198. Indeed, in his response to previous work of ours, Priest stresses that, in the absence of 
market failures, "there will be exactly the same product output, the same product price, and the 
same number of product injuries whether the legal rule provides for no manufacturer liability, 
absolute manufacturer liability, or a standard of liability anywhere in between." George L. 
Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability Be Defended?, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 237, 252 (1992). 
There, Priest also argues, inexplicably, that no market imperfections would justify either choos-
ing negligence over absolute consumer liability or making his proposed negligence standard, or 
any standard, mandatory. Id. at 252-58. 
199. Indeed, as explained above, those scholars who now argue for such a regime rely heavily 
on Priest's arguments. See supra section 111.B.1. 
200. Priest's choice of a negligence rule suggests that in his view the consumer product mar-
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d. Alan Schwartz. 
i. Mutability dimension. Professor Schwartz' position is easily 
summarized. He argues straightforwardly that, whatever the liability 
standard, it should be mutable by contract: . 
[T]he evidence in support of market failure is too weak to support the 
contract-proscribing aspect of strict liability. Rather, markets should be 
permitted to generate the terms under which consumers purchase. This 
conclusion implies first that courts should enforce exculpatory clauses 
and contractual specifications of the seller's quality obligation, and sec-
ond that when the parties' agreement is silent, courts should fill in the 
gaps with the appropriately derived optimal contract.201 
Like his fellow contractarians, Schwartz favors freedom of contract. 
ii. Liability-standard dimension. As for the liability-standard di-
mension, Schwartz argues for strict manufacturer liability with a con-
tributory negligence defense: "Well-informed consumers probably 
would contract for this risk allocation, so the law, following the dic-
tates of consumer sovereignty, should provide it."202 Schwartz 
chooses strict liability "first by supposing that persons prefer contracts 
that maximize their expected utility, and then by deriving the terms 
that this preference best implies."203 
According to Schwartz, strict liability is the preferred standard 
"[b]ecause it induces both consumers and firms to reduce accident 
costs optimally .... "204 By itself, however, this is hardly a dispositive 
argument. Under the assumptions that led Schwartz to endorse free-
dom of contract, he could have shown that any liability standard 
would optimize consumer and manufacturer investments in accident 
prevention.205 To be sure, Schwartz does narrow the choices of liabil-
ket is not without imperfections, for if he believed markets were perfect he would favor a no-
liability regime over negligence. A no-liability regime would have zero administrative costs and 
would create none of the adverse insurance effects that he believes our current regime creates. 
See Priest, supra note 9; supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text. Perhaps Priest does not 
advocate a mutable rule because he believes that courts are more receptive to proposals for 
changing the liability standard than proposals for reinstituting contract. Alternatively, Priest 
may believe that his proposed regime would be the optimal liability regime for all products, such 
that no manufacturers or consumers would desire to contract out of it. In that case, no con-
tracting costs are at stake, so the standard might as well be immutable: telling manufacturers 
and consumers that they cannot do what they have no interest in doing would be a toothless 
mandate. Finally, Priest may consider the costs of contracting around a default standard so 
prohibitive that making the background liability standard a default standard carries no benefit. 
For that reason, Priest may fail to focus on the mutability dimension. On the other hand, that 
view contradicts the assumptions underlying Priest's investment theory of warranties. 
201. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 355-56. 
202. Id. at 356. 
203. Id. at 357. 
204. Id. at 393. 
205. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 24-28, 313-14; SHA VELL, supra note 9, at 6-32; 
Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 168-69. See generally Coase, supra note 167. 
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ity standards by one when he argues that courts cannot implement a 
negligence standard efficiently.206 But he just as well could have rec-
ommended absolute consumer liability as strict liability. Strict liabil-
ity may be more efficient than absolute consumer liability where 
transaction costs are high and where there is no market nexus;207 but 
where, as in Schwartz' model, the market generates efficient results on 
its own, it seems doubtful that the benefits of legal intervention would 
exceed the costs. 20s 
Schwartz has a response. He points out that consumers demand 
insurance against the risk of pecuniary losses. 209 Because only strict 
liability automatically insures consumers for the costs of initially pre-
206. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 386-88; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 84-88; Han-
son & Logue, supra note 11, at 169-70. 
Given that Schwartz and Epstein do not believe that courts can efficiently implement a negli-
gence standard, they should argue that parties should not be permitted to contract to a negli-
gence regime on their own if the products liability standard is otherwise mutable. That is, their 
arguments regarding courts' competence at conducting cost-benefit analysis concern not only 
what liability standard should be adopted as the default, but also what liability standards parties 
should be permitted to contract to given a particular default. Thus, although Schwartz and 
Epstein claim to argue for freedom of contract, they actually argue for limited freedom (a default 
standard with mandatory components). This raises an interesting question: What if under a free 
contracting regime parties sometimes opted out of the default and adopted a negligence regime 
(or did not opt out of a negligence default)? Assuming that markets work as well as the con-
tractarians contend, Schwartz and Epstein would have to choose between their arguments that 
such contracts do not satisfy the consumer sovereignty norm and their arguments that markets 
work and thus correctly reveal consumer preferences. Neither Schwartz nor Epstein considers 
this problem. 
207. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 163. 
208. Schwartz might have argued that he prefers strict liability to absolute consumer liability 
on the ground that, even though contracts are ultimately efficient, making manufacturers liable 
for initially preventable and unpreventable accidents would require manufacturers to disclaim 
liability in order to contract out of the default to an absolute consumer liability standard (Box 7), 
The act of contracting around the default would require manufacturers to reveal certain informa-
tion that consumers may not possess. In this way, the strict liability default would serve as what 
Ayres and Gertner have termed a "penalty default" - a default standard that "giv[es] a more 
informed contracting party incentives to reveal information to a less informed party." Ayres & 
Gertner, supra note 15, at 97; see also id. at 95-107 (providing a more general description of 
penalty defaults); Johnston, supra note 177, at 616; cf. Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priori-
ties, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 218-24 (1989) (arguing that creditors could obtain information 
from debtors about prior claims on a borrower's property through contract clauses - the 
equivalent of penalty defaults - even in the absence of a public filing system). See infra section 
IV.C.l (describing Box 7 approach). 
Schwartz, however, makes no such argument. To the contrary, he claims to advocate a liabil-
ity standard that would give consumers the " 'optimal contract' - the contract that informed, 
competent consumers would prefer," not a default standard that would, because it is inefficient, 
require parties to contract around it. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 355; see also text accompa-
nying note 120. Moreover, if consumers estimate product risks correctly on average, as Schwartz 
suggests, what does the system gain by forcing manufacturers to contract around an inefficient 
default standard? Finally, even were Schwartz to argue that consumers are comparatively unin-
formed of product risks, a disclaimer or exclusion in a warranty would add little to their informa-
tion. What would they learn beyond the fact that they would need to obtain insurance from 
another source for the unspecified risk? 
209. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 404. 
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ventable and unpreventable accidents,210 strict liability will be the 
standard of choice. That response, however, does not explain why 
consumers would want to pay for manufacturer-provided insurance 
when they possess, or could obtain, first-party insurance at what most 
scholars believe are much lower rates.2 11 
Schwartz argues further that some consumers may systematically 
underestimate product risks. Under absolute consumer liability, those 
consumers would buy too little first-party insurance, and manufactur-
ers, with suboptimal incentives to invest in safety would produce too 
many unsafe products.212 Schwartz thus argues for holding manufac-
turers strictly liable for unpreventable accidents because in a strict lia-
bility regime "the price of [the products] will more accurately reflect 
their accident costs, thereby better informing consumers of the risk of 
driving (just as a warning would)."213 Ultimately, then, Schwartz' 
justification for strict liability is that, without it, consumer misinf or-
mation leads to inefficient results. Schwartz' position along the muta-
bility dimension is premised on his claim that markets do not fail, but 
his position along the liability-standard dimension is based on his 
claim that they do fail. Thus, although important and in many ways 
persuasive, Schwartz' argument, like Huber's, Epstein's, and Priest's, 
contains a significant internal tension. 
To see the tension in Schwartz' proposal more clearly, suppose 
that courts adopted his strict liability default standard (Box 5) and 
that some consumers systematically underestimated product risks. 
Those consumers who were well informed about product risks would 
contract around the default because they would have sufficient first-
party coverage and would refuse to pay extra for something they al-
ready had. Those consumers who underestimated product risks would 
contract around the default despite the fact that they had inadequate 
first-party insurance, because - given the fact that they underesti-
mated product risks - they would assume they already had sufficient 
first-party coverage. In short, well-informed consumers would opt out 
of the default because they knew better, and ill-informed consumers 
would opt out because they did not know better. A strict liability de-
fault would create only transaction costs.214 
210. Utility-maximizing consumers may not demand insurance against residually preventa-
ble accidents - that is, accidents that they could have prevented at least cost. Accordingly, 
Schwartz does not recommend an absolute manufacturer liability standard. 
211. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 393. 
212. Id. at 376, 405-06. 
213. Id. at 399. 
214. In a more recent article, Schwartz presents the case against strict liability. See 
Schwartz, supra note 87. There, Schwartz confirms his loca~on in Column 1, but seems to place 
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Returning again to the Products Liability Matrix, Table 3 summa-
rizes the contractarians' positions. 
himself also in Row 1. Thus, although he cites to his previous work when presenting his case 
against strict liability, id. at 825 n.9, 830 n.21, and nowhere indicates that his position has funda-
mentally changed, our treatment of Schwartz in the text above might nevertheless respond to a 
view that he himself no longer holds. But if we are attacking a straw man, it is a straw man 
armed with a pitchfork. For whatever Schwartz' own position now may be, the argument above 
treats what we consider to be his strongest, and what has certainly been his most influential view, 
see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OP LAW 215 (4th ed. 1992) (including 
Schwartz, supra note 7, on a short list of suggested reading); Kathryn D. Sowle, Toward a Syn-
thesis of Product Liability Principles: Schwartz's Model and the Cost-Minimization Altematfre, 46 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1991) (scrutinizing Schwartz' views on products liability, principally "Pro-
posals for Product Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis"), a view that, significantly, in-
formed the recent ALI Report's examination of products liability. See, e.g., 2 THE AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 33 n.1 (citing Schwartz, supra note 7). 
For just one example, Schwartz seems simultaneously to assume that consumers' estimates of 
initial risk levels will dominate their estimates of safety improvements, Schwartz, supra note 87, 
at 830 (the "anchoring effect"), which allows him to eliminate certain possible products regimes, 
and that consumers' estimates of product safety improvements will dominate their estimates of 
products' initial risk levels, id. at 831 (arguing that perceptions of safety improvements drive 
perceptions of initial risk levels), which allows him to eliminate other possible regimes, without 
ever reconciling the apparent inconsistency. 
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TABLE 3 
THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY MATRIX 
THE CURRENT PRODUCTS LIABILITY DEBATE: 
THE CONTRACTARIANS 
DEGREE OF MUTABILITY 
(Column 1) (Column 2) 
Default Mandatory 
--
(Row 1) (Box 1) (Box 2) 
Absolute Huber 
---Consumer Epstein 
Liability Priest? 
L Schwartz? 
I 
A 
B 
I (Row 2) (Box 3) (Box 4) 
L 
I Negligence Priest 
T 
y 
s (Row 3) (Box 5) (Box 6) 
T 
A Strict Liability Schwartz Schwartz? 
N 
D 
A 
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D 
(Row 4) (Box 7) (Box 8) 
Absolute 
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Manufacturer 
Liability 
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C. The Regulators: Market Skeptics 
Section III.B showed that the contractarians should, but do not, 
take positions in the liability-standard dimension and the mutability 
dimension that are consistent with their starting assumption that con-
sumer product markets are free of any significant imperfection. This 
section argues that the regulators should, but do not, take positions 
along the two products liability dimensions that are consistent with 
their starting assumption that consumer product markets have signifi-
cant imperfections. 
1. Regulating Product Risks: Tort Versus Administrative Law 
As mentioned above, although the regulators for the most part 
share the contractarians' belief that products liability is in need of re-
form, they do not share the contractarians' faith in the market. The 
regulators believe that unfettered product markets will achieve subop-
timal allocation of product risks. Yet, as described below, the regula-
tors have not offered much in the way of a response to the 
contractarians' case for unregulated markets. Many of the regulators 
simply assume that free markets will not produce efficient investments 
in product safety and concentrate on proposing solutions to unspeci-
fied market failures. 
The regulators propose a range of solutions, according to which 
the tort system would serve a range of roles. At one end of the spec-
trum, Professor Landes and Judge Posner argue that reform is not 
necessary and that the tort system as we know it is an efficient mecha-
nism for regulating consumer product risks. The other regulators dis-
agree on both counts, largely because they believe that tort law caused 
the liability crisis of the mid-1980s. Professor Viscusi, for one, at 
times seems to countenance a significant role for tort law, but argues 
ultimately that product risks should be regulated principally by ad-
ministrative agencies and that the tort system should serve as only a 
secondary or residual system for product risk regulation. Professor 
Rose-Ackerman also favors administrative regulation, but she calls 
less equivocally for the complete displacement of tort law, arguing 
that tort law should serve little more than a "stopgap" function. Fi-
nally, at the other end of the regulators' spectrum, Professor 
Sugarman proposes doing away with tort law altogether. These schol-
ars' views are discussed in turn. 
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2. Choosing the Optimal Form of Regulation 
a. William Landes and Richard Posner. 
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i. Liability-standard dimension. Professor Landes and Judge 
Posner are unique among products liability scholars in not calling for 
reform.215 They are also the only regulators who challenge, albeit 
sparsely, the contractarians' position that consumers are sufficiently 
well informed of product risks for product markets to yield efficient 
levels of safety. Landes and Posner contend that information costs 
lead to a significant market failure in the market for consumer product 
warranties: 
[G]iven the high costs (relative to benefits) of information about an ex-
tremely low-probability event, [the expected damages from which are 
low], it may not pay the consumer to study a disclaimer of liability care-
fully even if it is clear and conspicuous. A manufacturer will reap little 
consumer ill will from fooling consumers with a disclaimer that they fail 
to read, because product accidents are so rare anyway; and for the same 
reason competing manufacturers will not find it profitable to try to com-
pete by offering to disclaim disclaimers. High information costs relative 
to the benefits of the information may defeat voluntary contracting.216 
Thus, the market fails to. allocate the costs of consumer product ~sks 
efficiently according to Landes and Posner, because consumers are im-
perfectly informed, a consequence of consumers' rational decisions not 
to procure information when the costs of doing so would outweigh the 
benefits. 
In their view, the empirical evidence that contractarians like Priest 
offer to support their belief that product warranties are efficient217 is 
relevant only with regard to risks of product replacement and repair. 
Such evidence proves nothing about the likely efficiency of warranties 
for allocating the risk of personal injuries. Because of this market fail-
ure, their argument goes, strict liability is often the most efficient lia-
bility standard: 
The kind of product failures against which manufacturers expressly war-
rant. their products are frequent and hence familiar to consumers and 
therefore enter into their buying decisions. But product failures that 
cause serious personal injuries are extremely rare, and the cost to the 
consumer of becoming informed about them is apt to exceed the ex-
pected benefit .... Therefore, if the manufacturer is not made liable, the 
marketplace may fail to discipline him by diverting consumers to safer 
brands. Strict liability in effect impounds information about product 
215. Not coincidentally, they are also unique in ignoring insurance considerations in their 
analysis of alternative regimes. See infra note 239. 
216. LANDES & PosNER, supra note 7, at 281-82 (emphasis added); see also Landes & Pos-
ner, supra note 12, at 543-45, 547. 
217. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text. 
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hazards into the price of the product, resulting in a substitution away 
from hazardous products by consumers who may be completely unaware 
of hazards.218 
Landes and Posner conclude, however, that, depending on the context, 
either "a strict liability rule ... [or] a negligence rule will create incen-
tives for the parties to take the right amount of care in product cases 
even if [contracting costs] are prohibitive."219 Thus, Landes and Pos-
ner seem to occupy Rows 2 and 3 of the Products Liability Matrix. 
ii. Mutability dimension. The same market failure that leads 
Landes and Posner to argue in favor of a strict liability or negligence 
standard also appears at first glance to lead them to conclude that the 
liability standard should be mandatory: 
[Our] analysis may ... explain the law's refusal to enforce disclaimers of 
liability for personal injuries caused by product accidents. If the hazard 
is very small, it will not pay the consumer to be attentive to disclaimers; 
and, for the same reason, the manufacturer will not reap significant ill 
will when he enforces the disclaimer in those very few cases in which 
someone is injured.220 
Thus, they conclude "the law's decision not to leave the regulation of 
product safety entirely to the market appears to be an economically 
·rational one. "221 This suggests that Landes and Posner properly be-
long in Boxes 4 and 6 of the Products Liability Matrix. 
, But Landes ~d Posner's position on the mutability dimension 
comes with a twist. They argue not that the liability standard should 
always be mandatory, but that it should be mandatory only for nonob-
vious risks. Thus, Landes and Posner seem to take the position that 
the liability standard should be only presumptively mandatory.222 To 
this extent, Landes and Posner accurately might be placed in Boxes 3 
and 5 of the Products Liability Matrix. The presumption against en-
forcing disclaimers of liability is rebutted when "the danger to the con-
sumer is in the product itself and . . . the danger is obvious to the 
218. POSNER, supra note 10, at 166; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 280-82. 
219. Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 543. 
220. POSNER, supra note 10, at 166; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 544. Else-
where Landes and Posner write: 
[T]he injurer and the victim have a contractual relationship, so why shouldn't they be left to 
work out the optimal combination of safety precautions contractually? ... 
The answer is that contracts are costly to make and that the costs may well exceed the 
benefits, relative to regulation by tort law, when the contingencies that would be regulated 
by contract - death or personal injury from using a product - are extremely remote. 
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 280 (footnote omitted). Others have suggested a similar 
market failure. See, e.g., CooTBR & ULEN, supra note 8, at 428; Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, 
at 174-75. 
221. Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 547. 
222. Put differently, they take the position that manufacturers should be able to contract 
around the default by ensuring that consumers are well informed. 
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consumer .... "223 Under such circumstances: 
the consumer ... will be deemed to have assumed the risk of an accident 
if one occurs ... and the manufacturer will not be liable. Therefore, if 
the manufacturer wants to disclaim liability, he need only take steps to 
make sure that the danger in his product is obvious to the consumer. 
The danger may be obvious from casual inspection but if not it usually 
can be made obvious by a warning on the label or by descriptive literature 
included in the package in which the product is sold. In effect, the law 
enforces an implicit disclaimer when the costs of information to the con-
sumer are low .... 224 
According to Landes and Posner, this common law "solution is con-
sistent with the economics of the problem."225 
Although Landes and Posner suggest that they have provided fur-
ther specific evidence in support of their positivist claims, they have in 
fact created a significant tension.226 On one hand, they argue that 
courts should not enforce disclaimers against personal injuries, be-
cause "product failures that cause serious personal injuries are ex-
tremely rare, and the cost to the consumer of becoming informed 
about them is apt to exceed the expected benefit."227 On the other 
223. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 283. 
224. Id. at 283·84 (emphasis added). 
225. Id. at 284. Unhappily, Landes and Posner have received no support and much criticism 
for their position. At the most general level, critics have brushed their arguments aside for rea-
sons that appear largely unrelated to the arguments themselves. The now-common refrain is that 
Landes and Posner are so committed to reaching conclusions that confirm their positivist hy-
pothesis - that tort law is best explained as if the judges were trying to promote efficient re-
source allocation - that they have indiscriminately adopted whatever arguments will get them 
there. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 1. Epstein, for example, writes: "Landes and Posner 
reach [their] position only because they are so wedded to their 'positive' theory that the common 
law rules of liability must be 'efficient' •... " Epstein, supra note 101, at 2205; see also Priest, 
supra note 29, at 23 (''The efficiency issue has been treated as seriously as it has only because of 
excessive attention to the extravagant Posner-Landes empirical claims of the efficiency of the 
law."); HUBER, supra note 8, at 6 (disparaging Posner's role in the products liability revolution, 
which gave rise to the liability crisis). So too Huber writes: 
An economist, it has been said, is someone who observes what is happening in practice and 
goes oil' to study whether it is possible in theory. The new tort economists[, Landes and 
Posner plainly central among them,] were entirely true to that great tradition. Indeed, they 
carried it a step forward, concluding that the legal revolution that had already occurred was 
not only possible but justified and necessary. Mustering all the dense prose, arcane jargon, 
and elaborate methodology that only the very best academic economists muster, they set 
about proving on paper that the whole new tort structure was an efficient and inevitable 
reaction to failures in the marketplace. 
Id. Without exception, other legal economists disagree with Landes and Posner's conclusion that 
both the historical development of tort law and its current doctrinal structure are in the main 
consistent with efficiency. Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 535. Consequently, but unfortu-
nately, the arguments underlying Landes and Posner's conclusions have been given little if any 
credence. 
226. Others have offered dill'erent criticisms of Landes and Posner's view of products liability 
law. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Comments on Landes and Posner: A Positive Economic Anal-
ysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 572 (1985); Epstein, supra note 101, at 2204-
05. 
227. POSNER, supra note 10, at 166, and text accompanying note 218. 
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hand, they argue that the immutability of the liability standard should 
be merely a rebuttable presumption and that, accordingly, courts 
should not hold manufacturers liable for the accidents their products 
cause when consumers are informed of product risks. According to 
Landes and Posner, consumers are adequately informed when the dan-
ger is obvious - when there is a "warning on the label" or "descrip-
tive literature included in the package in which the product is sold."228 
A warning or descriptive literature constitutes an "implicit dis-
claimer" that courts should enforce. This analysis raises but fails to 
answer the question of why consumers would ever bother to become 
informed of a product's risks through the product's warning or de-
scriptive literature, when becoming informed of the product's risks by 
reading the product's warranties and warranty disclaimers ("even if 
[the disclaimer] is clear and conspicuous"229) would not be worthwhile 
for them. 
Landes and Posner seem to anticipate this criticism, arguing that 
"[i]t is not inconsistent to allow warnings to defeat liability but refuse 
to enforce disclaimers of liability."23o They explain: "The warnings 
come into play only when the product is highly dangerous, either to all 
users or to a defined class of users. The benefits of information to 
consumers are very great in such a case, and consumers can therefore 
be expected to make some investment in absorbing the information 
conveyed by the manufacturer."231 But this defense is not persuasive. 
To begin with, warnings may in some instances act as implied dis-
claimers even when the product is not highly or obviously dangerous. 
Manufacturers use warnings (and courts sometimes enforce them as 
implied disclaimers in at least some jurisdictions) for products span-
ning a significant range of riskiness.232 Thus, to the extent that warn-
ings are used or could be used for low-risk products, the law is 
inefficient, either because it treats warnings as implied disclaimers of 
personal injury liability or because it does not enforce explicit dis-
claimers of personal injury liability. 
Moreover, even if manufacturers used warnings only for "highly 
228. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 283. 
229. Id. at 281. 
230. Id. at 297. 
231. Id. 
232. See, e.g., Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 731 P.2d 1267 (Idaho 1986) (manufacturer 
of aluminum twist-off soft drink bottle caps held liable for failing to warn ultimate consumer that 
cap could blow off forcibly and cause injuries), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1031 (1988); Moran v. 
Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 20 (Md. 1975) (allowing plaintiff to recover against perfume manu· 
facturer for explosion caused by plaintiff's pouring perfume over a lit candle; perfume held defec· 
tive for failure to warn of flammability hazard). 
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dangerous products," it is not clear why c0nsumers would have any 
incentive to look at the warnings. Before making the investment to 
determine whether a product is dangerous, consumers, according to 
the logic of Landes and Posner's argument, have to know that the 
product is highly dangerous. Otherwise, they will not know that the 
"benefits of information" "are very great." If a consumer does not 
know that the product is particularly risky, then she has no incentive 
"to make some investment in absorbing the information Conveyed by 
the manufacturer." In short, Landes and Posner's argument is circu-
lar: A product's risk is obvious when consumers know the product is 
risky; consumers know a product is risky when manufacturers warn 
them that the product is risky; and consumers will read manufactur-
ers' warnings when the consumers know that a product is risky. 
Landes and Posner never explain how consumers know a product is 
dangerous in the first place. Even if consumers did know (from some 
exogenous source) that a product was dangerous, a warning would 
only tell consumers what they already knew.233 Consumers either do 
not know that a product is risky, in which case they will have no in-
centive to find out, or they do know that a product is risky, in which 
case they have little to learn. Warnings, in either case, have no effect. 
Landes and Posner may imagine that product warnings proVide 
consumers with specific details about the product's danger when the 
consumer already perceives that the product is dangerous in some gen-
eral sense. But Landes and Posner offer no evidence to suggest that 
product warnings are, as an empirical matter, particularly specific or 
informative.234 Even if they were, the fact remains that, the more spe-
cific or detailed a warning becomes, the more remote each specific risk 
associated with the product's overall risk becomes, and the less likely 
that consumers will perceive the product as risky. That is, the benefits 
of reading a warning decrease as the warning's specificity increases. 
Moreover, the more detailed the warning, the greater the costs of read-
ing and absorbing it.235 In short, no matter what type of product or 
risk is involved, Landes and Posner offer no plausible argument to sug-
233. See VISCUS!, supra note 117, at 142 ("If the hazards are widely known or readily appar-
ent, warnings have no new information to convey."). Another problem with Landes and Pos-
ner's efficiency analysis is that it neglects to consider the fact that under any default standard less 
strict than absolute manufacturer liability, manufacturers will not have an incentive to warn 
consumers against all product risks. See infra section IV.C.1. 
234. The federally mandated warnings that cigarette manufacturers are required to provide, 
for example, do not seem especially informative. See Debra Jones Ringold & John E. Calfee, The 
Informational Content of Cigarette Advertising: 1926-86, 8 J. PUB. POLY. & MARKETING 1 
(1989). 
235. See VISCUS!, supra note 117, at 139-40 (describing problem of information overload); id. 
at 143 ("Detailed examination of the information that individuals retain from hazard warnings 
indicates that even with very detailed and well-designed warning labels, individuals can seldom 
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gest why courts should treat warnings, as implied disclaimers of liabil-
ity for personal injury, any differently than they treat explicit 
disclaimers. H warnings can effectively communicate information to 
consumers about a product's risks, then explicit disclaimers of liability 
against those risks should do so equally well. 236 
Furthermore, Landes and Posner's reliance on warnings as a justi-
fication for absolute consumer liability seems to disregard the justifica-
tion they provide for the position they take on the liability-standard 
dimension. When justifying strict liability, they argue that the price 
mechanism acts as a powerful source of information for both consum-
ers and manufacturers.237 However, they make no mention of the 
price mechanism when justifying the court's use of absolute consumer 
liability. With regard to strict liability, they write: 
It is true that to a perfectly informed consumer the price increase 
resulting from strict liability would not be a net cost; it would just offset 
the benefit [the consumer] would be receiving from shifting to the manu-
facturer the cost of injuries caused by the product. But now recurs the 
point that it does not pay consumers to obtain information about small 
product risks. Suppose that in making his purchasing decisions the con-
sumer will treat minute risks as zero risks (that is, they will not affect his 
decisions) ... simply because it does not pay to compute and try to avoid 
extremely remote contingencies .... Then in a world of no liability, 
output will exceed the optimal output ... and the manufacturer will fail 
to take due care. Shifting to strict liability will result in a price increase 
to cover the manufacturer's expected products liability costs, and the 
higher price will be perceived by the consumer as an increase in the full 
cost of the product ... and there will be some substitution away from the 
product. Thus, . . . the information about risk is impounded in the 
higher price and "communicated" to the consumer in a form that he can 
understand without investing in costly information. Finally, because the 
manufacturer aggregates the expected accident costs of all his present 
and future customers, an imperceptible cost to the individual consumer 
becomes a noticeable cost to the manufacturer, inducing him to look for 
ways of making long-run improvements in safety.238 
Landes and Posner's argument here, though sound, proves too much. 
The price mechanism, as they describe it, will communicate informa-
tion to manufacturers and consumers no matter how risky the prod-
recall more than six pieces of information from a label. • . • With the addition of more informa· 
tion, individuals eventually reach a saturation point.") (footnotes omitted). 
236. To put it another way, the question whether a liability standard is a default standard is 
separate from the question of what the necessary and sufficient conditions are to contract around 
a default. See infra note 340 and text accompanying notes 341-42. See generally Ayres & 
Gertner, supra note 15, at 121-23 (discussing the "default-immutable spectrum"). If opting out 
of the default liability standard requires enumerating the risks that a product poses, then Landes 
and Posner's distinction between warranties and warnings collapses. 
237. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 287. 
238. Id. at 293-94. 
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uct. Although Landes and Posner argue that warnings under an 
absolute consumer liability standard will effectively communicate to 
consumers the risks of highly dangerous products, they offer no expla-
nation for why the price mechanism under a strict liability standard is 
not an equally or more effective means to the same end. 239 
In sum, although Landes and Posner's arguments regarding the 
effects of costly information are not without merit, the arguments do 
not support their conclusion that the current products liability regime 
is the most efficient. 
b. W. Kip Viscusi. 
Sharing Landes and Posner's point of departure, Professor Viscusi 
argues that unregulated consumer product markets are inefficient and 
that "[t]he purpose of products liability is to fill the gaps left by mar-
ket imperfections and to replicate the incentives that would have been 
generated had markets been functioning perfectly."240 According to 
Viscusi, "the chief inadequacy of the market is inadequate risk inf or-
239. Landes and Posner try to defend absolute consumer liability by illustrating that under· 
strict liability high-risk consumers will be able to buy produ9ts at the same price as low-risk 
consumers and that strict liability could therefore lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. 
Id. at 295-96. 
But Landes and Posner's defense creates more problems than it solves. First, even if strict 
liability could lead to an inefficient allocation of resources, the same would be true for all types of 
products - high· and low-risk products alike. Yet Landes and Posner ignore this potential 
problem when. they defend strict liability for low-risk products. 
Second, their argument that strict liability forces low-risk consumers to cross-subsidize high-
risk consumers is, although they do not style it as such, an argument about the insurance effects 
of strict liability. Indeed, Huber, Epstein, and Priest each consider this same phenomenon to 
represent one of the most significant adverse insurance effects of strict liability. In those scholars' 
views, the heterogeneity of consumer product risk pools - in other words, the inability of manu-
facturers to segregate high-risk from low-risk consumers - is chiefly to blame for the recent 
insurance "crisis." HUBER, supra note 8, at 133-52; Priest, supra note 9, at 1550-63. But see 
Croley & Hanson, supra note 4, at 29-38 (arguing that the phenomenon does not plausibly ex-
plain the insurance crisis); Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 153 -58 (arguing that manufactur· 
ers can segregate consumers into reasonably narrow risk pools). Landes and Posner thus cannot 
claim to have tested, much less confirmed, their hypothesis that the common law is efficient when 
they have disregarded the very evidence that most scholars believe proves the contrary. 
Moreover, Landes and Posner emphasize that the vitality of their positivist approach depends 
on their fully excluding insurance considerations from their analysis. See LANDES & POSNER, 
supra note 7, at 22, 273; Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 536. By employing an insurance 
argument, Landes and Posner threaten their economic theory by substituting rationalization for 
prediction. That is, Landes and Posner may have unwittingly undermined their positivist project 
by relying on insurance considerations to justify the exceptions courts have made to the general 
rule of strict liability. 
Finally, the cross-subsidization problem that Landes and Posner describe as existing under 
strict liability would also exist under the absolute consumer liability standard that they attempt 
to defend. One difference is that, under an absolute consumer liability standard, the problem 
would occur in first-party insurance pools instead of in the pools of consumers who buy the 
products. The problem is the same in both situations. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 
137-41. Indeed, it might be greater in first-party insurance pools. See id. at 137-59, 164-66. 
240. VISCUSI, supra note 117, at 66. 
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mation":241 "Specifically, information and transactions costs make 
complete internalization of the costs of risk impossible. The resulting 
risk-reduction incentives exist at less than efficient levels, giving rise to 
a greater than optimal number of accidents."242 
Although Viscusi's general goal is to replicate the incentives of a 
perfectly functioning market, he focuses primarily on consumers' role 
in reducing product accidents. Explaining the need for increased reli-
ance on product warnings, he writes: "What is most needed . . . is a 
general recognition that the consumer must play an active role in pro-
moting product safety."243 The goals of Viscusi's reform proposals 
therefore include shifting "greater responsibility for safety to the con-
sumer of a product so that the overall scope of liability will be dimin-
ished. "244 The attempt to inform consumers so that they can play an 
active role in accident prevention underlies much of Viscusi's reform 
project. 
i. Liability-standard dimension. Viscusi focuses almost entirely 
on accidents caused by defects in the design of a product.245 For these 
design defect cases, Viscusi prefers different standards for two different 
types of risks: those risks for which product warnings would be effec-
tive (warnable risks), and those for which product warnings would not 
be effective (unwarnable risks). 246 For unwamable risks, he advocates 
a negligence standard.247 With Michael Moore, Viscusi explains: 
"The liability test should be simply whether the firm has provided an 
efficient degree of product safety .... In place of the current strict 
liability standard, we would substitute an elaborate negligence test de-
fined in economic terms."248 In a first-best world, regulators would 
241. Id. at 64. 
242. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role/or Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Govern-
ment Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON RBo. 65, 82 
(1989). . 
243. Viscus1, supra note 117, at 212. 
244. Id. at 212-13; see also id. at 9 ("Ideally, warnings should shift more of the responsibility 
for product safety from the producer to the user."), 12 ("Product safety is a shared responsibility, 
not just a corporate responsibility."), 124 (''The chief method of bringing consumer habits into 
the picture is the hazard warning ..•• "). 
245. Following Viscusi's lead, we will focus primarily on his proposal to reform tort law's 
approach to design defect cases. With respect to the less significant class of injuries caused by 
products that fail a manufacturer's own standard of design, manufacturing defects, Viscusi rec-
ommends retaining § 402A's strict liability standard (somewhere between Box 6 and Box 8). Id. 
at 11. 
246. Although Viscusi does not say so explicitly, the set of products that pose warnable risks 
seems quite small, consisting of products that pose risks of which consumers are unaware and of 
which warnings can make consumers aware without being alarmist. See id. at 134-35, 142-46; 
see also infra text accompanying notes 267-68. 
247. See Viscus1, supra note 117, at 136. 
248. W. Kip Viscusi & Michael Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship Between Product Lia-
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"apply" the negligence test to manufacturers by prescribing product 
design standards.249 Until reformed regulatory agencies supplant tort 
law, however, Viscusi would have courts apply his negligence standard 
to unwarnable product risks. For warnable risks, Viscusi would adopt 
absolute manufacturer liability.250 
ii. Mutability dimension. For unwarnable risks, Viscusi would 
make the negligence standard mandatory. As for warnable risks, Vis-
cusi would allow manufacturers to contract out of absolute manufac-
turer liability through product warnings. However, just as Viscusi 
would prefer that administrative agencies rather than courts enforce 
the negligence standard, he would also prefer that agencies rather than 
courts devise and prescribe effective warnings. Where courts perform 
this function, manufacturers would still have to pass Viscusi's rigorous 
risk-utility negligence test to avoid liability. That is, manufacturers 
could contract out of Box 7, but only as far as Box 4. In urging courts 
to adopt his ·risk-utility analysis rather than absolute consumer liabil-
ity (where manufacturers have provided court-approved warnings), 
Viscusi is proposing a reform that is "incremental in character . . . 
modest rather than revolutionary."251 Where agencies rather than 
manufacturers and courts devise and prescribe product warnings, 
however, Viscusi would allow the liability standard to be fully muta-
ble. That is, manufacturers could, through product warnings, con-
tract out of absolute liability completely without being subject to a 
court's risk-utility test.252 
The goal of all of Viscusi's proposed reforms, recall, is to overcome 
the problem of imperfect consumer information. Viscusi's warning re-
quirement would do so by inducing manufacturers to disclose infor-
mation about a product's risk of preventable and unpreventable 
accidents.253 Based on that information, consumers would adjust their 
bility and Innovation, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTERESr, supra note 14, at 105, 124. See 
generally V1Scus1, supra note 117, at 62-86 (describing the current design defect test and propos-
ing a more rigorous version); Suzanne M. Lambert, Book Note, 90 Mice. L. REv. 1634, 1635-36 
(providing a helpful summary of Viscusi's proposed risk-utility test). 
249. See infra note 284 and accompanying text. 
250. V1Scus1, supra note 117, at 136. 
251. Id. at 86; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 
39 AM. U. L. REv. 573 (1990): 
The original emphasis of risk-utility analysis on the need for balanced decisions with respect 
to product liability is a correct and fundamental principle. Moreover, many traditional fac-
tors that have been considered are legitimate, but they did not provide a framework for 
comprehensive and consistent risk-utility judgments. The development in this Article of a 
series of economic formulations of the risk-utility test is intended to establish a sounder basis 
for a products liability defect doctrine. · 
Id. at 614. 
252. V1Scus1, supra note 117, at 128, 149. 
253. Although Viscusi does not refer to it as such, he has proposed what Ian Ayres and 
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care and activity levels.254 The purpose of Viscusi's risk-utility test is 
to ensure that manufacturers adjust their care levels to prevent all ini-
tially preventable accidents. As Viscusi recognizes, however, the risk-
utility test would be redundant if warnings were fully effective at in-
forming consumers. 255 That test is necessary only because, Viscusi 
must believe, manufacturers' warnings will not ensure that consumers 
are completely informed. In theory, under Viscusi's approach, all jus-
tified care- and activity-level adjustments would be made,256 repli-
cating the incentives of a perfectly functioning market. Upon careful 
scrutiny, however, Viscusi's proposals seem unlikely either to mitigate 
the problem of imperfect information or to affect consumer behavior 
substantially. 
According to Viscusi, "most product risks tend to be compara-
tively small, and in the typical case in which there is some (imperfect) 
awareness of the risk, individuals are likely to overestimate these risk 
levels."257 Where consumers overestimate risks, "[i]ncentives for 
safety generated for firms will consequently be too great, rather than 
too small."258 Therefore, "there is no need for additional intervention 
through tort liability."259 If warnings were provided for already over-
estimated risks, warnings would only exacerbate the problem. As Vis-
cusi explains, "the very presence of a risk warning" may "boost the 
consumers' risk perception in an adverse manner."260 For most prod-
uct risks, therefore, a warning requirement would, if anything, make a 
bad situation worse. 
Warnings will be helpful, if at all, for only a minority of product 
risks.261 According to Viscusi, this class of risks "includes those posed 
by pesticides, food additives, many pharmaceutical products, and 
long-term carcinogenic risks."262 Viscusi's examples, however, seem 
inapposite. First, it is not clear - and Viscusi offers no evidence -
that consumers are unaware of the fact that such products pose 
Robert Gertner termed a "penalty default." See supra note 208; infra notes 420-22 and accom-
panying text. 
254. Viscusi's explicit goal, recall, is to encourage consumers to change their behavior. See 
supra note 244 and accompanying text; see also VISCUSI, supra note 117, at 156. 
255. See VISCUS!, supra note 117, at 146 (explaining that where warnings are effective the 
market will, in effect, perform its own risk-utility test). 
256. See id. at 134-39. 
257. Id. at 64; see also id. at 136 (explaining that warnings are not needed where risks are 
visible or publicized). 
258. Id. at 64. 
259. Id. at 65. 
260. Id. at 136-37. 
261. Id. at 136, 142. 
262. Id. at 136. 
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risks.263 Moreover, many if not most of those risks will probably be 
relatively small. That is a problem, because Viscusi wants manufac-
turers not to warn consumers about small risks.264 The costs to manu-
facturers of warning consumers of such risks will often exceed the 
benefits, especially when more detailed warnings lead to "information 
overload. "265 Furthermore, as Viscusi recognizes, it is often irrational 
for consumers to take account of small risks or for them to read, pro-
cess, and heed product warnings of such risks.266 Accordingly, Vis-
cusi's warning requirement would fail to inform consumers of a 
substantial subset of risks of which they are not already aware. The 
only risks for which Viscusi's warning proposal may have some benefi-
cial effect are significant risks that are not initially preventable and of 
which consumers are otherwise unaware. Because the number of 
warnable risks may well be small, the game may not be worth the 
candle. 
Even assuming that Viscusi's proposals for how courts should ap-
proach warnings would improve consumers' information, why he goes 
further to propose that courts adopt a rigorous risk-utility negligence 
test as well is not entirely clear. For risks that are warnable, effective 
product warnings presumably would communicate to consumers 
whatever information they needed to know. For risks that are un-
warnable, it is not clear why regulation is justified. After all, Viscusi 
argues that most product risks tend to be small and that consumers 
tend to overestimate small risks, in which case market incentives 
overdeter.267 In any event, Viscusi must believe that there remains 
some informational imperfection-whether due to (1) warnable risks 
for which warnings are not fully effective, (2) unwarnable risks that 
consumers underestimate, or (3) possibly Viscusi's doubt that courts 
can competently distinguish between warnable and unwarnable risks 
- that warrants his risk-utility test. This raises the question whether 
his proposed risk-utility test would accomplish his deterrence goals, 
which seems unlikely for several reasons. 
First, even assuming courts could successfully implement Viscusi's 
elaborate negligence test, consumers would still have no incentive to 
263. Our empirical hunch, for whatever it is worth, is that those products fall within the 
class of product risks of which consumers are aware and, assuming Viscusi is correct, that con-
sumers therefore overestimate. 
264. See id. at 83, 151; see also Schwartz, supra note 87, at 841 ("firms should not warn 
against slight risks at all"). 
265. See infra text accompanying notes 423-24. 
266. VISCUSI, supra note 117, at 83, 138-39, 148-49; see also supra note 220 and accompany-
ing text. 
267. See supra text accompanying note 258; VISCUSI, supra note 117, at 64, 136. 
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increase their care levels in response to residually preventable risks, or 
decrease their activity levels in response to unpreventable risks, given 
that, by hypothesis, consumers are uninformed of those risks. 268 
Moreover, with respect to initially preventable accidents, many 
legal economists have argued that courts cannot successfully imple-
ment a rigorous cost-benefit negligence analysis.269 Viscusi acknowl-
edges that "courts are not well suited to resolving product design 
questions."270 But he offers no defense to the criticism "that a com-
prehensive risk-utility analysis is too difficult for judges and juries to 
undertake and that making societal benefit and cost decisions regard-
ing product safety is beyond their competence."271 Viscusi responds 
that, although "[s]uch criticisms are not without foundation, ... the 
solution is not to establish a simpler but less appropriate test for ascer-
taining product defects."272 But Viscusi never explains why his ap-
proach provides the optimal balance between simplicity and 
268. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 293-94; Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 
175-79; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 376-78. 
The problem of imperfect consumer information may plague Viscusi's proposal in other ways 
too. For instance, under Viscusi's proposed regime, manufacturers would be liable for initially 
preventable design-related accidents, but consumers would not always know whether a manufac· 
turer was liable unless they brought a claim. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 4, at 17 (explain-
ing that not just the liability rule, but also the litigants' need for information to determine the 
application of a liability rule, often necessitates litigation). Costly false positives and false nega-
tives would occur as injured consumers attempted to litigate invalid claims and failed to litigate 
valid claims. To the extent that some consumers injured in initially preventable accidents did not 
make claims due to, for example, inadequate information about their legal prospects or prohibi-
tive costs of litigation, manufacturers would have insufficient incentive to take optimal precau-
tions. On the other hand, to the extent that injured consumers litigated their claims in order to 
find out whether they had valid negligence claims (that is, whether the injury was initially pre-
ventable), one of the purported advantages of negligence over strict liability or absolute manufac-
turer liability - fewer cases litigated - would disappear. Of course, this criticism applies to all 
scholars who recommend a standard tougher than absolute consumer liability or less strict than 
absolute manufacturer liability (although consumers must know whether a product caused an 
injury even under the latter). This criticism seems especially applicable to the proposals of Vis-
cusi and Priest because they call for an elaborate cost-benefit standard. Consumers are unlikely 
to have the requisite information or (even assuming they had the information) the sophistication 
to conduct the cost-benefit analysis for themselves. 
269. Priest and Viscusi both clearly favor a cost-benefit negligence regime, and both believe 
that courts have employed the wrong negligence test. Accordingly, both urge courts to adopt 
their more rigorous negligence formulations. Schwartz agrees that courts have applied an ineffi-
cient negligence test but argues that courts are simply incapable of applying a negligence rule 
that will yield efficient outcomes. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 386-88; see also Croley & Han-
son, supra note 4, at 94-96; supra sources cited in note 206. Schwartz prescribes strict liability in 
part for that reason. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. Neither Priest nor Viscusi has 
attempted to defend his proposals against Schwartz' criticisms of negligence. Similarly, these 
scholars have not offered a persuasive defense of negligence against the argument that a negli-
gence standard fails to optimize activity levels. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 368-
69; SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 25; see also Croley & Hanson, supra note 4, at 68-75 (criticizing 
Priest on this basis). 
270. V1Scus1, supra note 117, at 212. 
271. Id. 
212-,Id. 
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appropriateness. What is more, Viscusi does not defend his proposal 
against alternative reforms of the tort system. Instead, he simply con-
cedes that courts are ill equipped to conduct cost-benefit analyses, 
which is tantamount to conceding that his proposed risk-utility test 
may have little beneficial effect. 
Because Viscusi recognizes the inherent, insuperable limitations of 
the tort regime he proposes, his first-best regime is one in which courts 
would assume a residual role, and administrative agencies a primary 
role, in the regulation of consumer product risks. He writes: "[W]e 
should recognize the limited competence of the courts and attempt to 
shift the task of promoting product safety to those institutions that are 
better equipped to handle the necessary societal tradeoffs" - adminis-
trative agencies.273 And, ideally, administrative agencies instead of 
courts could assess the adequacy of warnings and prescribe warning 
requirements for manufacturers.274 Ideally, administrative agencies 
instead of courts could also assess the adequacy of alternative product 
designs and prescribe design standards for manufacturers. 275 In-short, 
Viscusi's ultimate response to the limitations of his tort proposal is 
that those limitations simply underscore the need for administrative 
regulation to govern both warnings and product designs - that is, 
administrative regulation for both dimensions of products liability. 
One immediate problem with that response, however, Viscusi also 
recognizes: administrative regulation is currently ineffective, and how 
to get from the current administrative regime to the reformed regime 
he hypothesizes is not at all clear.276 Viscusi himself has identified 
many of the specific ways that administrative regulation can be ineffec-
tive. 277 As he points out, "[the regulatory] process is subject to the 
same political forces that drive other types of government action."278 
273. Id. at 212. 
274. Id. at 155-56 (explaining proposal for a national warnings policy). 
275. Id. at 120 ("The safety incentives of products liability are dwarfed by those achievable 
through regulation."), 131 ("tort system should be subsidiary" to other institutions), 210 (other 
institutions should perform "the brunt of the task of promoting safety"). 
276. Viscusi asserts without explanation or argumentation that "[a]gencies can resolve [their] 
problems more easily than the problems associated with both tort liability and social insurance 
can be resolved." Id. at 122-23. 
277. See generally W. KIP VISCUS!, REGULATING CoNSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY (1984). 
As Landes and Posner observe: 
Those scholars who are primarily interested in developing proposals for better methods 
of cost internalization naturally find the tort system wanting when compared with the ideal 
standard to which they orient their own proposals. The experience with direct regulation of 
the economy, however, indicates that ideal solutions to problems of cost internalization are 
unlikely to be achieved in practice. One is therefore inclined to view the shortcomings of the 
tort system in a more forgiving light. 
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 53. 
278. VISCUS!, supra note 117, at 118-19. 
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Further, administrative regulation "often involves substantial de-
lays."279 Regulators can be both underzealous - "[n]ot all product 
risks are addressed by regulation"280 - and overzealous - when reg-
ulators "go beyond the efficient level of precautions in setting the risk 
level."281 Finally, Viscusi argues that regulatory approaches have 
wrongly "emphasized the role of technological solutions as opposed to 
behavior[ ]al ones."282 Even according to Viscusi's own assessment of 
administrative regulation, therefore, his proposal would not necessar-
ily bring us any closer to replicating the incentives of a perfectly func-
tioning market. 
Assume for the sake of argument that administrative regulation 
could be effectively reformed to cause agencies to devise and prescribe 
optimal warnings and optimal design standards. What kind of "be-
havioral solutions" would the world of reformed administrative agen-
cies produce? Unfortunately, even in the first-best world of reformed 
administrative regulation, Viscusi's proposals appear capable neither 
of overcoming the market failure that he believes justifies regulation in 
the first place - imperfect consumer information - nor of avoiding 
the shortcoming he believes characterizes current tort-oriented ap-
proaches to regulation - the failure to affect consumers' behavior. 
First of all, assuming that regulators could always adopt and pre-
scribe optimal product warnings, those warnings still would not 
render consumers fully informed. That is, optimal warnings are not 
fully informative warnings, as Viscusi himself explains. Given con-
sumers' propensity to overestimate small risks they are aware of as 
well as risks "brought to their attention," warnings require delicate 
tradeoffs involving the quantity and the format of information 
presented in warnings. Viscusi proposes that regulators, rather than 
manufacturers and courts, perform those tradeoffs, on the grounds 
that regulators are better equipped to do so. But, as Viscusi explains, 
even the best warnings are helpful only for certain kinds of product 
risks and only for conveying a certain amount of information.283 
Warned consumers who lack adequate information about residually 
279. Id. at 119. Because of delays in the appointment of a third Commissioner, the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission did not even convene, let alone adopt any safety standards, 
for almost one year, from December 29, 1988, to December 12, 1989, following the 1988 presi· 
dential election. Telephone Interview with Rochelle Hammond, Office of Executive Secretary, 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (July 20, 1990). 
280. VISCUSI, supra note 117, at 121. 
281. Id. at 119. 
282. Id. at 123. 
283. See supra notes 257-61 and accompanying text; infra notes 423-26 and accompanying 
text. 
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preventable accident risks will not adjust their care levels accordingly, 
and warned consumers who lack adequate information about unpre-
ventable risks will not adjust their activity levels accordingly. 
Second, assuming that regulators always prescribed optimal design 
standards and manufacturers complied perfectly, consumers would 
still be uninformed about the risks of residually preventable and un-
preventable accidents. Because in the first-best world manufacturers 
would not be liable so long as they complied with regulatory designs 
- according to Viscusi compliance with regulatory design standards 
should be exculpatory284 - manufacturers would have incentives not 
to inform consumers about the risks of residually preventable or un-
preventable accidents. In the absence of such information, consumers 
would have no reason to adjust either their care levels or their activity 
levels. Thus, in the world of reformed administrative regulation, the 
goal animating Viscusi's proposals would not be served.285 
As with other products liability scholars, then, the position Viscusi 
takes in one dimension of the Products Liability Matrix is in tension 
with the position he takes in the other. For unwarnable risks, he 
would not allow contracting out of a risk-utility test or regulatory de-
sign standards, on the grounds that consumers are uninformed. But if 
consumers are uninformed, it is not clear why Viscusi inhabits Row 2 
rather than Row 3 or 4. Similarly, for warnable risks, he begins in 
Box 7 but then is willing to allow contracting back to Box 4. He al-
lows this even though the warnings manufacturers supply to contract 
out of Box 7 will not fully inform consumers, and even though the 
risk-utility test and design standards to which manufacturers are sub-
ject in Box 4 will not overcome the problem of imperfect consumer 
information. 
c. Susan Rose-Ackerman. Professor Rose-Ackerman also advo-
cates increased reliance on administrative regulation. Like Viscusi, 
Rose-Ackerman argues that tort law could be employed as a "comple-
ment" to administrative regulation,286 though she is slightly less equiv-
ocal in calling for the abolition of tort law. Unfortunately, Rose-
Ackerman devotes little attention to explaining why regulation in any 
form is necessary. Offering no direct challenge to the contractari-
284. See VIScusr, supra note 117, at 128, 212. 
285. Indeed, Viscusi's first-best world may make matters worse, because in it compliance 
with regulatory designs is exculpatory, whereas in the second-best world manufacturers must 
also provide warnings to avoid liability for warnable risks. In other words, although administra-
tively authored warnings may be superior to manufacturer-authored (and court-approved) warn-
ings, in the first-best world consumers will get neither whenever manufacturers comply with 
regulatory designs. 
286. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 124, at 82-83. 
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ans,287 she remarks simply that "external effects and poor information 
cause serious market failures that only regulation can effectively 
address. "288 
In any case, Rose-Ackerman clearly favors administrative regula-
tion over tort regulation of product risks,289 although she believes the 
former is itself in need of reform, and she nowhere addresses the possi-
ble shortcomings of even a reformed system of administrative regula-
tions. 290 Her view of tort law's proper role depends on what the 
underlying administrative landscape looks like. She considers three 
types of administrative regulation: command-and-control regulation, 
performance-based standards, and incentive strategies.291 Rose-Ack-
287. She instead confines her analysis to those situations where contracts, by assumption, do 
not work: 
Of course, some risk situations may best be regulated by enforcing private contracts, and 
some instances of social regulation arguably fit into that category. This chapter, however, 
focuses on situations in which private contracts fail to incorporate all costs and in which tort 
suits are, therefore, the only feasible common law alternative to statutory regulation. 
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 124, at 82. 
288. Id. at 100; see also SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE 
AGENDA 7 (1992) [hereinafter ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING] ("Uninformed consumers may 
purchase products that cause health problems or do not perform as advertised."). Discussing 
"occupational health and safety," Rose-Ackerman sheds some, but not much, additional light on 
this.issue, writing that "people tend to be poorly informed about actual levels of risk. Many 
studies have documented these misperceptions and the general tendency to overestimate the 
probability of events that are beyond one's control while underestimating other risky possibili-
ties." Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics - And the New Administratfre 
Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 355 (1988) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Rose-Ackerman, Progressive 
Law]. 
289. Rose-Ackerman's discussion to some extent considers tort law in general, not just prod-
ucts liability. Thus, conclusions about her views on products liability must be drawn with cau-
tion. Furthermore, Rose-Ackerman's position on the most desirable products regime is hard to 
pin down because she focuses primarily on the distinctions and possible interrelationships be-
tween administrative and common law regulation, an important project in itself. 
That recognized, however, it seems that, while Rose-Ackerman contemplates the possibility 
of residual roles for tort law in other contexts, products liability in her view presents an especially 
strong case for wholesale statutory displacement. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING, supra 
note 288, at 121. Rose-Ackerman explains that, because the right to bring suit is "a well-en-
trenched social value," and because many see the tort system "as a defense against the state 
despite the fact that some statutes .•. were adopted to benefit ordinary people by substituting 
neutral administrative determinations for biased courts and costly lawyers,'' support for tort law 
"persists even when the logic of efficient risk control demands ex ante regulation." Rose-Acker-
man, supra note 124, at 85-86. Thus taking the persistence of tort law as given, Rose-Ackerman 
articulates how the tort system might be employed productively, rather than at cross-purposes to 
the administrative regime. See id. at 86. She seems to suggest, however, that wholesale displace-
ment of the tort system would be desirable if possible, at least in a world of reformed administra-
tive regulation. See id. at 82 ("I argue •.. that statutes should generally dominate so long as 
agencies can use rulemaking to shape policy. The trend to replace these more systematic regula-
tory techniques with case-by-case adjudication and product recalls should be resisted."), 101 
("Under incentive[-based administrative] schemes that require firms to pay for the damage they 
cause, statutes should preempt tort actions in order to avoid overdeterrence."). Indeed, as to 
product risks in particular, her view may be that the only regulation necessary is a mandated 
warning requirement. See infra text accompanying note 301. 
290. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKlNG, supra note 288, at 119. 
291. See generally Rose-Ackerman, supra note 124, at 95-98. Command-and-control regula-
February 1993] Enterprise Liability 753 
erman, as is common among legal economists, most prefers incentive-
based regulation, which gives the manufacturers the greatest leeway in 
choosing how to enhance safety, and she least prefers com.mand-and-
control regulation (which largely characterizes the current, un-
reformed administrative regime). 
Were administrative agencies to adopt the incentive-based ap-
proach, then tort law, according to Rose-Ackerman, should be pre-
empted altogether.292 Alternatively, if the administrative regime 
employed performance-based standards, Rose-Ackerman believes tort 
law should have one of two roles. Because of the significant eviden-
tiary burdens of establishing compliance or lack of compliance with 
performance standards, recovery in tort could be based upon either the 
standard set by the regulatory agency (in which case tort suits would 
be barred until the regulatory agency found a regulatory violation),293 
or absolute manufacturer liability. In either case, the court "need only 
assess damages, not compliance."294 
i. Liability-standard dimension. Meanwhile, in the not-yet-re-
formed administrative regime, Rose-Ackerman argues that tort regu-
lation can (but not necessarily should) be employed so as to 
complement administrative regulation: "[l]n policy areas that have 
not yet been reformed, a limited role remains for tort law or, at least, 
for private causes of action embedded in statutory schemes."295 This, 
however, "would require substantial tort reform."296 First, courts 
would need to adopt the same cost-benefit standards that are set by 
agencies and "apply them competently to individual cases."297 Alter-
natively, were courts to employ an absolute manufacturer liability 
standard, they would need to find better methods than they presently 
employ of "determining [causation] and assessing damages."298 Even 
then, however, tort law should serve largely a stopgap function, to be 
employed only until the appropriate agency acts. 299 
According to Rose-Ackerman, a reformed tort system of this sort 
tion imposes specific output requirements on regulated firms. Performance-based standards tell 
firms what they must accomplish but leaves them to decide how best to do so. Incentive-based 
regulation requires firms to internalize the total costs of their activities, leaving firms to decide 
· how to minimize those costs. 
292. See id. at 97-98. 
293. Id. at 96. 
294. Id. 
295. Id. at 101; see id. at 90-92. 
296. Id. at 91. 
297. Id. at 90. 
298. Id. at 91. 
299. Id. at 101. 
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might complement the unreformed administrative system in two ways: 
first, by serving as a supplementary enforcement system; second, by 
providing compensation. But, again, the tort system would serve these 
two functions only in a second-best administrative regime. In Rose-
Ackerman's view, other compensation mechanisms, including social 
and private insurance mechanisms, 300 and enforcement devices, in-
cluding a strengthened regime, are superior to those provided through 
tort law. 
Where Rose-Ackerman locates herself in the Products Liability 
Matrix thus depends on the type and extent of administrative regula-
tion that exists. Her first preference seems to be the expansion of in-
centive-based administrative regulation and the abolition of tort law 
(Row 1). To the extent that administrative regulators employ per-
formance-based or command-and-control standards, however, Rose-
Ackerman suggests a possible residual role for tort law and the imposi-
tion of a negligence or an absolute manufacturer liability standard. 
ii. Mutability dimension. On the mutability dimension, Rose-
Ackerman seems to suggest that manufacturers should be permitted, 
through product warnings, to contract out of liability. In her words, 
"[a] policy that requires suppliers to provide warnings ... may obviate 
the need for compensation by notifying buyers of the risks they 
face."3°1 Thus, Rose-Ackerman's view of warnings creates a now-fa-
miliar tension in her more general position regarding the need for reg-
ulation. If warnings can make consumers aware of the risks products 
pose, then there is no apparent need to regulate consumer product 
markets beyond basic warning requirements. 302 As with Landes and 
Posner and Viscusi, then, Rose-Ackerman's positions in the two 
dimensions of products liability are somewhat in tension with each 
other. She takes the position that product warnings might overcome 
information problems in consumer product markets. On the other 
hand, she clearly favors a more robust regulatory regime than just ad-
ministratively prescribed product warnings. But if she believes that 
more administrative regulation ii; necessary in order to protect con-
sumers from product risks, her reasons for allowing manufacturers to 
300. See id. at 91 ("True strict liability would convert manufacturers of such risky products 
as drugs and household chemicals into insurers of the consumers of their products even where 
the consumers can bear the risk more cheaply and would prefer to do so in return for a lower 
price."), 100 ("[R]etaining conventional tort actions in the face of regulatory statutes can under· 
mine the behavioral impact of statutes. Other solutions must be found to the problem of provid· 
ing compensation."). 
301. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 124, at 82. Insofar as Rose-Ackerman's warning require· 
ment would be exculpatory, she might be placed in Box 7. See infra notes 420-22 and accompa· 
nying text (explaining why warning requirements translate to a Box 7 regime). 
302. See supra text accompanying notes 228-36 (Landes and Posner) and 253-55 (Viscusi). 
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avoid liability through product warnings are unclear. 303 
d. Stephen Sugarman. 
755 
i. Liability-standard dimension. Professor Sugarman goes whole 
hog: He argues that tort law should be "do[ne] away with."304 Ac-
cording to Sugarman, no standard of liability can have significant ben-
eficial deterrence consequences.305 Indeed, personal injury law, if 
anything, "generates more perverse behavior than desired safety 
•••• "3°6 Thus, Sugarman takes as his starting point the position that 
manufacturers should not be liable to consumers for product-caused 
accidents (which places him in Row 1). In this respect, his view re-
sembles Huber's and Epstein's. 
ii. Mutability dimension. Unlike his contractarian counterparts, 
however, Sugarman argues that consumer product markets are subject 
to significant market failures. Like his fellow regulators, he largely 
fails to delineate them. According to Sugarman: 
It is widely thought that consumers today do not have enough informa-
tion to evaluate limitations on liability and waivers of tort rights that 
might appear in standard form contracts for the purchase of consumer 
goods. Indeed, the difficulty of properly informing consumers in such 
contexts is so great that courts quite rightly will not generally enforce 
such limits. 307 · 
303. Additionally, while Rose-Ackerman writes that products liability exemplifies the failure 
of the common law system to regulate effectively, ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 
288, at 10, 26, she does not consider institutional reforms that might render the tort system more 
effective. Instead, she advocates displacing tort regulation with administrative regulation, 
notwithstanding the fact that the latter has, as she seems to recognize, not proved effective in 
regulating such risks. See id. at 10 ("[C]onservative agency heads who wish to minimize the 
impact of their agency might try to minimize the number of major rules and delay those they 
cannot avoid considering .••• [T]he Consumer Product Safety Commission all but abandoned 
rulemaking."). In her preference for agency standard-setting, Rose-Ackerman, like Viscusi, 
stands in the somewhat awkward position of defending great reliance on administrative regula-
tion in the era of deregulation. Rather than urge courts to rely on existing administrative agen-
cies, she must urge courts to defer to yet-unknown administrative means of generating efficient 
regulations. Again, there is no reason to be confident that administrative regulation can be re-
formed any more easily to approximate that ideal than can tort regulation. · 
304. SUGARMAN, supra note 151. 
305. Most of Sugarman's attention is focused on finding a superior means of compensating 
accident victims as well as anyone else who is injured or ill; he focuses only secondarily on 
deterrence. Sugarman's compelling arguments in favor of developing superior methods of com-
pensating the injured and ill stand independent of his characterization of tort law as a mechanism 
for deterring injuries and illness. One might well agree that this country should adopt a national 
health system that made medical care available to all. At the same time, one might agree that 
tort law should be maintained in order to minimize the number of injuries and illnesses requiring 
medical care. For evidence of the deterrence effects of products liability, see Croley & Hanson, 
supra note 4, at 84-90. 
306. SUGARMAN, supra note 151, at xvi; see also id. at 3 ("There is, unfortunately, little 
reason to believe that personal injury law today actually serves an important accident-avoidance 
function. Worse, to the extent that it does influence behavior, there is good reason to think that 
much of the result is socially undesirable."). 
307. Id. at 206-07. 
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Thus, Sugarman does not appear to believe that a free-contracting re-
gime would generate efficient results; he appears, in other words, to be 
recommending a shift to Box 2. 
To mitigate the adv~rse effects of market failures, Sugarman rec-
ommends increased reliance on administrative regulation.308 Much 
like Viscusi and Rose-Ackerman, Sugarman would have society rely 
almost exclusively on administrative agencies: "I do not advocate that 
society abandon behavior control, but rather that new nontorts ap-
proaches be tried."309 Sugarman concedes that "[g]reater efforts by 
regulatory agencies will not rid our society of unreasonably dangerous 
conduct and products" and that "many of the shortcomings of our 
tort system as a deterrent apply to administrative regulation as 
well."310 Nonetheless, he cannot imagine doing away with regulatory 
agencies as the central protectors of consumer safety: "[The] chal-
lenge lies rather in developing better techniques to make agencies 
more responsive and more effective."311 Under Sugarman's plan, 
agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration would have increased 
powers to investigate, regulate, and penalize regulatory violators.312 
Offering few details, Sugarman calls for "accident prevention through 
regulatory strategies, with the increased involvement of citizens, vic-
tims, and citizen groups" in order to make the agencies "more respon-
sive and more effective."313 In sum, Sugarman's proposal seems to be 
that courts should shift to Box 2 and that administrative regulation 
should be enhanced to protect consumers from the inefficiencies of a 
free market in consumer product risks. 
A closer examination of Sugarman's work, however, reveals that 
308. Id. at xviii. 
309. Id. at 23. 
310. Id. at 153. 
311. Id. Sugarman's discussion is revealing. First, the fact that he cannot imagine a world 
without regulation is further evidence that, in contrast to the contractarians, he does not believe 
that unregulated markets will yield optimally safe products or contracts. Second, the fact that 
Sugarman "cannot imagine" doing away with administrative regulation is hardly dispositive. 
Others may be able to. In any event, doing away with tort law might be just as unimaginable. 
An equally persuasive response to Sugarman's critique of tort law might paraphrase Sugarman: 
"Tort law should not be done away with. Our challenge lies rather in developing better tech· 
niques to make tort law more responsive and more effective." Sugarman writes: "The idea that 
tort law might deter ... accidents seems to be very much wishful thinking to me." Id. at 24. 
Perhaps this is true, but Sugarman does not explain why his confidence in administrative regula· 
tion - typical of the regulators - is anything more than that. If administrative agencies do in 
fact have a comparative advantage at making causal determinations, as the regulators seem to 
believe, then perhaps the solution to the causation problem is to permit regulatory agencies to 
determine who caused an accident and then let courts take it from there. 
312. Id. at 156-59. 
313. Id. at 153. 
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his proposal is not easily located on the Products Liability Matrix. 
Like most of his fellow regulators, Sugarman not only fails to address 
any of the persuasive procontract and promarket arguments made by 
contractarians,314 but he also offers arguments that strongly suggest 
that he is himself a contractarian, notwithstanding his assertion that 
there are significant market failures and his recommendation that ad-
ministrative regulation should fill the need for nonmarket behavioral 
control. 
Surprisingly, Sugarman asserts that, as an empirical matter, firms 
rarely can do anything to reduce their liability costs through accident 
prevention efforts.315 Sugarman must therefore be arguing either that 
the market by itself will ensure optimal deterrence, in which case no 
enhanced role for regulation is necessary, or that some regulatory in-
stitution in addition to the market is needed to ensure optimal deter-
rence but that under the current liability regime manufacturers are, as 
an empirical matter, already making all cost-justified investments. If 
Sugarman believes the former, then society should not expend tremen-
dous resources creating an administrative regime never before em-
ployed. If he believes the latter, then his claim that manufacturers 
currently can do very little to reduce their liability costs belies his con-
clusion that we should do away with tort law because it has little or no 
beneficial deterrent effect. 
More puzzlingly, Sugarman at several points in his analysis reveals 
a faith in contract that seems incompatible with his claim that the 
market fails and his call for administrative regulation. Sugarman 
states that manufacturers should be permitted to contract out of the 
absolute consumer liability regime that he calls for. Under his pro-
posed scheme, "contract law would continue to deal with consumer 
warranties, but no warranty would be construed to provide compensa-
tion for personal injury unless this were so stated explicitly. Such a 
warranty would become, in effect, an intentional insurance con-
tract."316 Thus, Sugarman takes the seemingly irreconcilable positions 
that consumer product markets fail and that free contracting would be 
efficient. 317 
Elsewhere, Sugarman summarizes his reforms as follows: 
314. See supra section III.B.1. 
315. SUGARMAN, supra note 151, at 11. 
316. Id. at 162. Sugarman is confident that no manufacturer would voluntarily offer insur-
ance with its product and that no consumer would voluntarily pay for it. See id. at 35-49. 
317. Although Suganium does not specify the nature of the market failures that hamper 
consumer product markets, one possible problem may be that consumers overestimate product 
risks. See supra note 288. If so, then allowing consumers to contract for greater amounts of 
manufacturer-provided insurance would lead to inefficient contracts. 
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For the long run, I propose that ... we eliminate tort remedies for acci-
dental injuries, ... and ... build on existing regulatory schemes both to 
promote accident avoidance and to provide outlets for complaints about 
unreasonably dangerous conduct . . . . For the shorter run, I propose 
some :first steps that ... would move us in the right direction for the long 
term. They include ... reform by private contract ... ,31 8 
According to Sugarman, a "preaccident market in legal rights to bod-
ily security . . . could correct many shortcomings of existing tort 
law."319 He argues that, if only courts would enforce the contracts 
against product-accident victims, then preaccident contracts could 
"clearly improve[] the position of both victims and injurers."320 
Thus, throughout most of his book, Sugarman assumes that significant 
market failures justify some form of regulatory intervention in the 
market. Then, giving short shrift to these supposed market failures, 
Sugarman advocates an enhanced role for contract to overcome the 
shortcomings of tort. 
Finally, Sugarman describes in some detail the numerous nonregu-
latory mechanisms he believes would help ensure that manufacturers 
and consumers would take precautions in a world without tort law. 
With respect to the deterrence goal, Sugarman argues "that it is not 
tort law, but mainly other existing social forces, that cause people and 
enterprises to act reasonably."321 He nevertheless concludes, without 
explanation, that "existing regulatory, economic, moral, and self-pres-
ervation pressures fail to control all dangerous conduct that society 
would like to deter."322 Sugarman's argument that non-tort mecha-
nisms render tort law unnecessary may prove too much and under-
mine his prescription for enhanced administrative regulation. 
Ultimately, it is not clear how to reconcile Sugarman's various po-
sitions. Nor is it clear - in light of his apparent belief in the efficacy 
of contract - how his recommendations can be meaningfully distin-
guished from those of contractarians Huber or Epstein (Box 1). 
Table 4 adds the regulators to the Products Liability Matrix.323 
318. SUGARMAN, supra note 151, at xviii. 
319. Id. at 201. 
320. Id. Sugarman imagines "that people who are otherwise adequately insured against acci-
dents will transfer their preaccident rights to their employers, who would sell them to (i.e., 
presettle them with) liability insurers." Id. See generally Robert Cooter & Stephen D. 
Sugarman, A Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort Claims: Tort Reform by Contract, in NBW 
DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 174 (Walter Olson ed., 1988). 
321. SUGARMAN, supra note 151, at xvi. 
322. Id. at 21. 
323. As the Matrix is our own creation, it is possible we have misplaced one or more of the 
present generation in it; when confronted with our Matrix, some scholars may locate themselves 
differently. We have struggled not to misrepresent any scholar's views, but unfortunately schol-
ars do not always explicitly frame their proposals in the terms that define the Matrix. Indeed, 
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Next, section III.D explains why the products liability debate taken as 
a whole, apart from the arguments of individual scholars, has been 
unilluminating. 
that is part of our critique of the current debate. Scholars so far have not sufficiently recognized 
the importance of, or the relationship between, the two fundamental dimensions of products 
liability. In any event, part of our aim is to stimulate dialogue among scholars, not to pigeonhole 
any. 
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TABLE 4 
THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY MATRIX 
THE CURRENT PRODUCTS LIABILITY DEBATE 
DEGREE OF MUTABILITY 
(Column 1) (Column 2) 
Default Mandatory 
--
(Row 1) (Box 1) (Box 2) 
Absolute Huber Rose-Ackerman? 
---Consumer Epstein Sugarman 
Liability Priest? 
Schwartz? 
Rose-Ackerman? 
L Sugarman? 
I 
A 
B 
I (Row 2) (Box 3) (Box 4) 
L 
I Negligence Landes & Posner? Priest 
T Landes & Posner 
y Viscusi 
s (Row 3) (Box 5) (Box 6) 
T 
A Strict Liability Schwartz Schwartz? 
N Landes & Posner? Landes & Posner 
D 
A 
R 
D (Row 4) (Box 7) (Box 8) 
Absolute 
---Manufacturer Viscusi 
Liability 
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D. A Critique of the Debate 
Probably the most obvious criticism of the current products liabil-
ity debate is that neither camp has fully made its principal case --
neither the contractarians for contract nor the regulators for 
regulation. 
Confident in markets, Huber and Epstein both call for a regime of 
free contracting. But, in light of the contracts that existed prior to the 
Henningsen decision in 1960, Huber's and Epstein's proposals are tan-
tamount to proposals for absolute consumer liability.324 Put differ-
ently, given that there seem to be no examples (and the contractarians 
offer none) of firms that expressly contracted to accept liability for 
damages to consumers from product-caused injuries, no reason exists 
to believe that any manufacturers would, given the choice, contract to 
anything but absolute consumer liability. Thus, from Huber's and Ep-
stein's perspective, the important reform is not so much to revive con-
tract as it is to change the liability standard to absolute consumer 
liability. Choosing any other standard would merely create needless 
transaction costs. Whether the standard is mutable or mandatory 
matters ij.ttle; no one will contract around it in either case. 325 
Priest and Schwartz have attempted to show why an idealized, ra-
tional consumer would choose the liability standard that each pro-
poses. If either Priest or Schwartz is correct (and they cannot both be 
correct), then he has made a case for changing the liability standard, 
but not for contract. To make a case for contract, he would have to 
show that some idealized, rational consumer from among the large 
class of such consumers would prefer a liability standard other than 
the one he proposes. Because neither Priest nor Schwartz has ex-
plained why any consumer would want to opt out of his proposed 
standards, both should be agnostic regarding the mutability 
dimension. 326 
Thus, while purporting to be champions of contract, the con-
tractarians have failed to demonstrate the relevance, much less the im-
324. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); see supra notes 183, 190 
and accompanying text. 
325. The fact that both Huber and Epstein emphasize contract instead of absolute consumer 
liability and that they both at times stress that a wide range of contracts would ensue if con-
tracting were permitted might suggest that they believe procontract reform is more politically 
feasible than changing the liability standard, even though the former may, as a practical matter, 
amount to the latter. 
326. Cf. Ian Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 387, 
389 (1991) (making similar point about scholarly proposals regarding corporate contracts). In-
deed, in light of the evidence that free contracting leads to absolute consumer liability, Priest and 
Schwartz should call for a mandatory regime if they believe their proposed default standards are 
truly the ones that rational consumers would contract to. 
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portance, of contract. The regulators are no better. With the partial 
exception of Landes and Posner, the regulators have failed to consider, 
much less challenge, the contractarians' sophisticated economic argu-
ments in defense of contract. Moreover, the regulators have yet to 
explicate fully the market failures they believe exist. In other words, 
the regulators have proposed various forms of regulation without first 
establishing that regulation in any form is necessary, and without 
describing the precise nature of the market failures that ostensibly jus-
tify regulation. 327 Absent an understanding of the goals of regulation 
- that is, of the market failings that need to be overcome through 
regulation - it is not clear how one regulatory institution can be said 
to be superior to another as a means to those goals. Finally, not only 
have the regulators failed - both individually and collectively - to 
make a case for regulation, but each regulator has failed to explain 
how his or her proposed form of regulation would be superior to its 
alternatives. 
Viscusi, Rose-Ackerman, and Sugarman, the regulators who call 
for an expanded role for administrative regulation and a diminished 
role for tort regulation, do not consider the full range of possible tort 
liability standards, yet all call for some never-before-seen method of 
administrative regulation. They seem to acknowledge that the current 
administrative regime has been no more successful than the current 
tort system at regulating product risks, and thus they advocate radi-
cally reforming the present administrative regime and abandoning (to 
greater or lesser degrees) tort. Their unstated - and unsubstantiated 
- premise is that tort law, unlike administrative regulation, cannot be 
successfully reformed.328 In criticizing tort law, the regulators focus 
on the current tort regime without considering whether tort law might 
be reformed; in touting the potential benefits of administrative regula-
tion, they focus on reforming the administrative regime without con-
fronting its significant shortcomings. 329 
Landes and Posner's analysis contains the inverse shortcoming.330 
327. Cf. Clark, supra note 157, at 1708 (describing corporate law scholarship: "[S]pecifying 
exactly why there should be mandatory rules, and identifying theoretically justified and practi-
cally useful criteria for distinguishing between waivable and nonwaivable rules, have proven to be 
extraordinarily difficult."). 
328. Viscusi actually states the premise but nowhere defends it. See supra note 276 and 
accompanying text. 
329. See supra notes 273-85 and accompanying text (Viscusi), 290 and accompanying text 
(Rose-Ackerman), and 310-13 and accompanying text (Sugarman). See generally Clayton P. 
Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027 (1990) (raising 
significant doubt about the wisdom of proposals to increase the scope of administrative agencies 
at the expense of courts). 
330. But cf. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 53 (suggesting that one cannot assume 
direct regulation of the economy will be successful). 
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While they do describe certain market failures that might render a 
freedom-of-contract regime inefficient, they do not explain why tort 
law, rather than administrative regulation, is the appropriate response 
to those market failures.331 Their focus on tort no doubt tracks their 
primary concern with testing their hypothesis about the efficiency of 
the common law. However, by ignoring alternative institutions that 
their fellow regulators believe can be employed less expensively and to 
greater effect than the common law, Landes and Posner beg the ques-
tion whether the tort system is efficient. Indeed, if the other members 
of the regulators' camp are correct, products liability law as imple-
mented through tort regulation is grossly inefficient compared to the 
alternative of administrative regulation (or some hybrid of the two). 
Beyond not successfully making their cases, participants in the 
products liability debate are vulnerable to a second, and more funda-
mental, criticism. This article began with the claim that the most im-
portant question in products liability is whether - or how well -
markets work. Previous sections divided products liability scholars 
into two camps based on their explicit answers to that question: the 
contractarians argue that consumer product markets work; the regula-
tors assert that markets fail. As the analysis has shown, however, fun-
damental tensions mark the work of all products liability scholars: 
each expresses a view of markets in tension with the view implied by 
his or her policy prescription. 
Consider the contractarians. Collectively, they offer a powerful 
critique of the original assumptions and arguments in favor of the shift 
toward enterprise liability. 332 The problem is that the contractarians 
at times seem to doubt the force of their own arguments. 
Among the contractarians, Peter Huber and Richard Epstein ex-
hibit the greatest faith in free markets. Huber insists that any liability 
standard will do, as long as it is mutable by contract. 333 Epstein calls 
for contract but contends that lawmakers would save needless transac-
tion costs by adopting a liability standard that mimics the market. 334 
In light of the fact that pre-1960 (that is, pre-Henningsen) contracts 
between manufacturers and consumers allocated all the risks of prod-
uct accidents to consumers, Huber's and Epstein's recommendations 
331. Rose-Ackerman observes: "[E]ven Richard Posner recognizes that markets may fail to 
allocate resources efficiently. However, the chapter in his text devoted to comparing [administra-
tive] regulation with the common law considers examples that favor the common law." Rose-
Ackerman, Progressive Law, supra note 288, at 348 n.34 (discussing POSNER, supra note 10, at 
343-64). 
332. See supra section 111.B.1. 
333. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanyirig text. 
334. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. 
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amount to proposals for mutable, absolute consumer liability (Box 
1).335 Though extreme, that proposal seems wholly appropriate if 
markets are without significant imperfections. Yet both Huber and 
Epstein at times seem to imply that consumer product markets may 
have significant imperfections. Huber does so by suggesting a role for 
mandated warnings and for administrative regulation. 336 Epstein does 
so by suggesting tQ.at there are significant transaction costs associated 
with contracting around a default liability standard. If transaction 
costs are high, a free contract regime will not necessarily yield efficient 
outcomes. 337 
Alan Schwartz and George Priest reveal an even greater distrust of 
free markets. Priest argues in favor of an immutable negligence re-
gime (although he never explains why such a regime would be prefera-
ble to a mutable standard of any type or to absolute consumer 
liability).338 He seems to believe that manufacturers cannot write con-
tracts ex ante that allocate risks as efficiently as courts would under his 
proposed negligence standard, though manufacturers would if they 
could. But this view raises difficult questions about Priest's own anal-
ysis and defense of consumer product warranties. Among other 
things, his claim that warranties are nonexploitative and efficient lacks 
foundation if contracting costs are so high. 339 
Schwartz, having developed an elaborate defense of consumer 
product markets, calls for a mutable liability standard. Nevertheless, 
he too seems to harbor unexplained doubts about the efficiency of 
product markets. Strict liability, in Schwartz' view, would optimize 
insurance and deterrence. But Schwartz' preference for strict liability 
over absolute consumer liability stems, at bottom, from an implicit 
premise that a significant market failure in consumer product markets 
arises from the fact that consumers have imperfect information. 340 
335. See supra notes 183, 190 and accompanying text. 
336. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text. The contractarians, believing that tort 
law is unnecessary because contracts by themselves produce efficient results, face a difficult ques-
tion: Why is any form of regulation necessary? To justify a place for administrative regulation, 
one has to argue first that contracts are not sufficient guarantors of safety. For the contractari-
ans, therefore, the same logic that should (and in most cases does) lead them toward the north· 
west comer of the Products Liability Matrix should also lead them to reject the proposition that 
some form of administrative regulation is necessary to ensure that products are efficiently safe. 
Even if the contractarians did identify some inadequacy with contract, justifying administrative 
regulation while rejecting tort law would require some principled distinction between those dif-
ferent types of regulation. 
337. See supra notes 176-79, 186 and accompanying text. 
338. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text. 
339. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text. 
340. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. Whereas Huber and Epstein base their 
recommendations primarily on actual contracts, Priest and Schwartz base their proposals mainly 
on theoretical considerations about what a utility-maximizing consumer would want. By con-
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Consider the regulators. Landes and Posner, Viscusi, Rose-Acker-
man, and Sugarman all seem to believe that market forces alone will 
not ensure the optimal allocation of product risks. But all simultane-
ously exhibit considerable faith in consumer product markets. And 
most regulators suggest that basic warning requirements would obvi-
ate the need for additional regulation. A liability standard mutable 
through disclaimers or other exculpatory clauses is tantamount to a 
standard mutable through warnings. In either case, the liability stan-
dard is a default standard. The relevant question for all products lia-
bility scholars, then, is what conditions are necessary and sufficient to 
contract around the default. Whether warnings or warranty disclaim-
ers suffice makes no difference. 
Once warnings are understood as implied disclaimers, the two 
camps of products liability scholars effectively become one. Indeed, 
insofar as every products liability scholar is of two minds (one explicit, 
the other implicit) on the question whether markets work, the biggest 
difference between the two camps comes down to which position is 
explicit and which is implicit. The contractarians explicitly deny mar-
ket failures but then imply their existence by suggesting that a laissez-
faire regime would not yield efficient outcomes or by calling for some 
form or another of regulation. The regulators explicitly recognize sig-
nificant market failures but then imply their nonexistence by arguing 
that manufacturers should be permitted to disclaim liability through 
warnings, thus showing themselves to be contractarians. 341 At an im-
portant level of abstraction, then, all products liability scholars -
contractarians and regulators alike - would or should permit manu-
centrating on hypothetical instead of actual consent, Priest and Schwartz also fail to explain why 
their proposed liability standards were not adopted through contract before 1960. 
341. Readers may accuse us of contradicting ourselves. On one hand, we argue that Huber, 
a contractarian, is calling for regulation when he calls for a law of warnings. On the other hand, 
we argue that the regulators are implicitly making the case for contract when they suggest that 
warning requirements would overcome the market failures that might justify regulation. 
Our point is that most products liability scholars are in some sense contractarians and in 
some sense regulators. They are contractarians in that they believe warnings should serve as 
contracts to shift liability to consumers. They are regulators in that they believe that those warn-
ings should be required, and perhaps authored by administrative agencies. In taking these posi-
tions simultaneously, both the contractarians and the regulators betray their respective starting 
points and move part way into the others' camp. For example, Huber argues that markets will, 
by themselves, yield efficient levels of safety and insurance and then, without basis, advocates 
implementing a "law of warnings." Given Huber's premise, a law of warnings would only add to 
the costs of contracting around the default and would thus act as an impediment to efficiency-
enhancing transactions. The regulators, unlike Huber, argue that significant market imperfec-
tions exist and, hence, they call for significant amounts and various types of regulation. But 
when they suggest that a warning requirement would suffice to overcome the putative, but un-
specified, market failures, they are suggesting that the market failures are, after all, inconsequen-
tial. Put differently, they are suggesting that a laissez-faire regime, tempered only by sufficient 
risk-disclosure requirements, would be efficient. 
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facturers to ~pt out of the background liability standard. 342 If they 
differ, they differ only according to what they would require for a 
manufacturer successfully to disclaim liability. 
In a second, more subtle way, the regulators have shown them-
selves to be contractarians insofar as they argue that warning require-
ments would overcome all market failures. Presumably, warning 
requirements are intended to overcome imperfect consumer informa-
tion - indeed, it is difficult to imagine any other market failure that 
warnings might remedy. Suppose, then, that the regulators are right 
that consumers are imperfectly informed of product risks and that the 
market is otherwise unhampered by market failures. If consumers be-
lieve they are fully informed, they will have no incentive to study 
product warnings. 343 A warning requirement will have no effect on 
consumer information, because consumers will have no reason to take 
them into account. (You can lead a consumer to a warning, but you 
can't make her read.) 
If, on the other hand, consumers realize that they are imperfectly 
informed of product risks, then they will have an incentive to study 
product warnings. In that case, however, consumers would demand 
warnings from manufacturers in the absence of any mandatory warn-
ing requirement. Given that consumer markets are, by hypothesis, un-
hampered by other market imperfections, consumers will get what 
they demand. To obtain information, consumers might purchase 
products only from manufacturers who provided information about 
product risks. To dispel any doubt about the warnings' accuracy, con-
sumers might demand (and therefore get) an "information-inducing" 
contract term such as the following: "The manufacturer of this prod-
uct will pay the costs of any injury that this product causes but for 
which there was not reasonable warning."344 Consumers would 
thereby receive credible low-cost information, and manufacturers 
could avoid liability simply by providing that information. 345 
Thus, either a warning requirement will not overcome the market 
342. Accordingly, all products liability scholars can be placed fairly in Column I (most in 
Box 1) of the Products Liability Matrix. See supra Table 4. 
343. See supra notes 227-36 and accompanying text. 
344. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 94, 97-118 (explaining how penalty default rules 
can induce provision of information); cf. Mark Geistfeld, Towards a More General Theory of 
Products Liability Reform 63-64 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (arguing 
that uninformed consumers would demand more than optimal levels of manufacturer-provided 
insurance to help encourage manufacturers to make greater investments in product safety). 
345. Thus, if warnings were the solution to the problem of imperfect information, a warning 
requirement would be unnecessary; market forces would ensure that manufacturers provided 
warnings. That manufacturers have not contracted to the regime the regulators would mandate, 
even prior to 1960 when such contracts would have been enforced, suggests the existence of some 
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failure, or there is no market failure to overcome. Because imperfect 
consumer information is the only market failure that a warning re-
quirement might overcome, and because a warning requirement can-
not by itself overcome that market failure, the regulators, by arguing 
that a warning requirement would by itself overcome all market fail-
ures! IogicaI1y imply that there are no market failures. 
We have argued that participants in the products liability debate 
should, but do not, fully answer the following questions: Do con-
sumer product markets contain significant imperfections? If so, in 
what specific ways do markets fail, and which liability standard will 
most effectively respond to those failures? This section has shown how 
the tensions in the work of all products liability scholars arise as a 
consequence of their failure to answer or to recognize the relationships 
between these questions. In Part IV we offer our answers to these 
questions by arguing in favor of Box 8 of the Products Liability 
Matrix. 
IV. THE NEW CASE FOR ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
A. Introduction to the Affirmative Case: Reviving the First 
Generation's Legacy 
Little remains of the first generation's legacy. Today, less than 
three decades after the promulgation of section 402A of the Restate-
ment, at the peak of the first generation's influence, the present genera-
tion agrees that the first generation was misguided.~ As explained 
above, the contractarians have mounted what appears to be a success-
ful theoretical attack on the original justifications for the movement 
toward enterprise liability.347 The regulators, though expressing a 
additional market imperfection(s) that would render mandatory warnings, by thcmsclvc:s, ineffec-
tive. 
Warning requirements are a solution on which products liability scholars scan to be converg-
ing with increasing frequency lately. See infra note 368. This recent trend, though inadequate 
for the reasons explained in the text, has a commendable history. See JoHN S. M11..1., ON LIB-
ERTI (Elizabeth Rappaport ed., 1978) (1859): 
[I]t is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents. ••• [W]hen there is not n 
certainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself can judge of the 
sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk; in this case, therefore 
(unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some state or excitement or absorption incomp:i!l'ble 
with the full use of the reflecting faculty), he ought, I c:Onc:cive, to be only warned of the 
danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it. Similnr considerations, applied 
to such a question as the sale of poisons, may enable us to decide which runong the po3S1'b!e 
modes of regulation are or arc not contrary to principle. Such n precaution, for cxnmple, as 
that of labeling the drug with some word expressive or its dangerous character may be en-
forced without violation of h'berty: the buyer cannot wish not to know that the thing he 
possesses has poisonous qualities. 
Id. at 95-96. 
346. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. 
347. See supra section llI.B.1. 
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lack of faith in contracts, have been unable to muster any convincing 
new arguments in response to the contractarians' call for a return to 
·contract. Indeed, far from rising to the defense of the tort system, 
most regulators have instead argued that the allocation of product 
risks should be regulated principally outside the institution of the com-
mon law. 
The so-called "liability crisis" of the mid-1980s appears to have 
provided empirical confirmation for - and indeed may have precipi-
tated - the views of the many commentators calling for products lia-
bility reform. While scholars disagree over how to solve the crisis, 
most agree on its source: the expanding tort regime of the 1970s and 
early 1980s.348 Scholars view the crisis as the unfortunate price soci-
ety has had to pay because a few misguided judges and scholars origi-
nally convinced courts to move the regime in the direction of 
enterprise liability.349 Now that lawmakers have come to their senses, 
however, the arguments the first generation offered on behalf of enter-
prise liability appear dead. As one contractarian recently remarked, 
"the serious and systematic reform of modern tort law is 
inevitable. "350 
But the extent to which the "liability crisis" provides empirical 
support for rejecting the first generation's arguments is now a matter 
of some doubt. As we have argued elsewhere, the empirical phenom-
ena attributed to the liability crisis look strikingly similar to the bene-
fits the first generation predicted and hoped would result from the 
trend toward enterprise liability.351 Yet, while the case has been made 
that the liability crisis actually evidences the efficacy of tort law and 
the benefits of expanded manufacturer liability,352 a systematic theo-
retical response to the contractarians' critique of expanded liability has 
yet to be made. 
. For at least the past decade, contractarian theory has plainly out-
gunned that of the first generation. But, as the contractarians have 
repeatedly remarked, if only the first generation's premises about con-
348. See, e.g., VJScus1, supra note 117, at 3-4 ("Without question the most compelling em-
pirical result has been the tripling of products liability insurance premiums from 1984 to 1986. It 
was this mushrooming of premium levels that caught the public's attention and led to the wide-
spread consensus that the United States was in the midst of a 'products liability crisis.' "), See 
generally Croley & Hanson, supra note 4, at 5-10 (discussing the origins of the tort crisis and 
arguments for reform). 
349. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 8, at 3-4. 
350. George L. Priest, The Inevitability of Tort Reform, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 701, 701 (1992). 
351. Croley & Hanson, supra note 4, at 110 (''The recent events now commonly associated 
with the 'crisis' may be better understood as the inevitable and efficient consequences of desirable 
changes in products liability [toward enterprise liability].") 
352. See generally id. 
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sumer product markets were correct, enterprise liability would indeed 
be the optimal regime. George Priest, for example, writes: "The una-
voidable implication of the three presuppositions of manufacturer 
power, manufacturer insurance, and internalization is absolute liabil-
ity. "353 Thus, although the contractarians have successfully discred-
ited the original arguments in favor of expanded manufacturer 
liability, the question remains whether new arguments can rehabilitate 
the first generation's premises. 
This Part intends to provide such arguments. It brings the tools of 
law and economics to the defense of the premises of the first genera-
tion of products scholars and judges. In so doing, this Part provides 
new theoretical support for the first generation's expansion of manu-
facturer liability. In fact, by arguing for a full-fledged enterprise liabil-
ity regime, it goes even further than the first generation was willing to 
go. 
The sections that follow identify several important market failures 
that justify enterprise liability. Each market failure presented can be 
understood as a resurrection of one of the first generation's three prin-
cipal justifications for expanded manufacturer liability - imperfect 
consumer information (section IV.B.l), exploitative manufacturer 
market power (section IV.B.2), and risk distribution (section IV.B.3) 
- though often in drastically modified form. 
As noted above, many of those most critical of the expansion of 
manufacturer liability toward enterprise liability have acknowledged 
that, if the first generation's premises were true, then the revolution 
that generation began would not have been misguided. Significantly, 
the contractarians have conceded that not all of the first generation's 
premises must be true for the expansion of manufacturer liability to be 
justified; one or more of them may make the case. 354 In light of such 
acknowledgments the following arguments, which may well have indi-
vidual weaknesses, make a new and compelling case in favor of enter-
prise liability when taken together. 
353. Priest, supra note 37, at 527. Similarly, Schwartz implies that the assumptions underly-
ing the modem regime imply greater manufacturer liability. Schwartz, supra note 87, at 834. 
For additional suggestions that the first generation's premises, if correct, dictate manufacturer 
liability, see Epstein, supra note 101, at 2205 (prohibitive disclaimers make sense if there is "the 
skewed distribution ofloss prevention skills posited by the modem cases"); Priest, supra note 12, 
at 1311 & n.87, 1350; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 371 ("Strict liability is justifiable if firms rou-
tinely use.suboptimal contracts.") (emphasis added) .. 
354. Alan Schwartz, for example, has recently shown that certain pairs among the "founda-
tional assumptions" underlying the modem products regime justify strict liability. See Schwartz, 
supra note 87, at 821-23; see also Priest, supra note 37, at 520-27. 
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B. Reviving the Premises: Three Market Failures 
1. Imperfect Consumer Information: The Costs of Information 
a. The prohibitive costs of perfect consumer information. One 
source of imperfect consumer information follows from the simple 
proposition that information is costly.355 Yet the efficiency of a free-
dom-of-contract products liability regime depends upon consumers' 
knowledge of the full costs - that is, both the nominal price and the 
risk - of the products and services they purchase. In other words, 
the efficiency of consumer product markets depends upon consumers' 
ability to overcome information costs, for without full information 
consumers are unable to make consumption and warranty decisions 
that reflect their true preferences. For example, where consumers un-
derestimate product risks, they will tend to buy more products, and 
more dangerous products, than they would otherwise prefer.356 
Because consumers are not endowed with information about prod-
uct risks, 357 they must acquire it, and any means of obtaining such 
information requires investment. All else equal, the more information 
consumers seek, the more costs they must incur. Consumers' willing-
ness to incur such costs will, of course, depend on the benefits of the 
355. Although legal economists do not dispute this simple proposition, products liability 
scholars have so far failed to appreciate fully its profound implications. See infra section IV.B.2. 
356. Products liability scholars have taken, roughly speaking, one or both of two approaches 
to the question of whether consumers are sufficiently well informed of product risks. The first 
approach, the information-cost approach. assumes that consumers are rational and informed of 
those risks for which the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs of becoming informed. The 
second approach, the information-bias approach, recognizes that cognitive biases may cause con-
sumers systematically to misperceive certain types of risks. In this article we take an informa-
tion-cost approach and respond to those who have done the same. Thus, we do not respond to 
scholars who have criticized the trend toward enterprise liability on the ground that consumers, 
because of risk-perception biases, generally overestimate rather than underestimate product risks. 
See, e.g., VISCUSI, supra note 117, at 64-65; Schwartz, supra note 87, at 829-30. According to 
that view, the problem of imperfect information will, if anything, lead to overdeterrence and 
overinsurance under a free-contract regime. Tort law, according to that view, cannot reduce the 
inefficiencies that result from overestimation of product risks. In subsequent work, we intend to 
respond to this information-bias critique of enterprise liability by providing support for the fol-
lowing three conclusions. First, cognitive biases, by themselves, may cause consumers to under-
estimate, not overestimate, the risks of most products. Second, ·manufacturers can and will 
employ consumers' cognitive biases in order to induce consumers to underestimate product risks 
further. Finally, even if the only inefficiencies that do exist in consumer product markets result 
from consumer overestimation, enterprise liability can be justified as a means of mjtigating those 
inefficiencies. 
357. Identifying all of the different types of information consumers must have to make fully 
informed consumption decisions - information about the types of possible product injuries, the 
probability of each, the severity of each, the way those risks are allocated contractually and 
legally, and so on - is a complicated project beyond the scope of this article. For present pur-
poses, we simply recognize that a freedom-of-contract regime will be efficient only if consumers 
know (1) what risks products pose and (2) how warranty (or disclaimer) terms (including the 
legal rules governing those, see infra notes 359-60 and accompanying text; text accompanying 
note 371) allocate those risks - that is, which among all product risks consumers will bear. 
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information they obtain. Rational consumers will invest only up to 
the point at which the marginal costs of additional information equal 
the marginal benefits. Because information is costly, and becomes 
more costly as more is obtained - assuming diminishing marginal 
returns to investments in information -· it seems very unlikely (and, 
indeed, may often be impossible) for consumers to be perfectly in-
formed about product risks and how those risks are allocated. Where 
the benefits of information about risk are small, as they may well be 
for a 1arge majority of product-caused accidents, which are very im-
probable, consumers will invest little to obtain that information. 358 
Reading product warranties or product warnings, where available, 
is one strategy consumers might adopt to obtain risk and insurance 
information. But even that relatively inexpensive strategy may not be 
worth its costs, especially where the probability of a product accident 
is small. 359 Even where the benefits of reading a warranty or warning 
do exceed the costs, consumers may often still lack the information 
they need to make informed consumption choices. Consumers must 
do more than read the words in a warranty; they must know what the 
words mean and whether the words are credible. Among other things, 
consumers must know which liability standard applies in the relevant 
jurisdiction and whether, how, and to what extent manufacturers can 
contract around that standard through warnings or warranties. Addi-
tionally, if the manufacturer may be held liable for some or all of the 
costs of product-caused accidents through tort or contract, the con-
sumer must have some information about the manufacturer's solvency 
or liability insurance coverage. In short, the fact that the costs of 
reading a warranty or warning are low does not necessarily mean that 
the costs of becoming well informed also will be low.360 
Notwithstanding that information is costly and that the benefits of 
product- and warranty-related information are likely often small, the 
358. Cf. generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. K.raakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 10 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (arguing that the cost of information is critical to the 
question of whether and when capital markets will be efficient). 
359. Landes and Posner make, but then effectively abandon, this point. See supra notes 220-
24 and accompanying text. 
360. We belabor the point only because some products scholars seem to overlook it. See, e.g., 
Landes & Posner, supra note 124, at 419; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 137, at 1402 (arguing 
that warranties are an element of the "search equilibrium model," where "search" refers to the 
process by which consumers become informed about the products, prices, and terms of sale); 
Priest, supra note 12, at 1347 (stating that manufacturers will respond to the preferences of those 
consumers who read warranties). Professor Howard Latin, in an article largely overlooked in the 
products liability literature, provides a fine summary of the factors that might lead consumers to 
be ineffective, and manufacturers to be effective, at "problem-solving behavior," which includes 
being well informed. See Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Lia-
bility, 73 CAL. L. REv. 677, 682-96 (1985). Based on his analysis, Latin offered a preliminary 
argument in favor of an enterprise liability regime. See id. at 730-32. 
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contractarians appear to have shifted the burden of proof to those who 
would argue that consumer product markets should be regulated be-
cause of imperfect consumer information.361 They have done so by 
offering a range of theoretical arguments, which the contractarians be-
lieve are supported by empirical evidence, on behalf of the claim that 
the first generation was wrong to assume that consumers systemati-
cally underestimate product risks.362 Based on those arguments, the 
contractarians have concluded that consumers are sufficiently well in-
formed to ensure that consumer products and product warranties re-
flect the preferences of fully informed consumers. As the following 
section argues, however, the contractarians (and for that matter the 
regulators) have not fully appreciated the implications of the fact that 
information is costly.363 
b. The contractarians' response to the problem of information 
costs. The contractarians understand fully that information costs may 
prevent otherwise effici~nt contracting. They have responded to this 
possibility, first, by denying its empirical importance and, second, by 
explaining how the costs of information may be overcome. 
Some contractarians argue, for instance, that consumers are likely 
to read most product warranties because the risks of product-caused 
injuries are large enough to motivate consumers to acquire informa-
tion. As Alan Schwartz puts it, because "[p]roduct-defect risks are 
among the most important risks that consumers faceL] consumers 
probably are familiar with the aspects of contracts that relate to prod-
uct failure."364 Schwartz, however, provides no empirical support for 
his assertion regarding the benefits of acquiring that information. 
Even if consumer product accidents are, in the aggregate, among the 
most important risks that consumers face, those risks probably relate 
disproportionately to a small number of consumer products, such as 
automobiles and :firearms; the risks posed by the vast majority of re-
maining products are probably relatively small. Thus, the benefits of 
reading warranties that govern the risks of that majority of products 
361. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text. 
362. See supra section 111.B.1. 
363. Indeed, scholars have basically ignored Landes and Posner's argument that information 
costs may be high enough to prevent consumers from reading warranties. The assumption seems 
to be that, because Landes and Posner's information cost argument is part of a suspect, positivist 
project, their argument itself must be suspect. See supra note 225. Those scholars who have 
considered the costs of information implicitly or explicitly concede that information costs could 
as a matter of theory lead to market failures, see, e.g., Danzon, supra note 226, at 571-72; Ep-
stein, supra note 101, at 2203; Schwartz, supra note 87, at 828-29; see also infra notes 364-82 and 
accompanying text, but claim that possibility has little empirical significance. 
364. Schwartz, supra note 87, at 826. 
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seem unlikely to be worth the costs. 36s 
Still other scholars have argued that the costs of information could 
be lowered for consumers if manufacturers or third parties bore them. 
For example, Patricia Danzon, another well-known torts scholar,366 
claims that "the manufacturer or some consumer surrogate such as 
Consumer Reports" could reduce the costs of information to consum-
ers "simply by publishing warnings."367 That a manufacturer or con-
sumer surrogate could provide the information through product 
warnings, however, does not mean that it would. Obviously, the man-
ufacturer has no incentive to warn its consumers of risks that the con-
sumer underestimates. Indeed, the very fact that a market exists for 
consumer surrogates such as Consumer Reports provides some evi-
dence that manufacturers have not volunteered enough credible infor-
mation about their own products. Moreover, even Consumer Reports 
will provide less than the efficient amount of information to consumers 
regarding product risks given, first, the higher costs to Consumer Re-
ports (as compared to the manufacturers themselves) of gathering the 
relevant information and, second, the public-good nature of such 
information. 
Many products liability scholars have proposed that manufactur-
ers be required to provide warnings. 368 But this solution, like all warn-
ing proposals, merely denies the problem. As explained above, 369 if 
the costs of reading a warranty disclaimer exceed the benefits, it is not 
clear why the same would not be true of reading a warning. Informa-
tion costs might be reduced if, as Schwartz and Viscusi propose, warn-
ings were simplified. 370 Simple warnings, however, will not contain as 
365. Schwartz' argument assumes, of course, that products have written warranties. For 
products that are sold without written warranties, one possible source of information is 
eliminated. 
366. Danzon is another influential torts scholar who advocates increased reliance on admin-
istrative regulation as opposed to tort regulation. But because Danzon's views are substantially 
similar to (and somewhat less developed than) Viscusi's, we have not given- them independent 
treatment. See generally Patricia Danzon, A Second Look at Tort Reform (1990) (paper pre-
pared for the Round Table on Tort Reform, sponsored by the Institute for Law and Economics, 
University of Pennsylvania) (on file with authors). 
367. Danzon, supra note 226, at 572. 
368. Among the contractarians, Peter Huber and Alan Schwartz have called for warning 
requirements. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text (Huber); Schwartz, supra note 87, 
at 840-43. Among the regulators, all but Stephen Sugarman have. See supra notes 222-25 and 
accompanying text (Landes and Posner); supra note 245-52 and accompanying text (Viscusi); 
supra note 301 and accompanying text (Rose-Ackerman). 
369. See supra notes 226-39 and accompanying text (criticizing Landes and Posner's argu-
ment that disclaimers should not be enforced while warnings should). 
370. See Schwartz, supra note 87, at 840~42 (proposing a national warnings system); VIS-
cus1, supra note 117, at 155-56 (same); see also Geistfeld, supra note 344, at 48 (arguing that 
some types of imperfect information may be overcome through a regulatory requirement that 
warranties be made more readily understandable to consumers). 
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much information as complex warnings. 311 By trying to lower the 
costs of obtaining information, such a proposal would simultaneously 
lower the quantity and, hence, the benefits of the information ob-
tained. While Schwartz seems to recognize this tradeoff, he does not 
explain how it might be settled. 312 
Other contractarians emphasize that consumers' repeated 
purchases of certain products might mitigate the costs of reading war-
ranties. 373 Although the benefits of reading a warranty may be small 
when the consumer intends to buy a particular product only once, the 
consumer must multiply the benefits of reading the product warning 
by the number of repeated purchases. That argument too is flawed, 
however, inasmuch as it implicitly and implausibly assumes that man-
ufacturers cannot alter their warranties. Because manufacturers can 
change the terms of their warranties, a consumer will have to read a 
product's warranty with each purchase, no matter the number of re-
peated purchases. Moreover, in our many-product world, it seems un-
likely that consumers can remember the warranty terms provided with 
each product. 
Some contractarians make the related argument that, where con-
sumers make repeated purchases of the same product, their experience 
with that product will teach them about the risks of the product. That 
is, consumers will learn - even if they do not read the product warn-
ings - whether and how a product is risky if they buy the product 
repeatedly. Regarding consumer estimates of product risks, Alan 
Schwartz thus claims that "[e]xperience probably is a good 
teacher."374 But that assertion is belied by the fact, which Schwartz 
recognizes, that "a product accident is a low probability event. "375 
The chances of being injured are so low that consumers will either not 
be injured, in which case they will learn nothing about the product's 
371. See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text. 
372. See Schwartz, supra note 87, at 840-42. For further discussion of the possible merits of 
proposed warning requirements, see infra section IV.C.1. 
373. See Danzon, supra note 226, at 572 (''Thus for many common consumer products, re-
peat purchase undermines the argument that it is not rational for consumers to process informa-
tion about low-probability events."); Epstein, supra note 101, at 2204 ("[T]he de minimis 
argument is flawed, for while the frequency of accidents may be low, the number of repeat 
purchases is very large, so that contracting with the consumer would be worthwhile if the manu-
facturers wanted to disclaim the risk."). 
374. Schwartz, supra note 87, at 828; see also Priest, supra note 12: 
[W]arranty content may affect the repeat purchase rather than the initial purchase decision. 
A consumer may select among competing brands according to his experience with a specific 
product and with its warranty. If so, manufacturers may be forced to draft warranties re-
sponsive to consumer preferences in order to assure a continued custom. 
Id. at 1347 (footnote omitted). 
375. Schwartz, supra note 87, at 829. 
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riskiness, or they will be injured, in which case the information came 
too late and will probably be of little benefit in the future. In light of 
the fact that experience conveys little or no timely information about 
product risks, experience is, if anything, probably a cruel teacher.376 
Richard Epstein also challenges the empirical importance of the 
fact that information is costly by arguing that ordinary use reveals the 
defects of many or even most products; those defects are therefore al-
ready on consumers' minds. 377 As empirical support in defense of this 
claim, however, Epstein offers only a few examples of products, in-
cluding MER/29, which he believes is patently risky.378 But this ex-
ample does not support the argument. Although the risks of MER/29 
may now be well known, they were not well known at the time that 
the product came onto the market. 379 The risks became better known 
only after and because the product caused a large number of consumer 
injuries. But that information was of no help to those consumers who 
needed it - that is, the consumers who were injured. 380 By the time 
376. Mark Geistfeld has recently argued that "prior consumer experience" may not increase 
a consumer's knowledge of a product's safety and concluded that the "inefficiency generated by 
consumers' imperfect information about product risks ••• is much more intractable than the 
inefficiencies created by other types of consumer imperfect information." Geistfeld, supra note 
344, at 65-66. In essence, his point is that product safety quality is a credence feature - that is, 
a feature about which consumers typically gain little information either before or after they 
purchase the product - not a search or experience feature. See generally Phillip Nelson, Infor-
mation and Consumer Behavior, 18 J. POL. EcoN. 311 (1970) (defining search and experience 
goods); Michael R. Darby & Edi Kami, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 
J.L. & EcoN. 67 (1973) (defining credence goods). 
377. See Epstein, supra note 101, at 2204-05. With respect to latent defects, those not re-
vealed by ordinary use, Epstein actually agrees with Landes and Posner that rational consumer 
ignorance justifies a strict liability rule. See id. at 2202. Epstein thus suggests that the appropri-
ate inquiry for products liability reform concerns which product defects are patent and which are 
latent. See id. at 2206. 
378. Id. at 2204. Epstein offers general aviation aircraft as another example of a product the 
risks of which consumers are already aware. Id. Clearly, however, aircraft are not run-of-the-
mill consumer products. Cf. Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 191-93 (describing the spurious 
auto insurance paradigm). Epstein offers Bendectin as further support for his claim that consum-
ers are aware of a product's risks. But that example seems not to support his claim in light of the 
significant scientific dispute over Bendectin's risks. For background and case summaries on the 
continuing Bendectin controversy, see Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 
1349, 1350-52 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1992); see also 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 
S. Ct. 320 (1992) (The Supreme Court is expected to rule on the use and admissibility of various 
scientific studies offered to support claims of Bendectin's harmfulness). 
379. Indeed, far from the risks being "on everybody's mind," manufacturers of MER/29 
allegedly misled consumers and the Food and Drug Administration about the risks associated 
with the use of their product. See Richard A. Merrill, Compensation far Prescription Drug Inju-
ries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1, 22-23, 40-43 (1973). 
380. Moreover, consumers tend to rely on and defer to the judgment of their doctors in 
deciding whether and how much of any drug to consume. In such cases, whether a consumer 
ignores or considers a product's risks and warranty terms will depend in considerable part on her 
physician's recommendations. Thus, Epstein's example is, if anything, exceptional. 
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the risks were well known, the product was off the market.381 More-
over, Epstein does not consider the possibility that tort law may have 
played some role in publicizing such risks. 382 There is considerable 
irony in the argument that, because consumers are informed of prod-
uct risks, tort should be supplanted by contract. 
Finally, the contractarians have argued that, if even only a fraction 
(as few as one third) of a product's consumers inform themselves by 
shopping around, manufacturers will act as if all consumers are well 
informed. 383 As manufacturers compete over the small number of in-
formed marginal consumers, uninformed inframarginal consumers 
will be protected from their own ignorance. This argument, too, de-
pends on dubious assumptions. First, it is questionable whether, for 
most products, even one third of all consumers are informed of war-
ranty terms given the high costs and low benefits of information in this 
context. Second, even assuming a substantial percentage of consumers 
are well informed of warranty terms and product risks, uninformed 
consumers cannot free ride on the information investments of well-
informed consumers if, as seems likely, manufacturers can segregate 
between the two groups.384 Lastly, to the extent that manufacturers 
cannot segregate between informed and uninformed consumers, a ben-
efit will not necessarily accrue to uninformed consumers when the 
preferences of informed consumers dictate a product's safety level and 
warranty terms if the preferences of informed (or marginal) consumers 
do not match the preferences of uninformed (or inframarginal) 
consumers. 385 
In light of the above, the contractarians' faith that the costs of 
information do not undermine the efficiency of consumer product 
markets seems unfounded. 
c. Why impelfect consumer information that is co"ect on average 
is inadequate. As described in section III.B.1.a, the contractarians 
sometimes argue that even if information costs prevent consumers 
381. For background on MER/29, see generally Page Keeton, Some Observations About the 
Strict Liability of the Maker of Prescription Drugs: The Aftermath of MER/29, 56 CAL. L. REV. 
149 (1968); Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story -An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster 
Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116 (1968). 
382. Cf Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass 
Torts, 43 HAsnNos L.J. 301, 316 (1992) (describing the civil suits that preceded the "widespread 
publicity" of the MER/29 episode). See generally sources cited supra notes 379, 381. 
383. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. 
384. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 154-58 (arguing that manufacturers are able to 
differentiate their products and target sales to narrow consumer groups effectively). 
385. We argue below that, where the preferences of marginal consumers diverge from those 
of inframarginal consumers, there may be a welfare loss to inframarginal consumers. See infra 
section IV.C. 
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from estimating product risks with complete accuracy, there is no rea-
son to believe that consumer estimates will be biased on average. And, 
so long as consumer estimates are correct on average, contracting be-
tween manufacturers and consumers should yield efficient levels of de-
terrence and insurance. 386 For at least two reasons, however, that 
conclusion does not follow from the premise. First, even if consumers 
can estimate the average risks posed by, and average warranty provi-
sions of, a given product across competing brands, product markets 
will still be inefficient insofar as information costs prohibit consumers 
from distinguishing among specific brands of that product. In other 
words, consumer ignorance concerning the risk and warranty varia-
tion among particular brands of products will undermine market effi-
ciency to the extent that consumers will be well informed only about a 
generic product's risks and warranty terms. 
To see why,387 consider the incentives a particular manufacturer 
would have in a market where smp.e sufficient number of consumers 
read warranty terms and estimated product risks so that they were 
well informed about the generic version of the manufacturer's product 
but could not distinguish, according to risk level, the manufacturer's 
particular brand from competing brands of that product. Such a man-
ufacturer, considering whether to make its product more safe or less 
safe than the average brand, would reason as follows. To provide 
more safety than the average would require the manufacturer to raise 
its price by the cost of the improvement. That price increase would 
not be recoverable, however, since by hypothesis consumers could not 
appreciate it - that is, they could not distinguish the manufacturer's 
brand from other brands of the same product. The manufacturer 
would therefore not make the change. To make its brand less safe 
than the average, on the other hand, would lead to increased profits. 
Below-average safety would mean below-average costs of production. 
Yet consumers, unable to recognize that the manufacturer's product 
was less safe, would still be willing to pay the average price for the 
product. The manufacturer could thereby capitalize on consumers' in-
ability to make distinctions among specific brands. In short, the man-
386. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. Priest makes essentially the same argument 
about consumer product warranties. See Priest, supra note 12, at 1303 n.42 ("[T]he problem of 
product warranties is more interesting where consumers systematically misperceive product risks 
- because the market mechanism [therefore] requires correction - than where consumers make 
estimates that are highly variant, but on average accurate."). 
387. The story that follows is another iteration of the "lemons problem." See George A. 
Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84·Q.J. 
EcoN. 488 (1970); see also Geistfeld, supra note 344, at 63-67; Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, 
at 176-77; Latin, supra note 360, at 695; Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980) (all applying lemons problem to consumer product markets). 
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ufacturer would have an incentive to "free ride" on the safety provided 
by its competitors. Of course, all manufacturers would reason in this 
way; the result would be an "unraveling" of product safety. 
Unraveling of this sort would not be limited to product safety. In 
a ~arket where consumers who read warranties possess only generic 
information about the terms of those warranties, individual manufac-
turers would, for exactly the same reasons, have incentives to free ride 
on the insurance coverage provided by their competitors.388 Unrav-
eling will occur, then, either in the safety of a product or in the terms 
of the product's warranty (or both), so long as consumers' information 
about product risks and warranty terms is, albeit correct on average, 
generic. To avoid unraveling, consumers must have information about 
specific product brands. 
Second, even assuming that consumers' estimations of risk and 
knowledge of warranty terms are, on average, correct not merely 
about generic products but about particular brands of products, prod-
uct markets will still be inefficient to the extent that individual con-
sumers err.389 Although under such assumptions manufacturers will 
respond to average consumer preferences, and will thus provide both 
optimal safety investments and optimal warranty terms, the consump-
tion decisions of individual consumers, whose estimations would be 
distributed around that average, will still produce welfare losses. 
Some consumers will continue to underestimate product risks, only to 
be "offset," from the viewpoint of the manufacturer, by consumers 
who overestimate product risk by the same amount. The first con-
sumer will buy too much - an "error of commission" - while her 
counterpart will buy too little - an "error of omission."390 
The same will be true for warranty terms. Although consumers as 
a whole may understand warranty terms correctly on average, some 
individual consumers will mistakenly believe that a given warranty 
provides greater coverage than it really does and thus buy too much. 
Other individual consumers will simultaneously believe that the war-
ranty provides less coverage than it in fact does and thus buy too little. 
On the warranty dimension, too, these individual mistakes mean wel-
fare losses for individual consumers, no matter how perfectly 
offsetting. 
388. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 176-77; Priest, supra note 12, at 1303-05, 1352; 
Shavell, supra note 387, at 5. 
389. For a fuller treatment of this argument, see Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 177-79; 
see also Geistfeld, supra note 344, at 60-63. 
390. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 177-79. For the same reason, the first consumer 
will take too little care while her counterpart will take too much care. 
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In a number of ways, then, the consequences of the costs of infor-
mation are more complicated than contractarian theory suggests. In 
addition to the inefficiencies that arise when the costs of estimating 
product risks and of reading and understanding warranties exceed the 
benefits for all consumers, the problems of product safety and product , 
warranty unraveling, as well as the welfare losses associated with indi-
vidual errors of commission and omission, remain. These problems 
undermine the contractarians' arguments that lack of consumer infor-
mation is less problematic than the first generation thought. 
2. Exploitative Manufacturer Market Power: The New Exploitation 
Theory 
The first generation argued that manufacturer market power led to 
exploitative product warranties.391 The contractarians respond first 
that as a theoretical matter manufacturers with market power will sat-
isfy consumers' warranty preferences and will exercise their power 
only in setting prices, and moreover that the first generation's "ex-
ploitation theory" is not confirmed by actual product warranties, 
which confirm instead the predictions of Professor Priest's influential 
"investment theory" of warranties. 392 In making their case, the con-
tractarians have assumed that manufacturers are well informed of con-
sumers' warranty preferences. However, if manufacturers are not well 
informed of consumers' warranty preferences, products and warran-
ties may not efficiently conform to those preferences. An undetected 
divergence of preferences between marginal and inframarginal con-
sumers is one way that imperfect manufacturer information may un-
dermine the efficiency of consumer product markets. 
Imagine that Acme Incorporated, a firm with market power, is try-
ing to decide whether to add provisions to its warranty (or safety fea-
tures to its product) that would, if free, make all consumers better off. 
Assume for simplicity that each consumer buys just one widget. A 
warranty provision will increase Acme's costs by c. The marginal con-
sumer, to whose preferences Acme is most sensitive and from whom 
Acme gathers most of its information about consumer preferences 
generally, will value that warranty provision by p. Thus, if there are x 
consumers, Acme would expect its revenues to increase by xp. Acme 
391. See supra section 11.B.2. 
392. See supra section 111.B.l.b. The contractarians generally agree that the investment (or 
comparative advantage) theory of product warranties best explains the actual terms of product 
warranties and provides the best evidence that contracting between manufacturers and consum-
ers is efficient, not exploitative. See Epstein, supra note 43, at 656-58; Priest, supra note 12, at 
1347; Schwartz, supra note 87, at 828; see also Danzon, supra note 226, at 572; supra note 149 
and sources cited therein. 
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will add the provision only if it predicts that doing so will increase its 
profits. Because, however, p measures the marginal consumer's and 
not the typical consumer's willingness to pay (which Acme does not 
know), xp does not necessarily measure the social gains of adding the 
warranty provision. 393 The provision will be socially efficient if the 
average benefit exceeds the average cost (or, put differently, if the total 
benefits exceed the total costs). 
As Michael Spence has explained: 
The social benefits correspond to the increase in the revenues of the firm 
only if the marginal consumer is average or representative . . . • but there 
is nothing at all intrinsic to the market that guarantees that the marginal 
purchaser is representative. On the contrary, in many cases, the margi-
nal consumer is quite unlikely to be representative in his marginal valua-
tion of quality. 394 
It is, of course, possible that the marginal consumers of many con-
sumer products are unrepresentative in their valuations of warranty 
terms and safety investments. In particular, marginal consumers may 
demand warranty provisions (and safety investments) less extensive 
than those demanded by the average consumer. To the extent that 
th_is is the case, manufacturers, responding to those consumers' prefer-
ences, would stop adding warranty coverage too soon. Warranties 
would be inefficiently restrictive. 39s 
To understand the significance of this potential problem, it may 
now be useful to return to the example from section III.B.1 illustrating 
Schwartz and Wilde's argument that manufacturers will not exercise 
market power by reducing the quality of their products.396 In that 
example, it was assumed that Acme Incorporated was deciding 
whether to add a safety device (or warranty provision) to its widgets 
that would cost Acme only $20 but would save the average consumer 
$50 in expected accident costs. Schwartz and Wilde conclude that 
Acme will add the device but charge consumers more than the $20 it 
costs. But they effectively assume there is no relevant difference be-
tween marginal and inframarginal consumers,397 and their conclusion 
does not follow if that assumption is relaxed. Suppose for example 
393. This argument does not assume that manufacturers are completely unable to segregate 
consumers, but rather that they cannot do so perfectly. 
394. A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. EcoN. 417, 418 
(1975). 
395. The conclusion that providing a warranty suited to Acme's average consumer rather 
than its marginal consumer would improve social welfare may depend upon the shape of the 
distribution of consumers' preferences along the demand schedule. 
396. See supra notes 139·43 and accompanying text. 
397. Cf. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 122, at 639 n.19 ("[I]t seems safe to assume that the 
degree of risk aversion does not correlate strongly with the extent of search."). 
February 1993] Enterprise Liability 781 
that, a1though consumers of widgets are willing to pay, on average, 
$50 for Acme's new safety device, the margina1 consumer is willing to 
pay only $10 for it. In that case, even though the safety device is 
socially efficient, Acme will not provide it, insofar as margina1 con-
sumers' response will not "convey information about the va1ue at-
tached to [the safety feature] by inframargina1 consumers."398 In 
effect, therefore, just as the first generation had believed, the average 
consumer of widgets experiences "exploitation" at the hands of manu-
facturers as a result of their efforts to maximize profits by providing 
both products that are less than optimally safe and warranties that are 
less than optimally generous. That is the result predicted by the "new 
exploitation theory."399 
To determine whether the new exploitation theory might have rele-
vance to our understanding of consumer product markets, we will of-
fer preliminary answers to two genera] questions. First, is the new 
exploitation theory plausible - that is, is there any theoretica1 reason 
to believe that margina1 consumers are the relatively low-risk consum-
ers of a given product? And, second, if plausible, does the new ex-
ploitation theory predict actua1 warranty terms as effectively as (or 
more effectively than) the now-dominant investment theory does? 
Providing conclusive answers to those questions is well beyond the 
scope of this article. However, a brief examination of the arguments 
and evidence on which the investment theory is based suggests an af-
firmative answer to both questions. 
In setting forth the investment theory, Professor Priest unwittingly 
all but sets forth the new exploitation theory. As he emphasizes, 
"[t]he task of defining optima] warranty provisions resembles the task 
of defining optima] rate classes in insurance contracts:"400 
For most types of insurance, of course, it is prohibitively costly either to 
predict exactly the risk that an individual brings to a pool or to charge 
individual premiums. As a consequence, an insurer is forced to lump 
individuals into separate classes or, sometimes, into a single class .... 
Thus, the premium undercharges relatively high-risk individuals and 
overcharges relatively low-risk individuals.401 
As a consequence of this lumping, according to Priest, low-risk con-
sumers subsidize high-risk consumers and thus will be less willing to 
398. Spence, supra note 394, at 417. 
399. "According to the [old] exploitation theory, manufacturers exercise their powerful mar-
ket position by-imposing one-sided warranty terms on weaker consumers." Priest, supra note 12, 
at 1320. 
400. Priest, supra note 12, at 1316. 
401. Id. at 1314-15. 
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pay either to insure against or to prevent the loss.402 For that theoreti-
cal reason, Priest, in his analysis of insurance generally and of con-
sumer product warranties more specifically, concludes that low-risk 
insureds will be marginal consumers.403 To the extent that Priest is 
correct,404 the new exploitation theory gains plausibility. 
Assuming the new exploitation theory is theoretically plausible, 
there remains the important question as to how well the theory 
predicts the actual terms of warranties. Fortunately, Priest has, again 
unwittingly, already tested the new exploitation theory. That is true 
because the general prediction that Priest's investment theory yields is 
virtually identical to that of the new exploitation theory:405 
402. To some extent, price discrimination might provide a solution to this problem. Ideally, 
consumers would be charged variable premiums according to the amount of warranty coverage 
they demanded. But there may be real-world limits to how specifically warranties can be written. 
See supra text accompanying note 401; see also Schwartz, supra note 7: 
Since the costs to a firm of creating a special contract for one person will almost always 
exceed the gain to that person, and therefore the price he is willing to pay, this relatively 
unique consumer probably will be unable to purchase the insurance he wants. Firms com-
monly are responsive to the preferences of consllpler groups, rather than the preferences of 
every consumer. 
The consumer in the illustration actually is the victim of unequal bargaining power, but 
his plight seems not to call for a legal response. 
Id. at 371-72; see also Spence, supra note 394: 
One might ask why a whole spectrum of products, differentiated in terms of both price 
and quality, is not produced. The assumption is that fixed costs or increasing returns and 
demand prevent the profitable production of more than one product of the type under con-
sideration. More generally, fixed costs limit the number of products without reducing the 
feasible set to just one. 
Id. at 418 n.2. But cf. Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 154-58 (arguing that manufacturers 
may be capable of segregating consumers into fairly narrow classes). Because there are limits to 
the extent contracts can be narrowly tailored, some consumers will have to put up with what is 
for them nonoptimal coverage. 
403. See George L. Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance, 63 
TuL. L. REv. 999, 1027 (1989) ("Within any insurance pool, low-risk insureds will always be the 
marginal insurance purchasers."); Priest, supra note 9, at 1545 ("In essence, the insurers are 
competing over the relatively low-risk insureds of any risk pool, who are likely to select that 
insurer most precisely able to price the risk the insured brings to the pool."); Priest, supra note 
12, at 1315 ("At the margin, some low-risk individuals are likely to find that the cost of market 
insurance exceeds the benefit, and will shift to allocative investments that reduce the likelihood of 
the loss or to self-insurance."); id. at 1316 ("Smaller families at the margin [that is, families with 
a lower probability of experiencing a loss] may find warranty protection to be worth less than its 
cost."); id. at 1317 ("The warranty provides a term of basic coverage demanded by the lowest 
risk members of the pool."); Priest, supra note 130, at 1395 n.49 ("Warranty coverage expires 
when differences among consumers in their investments to prolong product life become signifi-
cant. Thus, low-risk consumers find longer coverage worth less than its average cost and are 
sufficient in number to dominate the warranty market."). 
404. We are somewhat skeptical of Priest's theoretical claim. It is not completely clear to us, 
for instance, why high-risk consumers would not be marginal consumers where insurance cover-
age was limited to some amount less than a high-risk consumer would lose were an insured loss 
to occur. Our goal in this section, however, is not to challenge that assumption, but to argue that 
even if the assumptions underlying the investment theory were correct, product warranties may 
still be inefficiently restrictive (i.e., "exploitative"). 
405. Priest purportedly bases his investment theory on the following empirical assumptions: 
(1) "consumers are perfectly informed about the likelihood of a product defect and about the 
losses that will be suffered should a product become defective"; (2) "consumers somehow make 
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The terms of the standard warranty ... establish the minimum level of 
coverage that is demanded uniformly by each member of the large class 
of purchasers . . . . The standard level of coverage comprises the mini-
mum performance bond necessary to encourage appropriate investments 
by manufacturers in the design or mechanical qualities of the product 
and the minimum insurance coverage demanded by the lowest risk mem-
bers of the consumer pool.406 
Reviewing the warranty provisions of sixty-two consumer products, 
Priest concluded that "the investment theory explains warranty prac-
tices more comprehensively" than its competitors do. 407 But, because 
the new exploitation theory yields the same prediction as does the in-
vestment theory, Priest confirmed the former when intending to con-
firm only the latter. 
As a means of choosing between the two theories, both of which 
seem equally consistent with the evidence, it should be noted that the 
investment theory provides only a very tentative explanation of the 
means by which consumers convey their preferences to consumers: 
Manufacturers compete, not over the entire set of consumers, but over 
the set of marginal consumers. If a small group of consumers reads war-
ranties and selects among products according to warranty content, man-
ufacturers may be forced to draft warranties responsive to the group's 
preferences, even though the large majority of consumers generally ne-
glect warranty terms."408 
Implicit in that explanation is the assumption that marginal consum-
their preferences regarding warranty terms known to manufacturers and .•. manufacturers are 
responsive to those preferences"; (3) ''warranty contracts are standardized only to reduce negoti-
ation costs"; and ( 4) "all products are manufactured under conditions of perfect competition, so 
that each characteristic of a product - including warranty terms - serves to optimize the wel-
fare of some dominant class of consumers." Priest, supra note 12, at 1307-08 (emphasis added 
and omitted) (footnote omitted). 
406. Id. at 1319 (emphasis added). Priest argues, when developing his theory of product 
warranties, that high-risk consumers will be satisfied with the minimal coverage provided in 
standard warranties because they can obtain supplemental coverage from other sources. See id. 
at 1316-18. However, that argument is not part of the general prediction that Priest is testing in 
his empirical analysis. Moreover, as Priest recognizes, these alternative sources cannot perfectly 
segregate consumers according to each consumer's demand for insurance. See id. at 1314-15. In 
any case, the segregation that does occur will not necessarily lead to the welfare-optimizing result 
that Priest imagines. See generally Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Com-
petitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. EcoN. 
629 (1976) (the seminal work exploring how low-risk insureds are made worse off by the exist-
ence of high-risk insureds where insurers are asymmetrically uninformed in a competitive insur-
ance market); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The 
Insurance Market, 44 REv. EcoN. STUD. 407 (1977) (same in monopolistic market); Phillipe 
Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 
J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 381 (1990); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 177, at 737-42 (employing Roths-
child & Stiglitz' insight to explain how contractual inefficiencies may exist even when contracting 
is costless). For an excellent and accessible rendition of the Rothschild-Stiglitz insight, see Ay-
res, supra note 326, at 392-402. 
407. Priest, supra note 12, at 1347. 
408. Id. 
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ers represent a random sample of the entire pool of a product's con-
sumers. Otherwise, by satisfying the preference of marginal 
consumers, manufacturers would - as Spence has shown and the new 
exploitation theory predicts - fail to satisfy the preference of average 
consumers. Also implicit, however, is the assumption that most mar-
ginal consumers, unlike most inframarginal consumers, base their con-
sumption choices on the content of warranties. Unfortunately, the 
investment theory fails to reconcile the positions that marginal con-
sumers are similar to inframarginal consumers in their demand for 
warranty coverage but different from inframarginal consumers in their 
willingness to acquire information regarding warranty content. If, for 
instance, most consumers ignore warranties because the costs exceed 
the benefits of doing otherwise, the investment theory provides no rea-
son to believe that the costs would be less or the benefits greater for 
that random sample of consumers who find themselves on the margin. 
In contrast, the assumption upon which the new exploitation theory is 
based - that marginal consumers have lower demand for warranty 
coverage - is not only consistent with the evidence, it may also sug-
gest why marginal consumers are more sensitive to warranty terms 
than average consumers are. 409 
Finally, the new exploitation theory survives a strong con-
tractarian criticism of the old exploitation theory: "A principal weak-
ness of the [old] exploitation theory is that it provides no theoretical 
link between market power and product warranty terms. Why would 
a firm with market power maximize its returns by offering one-sided 
warranty terms rather than . . . by charging a monopoly price?"4to 
"[I]n theory, a monopolist (or a group of conspiring firms) will gain 
the greatest return by offering the consumer an optimal warranty, but 
at a price that exceeds marginal costs."411 This general theoretical 
result does not obtain, however, in precisely those circumstances that, 
according to the investment theory, characterize the market for war-
ranties: where marginal consumers demand less warranty coverage 
409. See supra notes 400-04 and accompanying text. Schwartz and Wilde argue that Priest's 
evidence is also consistent with their search model. Like Priest's, however, Schwartz & Wilde's 
model assumes that the consumers responsible for ensuring that the optimal terms are provided 
are drawn randomly from the entire pool of consumers. See supra note 397 and accompanying 
text; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 137, at 1403 ("Some consumers have sample sizes of one -
they visit only one firm before buying - while others have sample sizes of two or more. We label 
these consumers 'nonshoppers' and 'shoppers,' respectively."); id. at 1426-27 ("Because consum-
ers in our model shop randomly, each firm will probably see a representative sample of the 
market."). 
410. Priest, supra note 12, at 1321; see also supra text accompanying notes 139-43. 
411. Priest, supra note 12, at 1321. 
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than average consumers.412 
3. Risk Distribution: The First-Party Insurance Extemality 
The first generation argued that manufacturer-provided insurance 
through tort law was desirable because consumers had no other means 
of spreading the risks of product-caused accidents.413 In the past sev-
eral decades, however, first-party insurance has become increasingly 
widespread. The contractarians argue that, because these alternative 
forms of insurance are now widely available, manufacturer-provided 
insurance is unnecessary.414 Ironically, however, the claim that first-
party insurance is now widely available provides a new justification for 
manufacturer-provided insurance. As has been argued elsewhere, 
there is reason to believe that first-party insurance largely removes 
from consumers and manufacturers incentives necessary for efficient 
investment in accident preventj.on.41s 
Contractarians and regulators alike generally assume that consum-
ers are insured through first-party mechanisms (including govern-
ment-supported insurance) against most of the pecuniary risks of 
product accidents.416 First-party insurers, however, rarely and imper-
fectly adjust premiums to reflect each consumer's decisions concerning 
which products are purchased, how many of each product are 
purchased, or how carefully those products are consumed. The failure 
of first-party insurers to adjust premiums to reflect those consumption 
choices gives rise to the first-party insurance externality.417 To the 
extent that consumers are compensated for their pecuniary losses 
412. Priest criticizes the old exploitation theory also on the ground that the warranty terms 
he investigated do not appear to correlate with a firm's market share or an industry's concentra-
tion. Id. at 1320-25. The relevant market-power variable in the new exploitation theory is the 
extent to which the preferences of marginal consumers differ from those of inframarginal con-
sumers with respect to the relevant quality attributes. Priest's empirical findings, therefore, shed 
little or no light on the new exploitation theory one way or the other. 
Priest shares the first generation's intuition that consumer product warranties are 
exploitative: 
Most of us, I would imagine, share some intuitive feeling that manufacturers possess bar-
gaining power superior to any consumer and that consumers have few opportunities to 
choose among warranty terms. This feeling accounts, I believe, for the popularity of the 
contract-of-adhesion and unfair bargaining power concepts in modem jurisprudence. 
Priest, supra note 130, at 1399. Thus, Priest does not find the exploitation theory implausible on 
its face. Rather, he argues that it is theoretically "impressionistic and imprecise," id., and that it 
does not account for the evidence. But the new exploitation theory not only comports with 
widely held intuitions; it also survives such criticisms. 
413. See supra section IV.B.3. 
414. See supra section III.B.l.c. 
415. See generally Hanson & Logue, supra note 11. 
416. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 273; Priest, supra note 9, at 1552, 1586-
87. See generally Hanson & Logue, supra note 11. 
417. See generally Hanson & Logue, supra note 11. 
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through first-party insurance and insurance premiums are not adjusted 
according to the risk of such losses, consumers will ignore those costs, 
externalizing them upon their first-party insurers. With respect to pe-
cuniary losses, consumers cannot be made to prevent residually pre-
ventable accidents, regardless of the background liability standard. 
Taking care would impose on consumers costs with no offsetting bene-
fits. Moreover, under a regime of free contracting, consumers will be 
unwilling to pay a higher price to compensate manufacturers for 
preventing initially preventable accidents. Manufacturers will write 
one-sided warranties and produce inefficiently unsafe products - not 
because consumers are ill informed and not because manufacturers are 
exploiting consumers, but because consumers simply will not demand 
efficient warranties or efficiently safe products. Furthermore, insofar 
as consumers externalize pecuniary accident costs, they will consume 
beyond a point where the true marginal costs of the product equal the 
marginal benefits; activity levels will be too high. In sum, the first-
party insurance externality poses a potentially substantial obstacle to 
reformers' deterrence objectives.41s 
C. Reviving the Conclusion: Enterprise Liability to the Rescue 
The previous section revived, in modified form, the first genera-
tion's premises concerning imperfect consumer information, exploita-
tive manufacturer market power, and risk distribution. We attempt in 
this section to revive the case for enterprise liability by explaining how 
enterprise liability responds to those market imperfections. 
1. Informing Consumers 
Given that consumers are imperfectly informed, a goal of tort law 
should be to provide incentives for manufacturers, who are compara-
tively well informed, to inform consumers of a product's residually 
preventable and unpreventable risks so that consumers can adjust their 
care and activity levels to efficient levels.419 As will become clear, tort 
418. See id. at 164-74. Both camps can be criticized for their assumption (often implicit) 
that first-party insurance does not blunt consumer incentives to minimize the costs of accidents. 
Moreover, those who call for some form of regulation can be criticized for failing to recognize the 
implications of that assumption. If first-party insurance worked perfectly - that is, if premiums 
were adjusted to reflect the expected accident costs of each insured's consumption choices - the 
market failures that advocates of regulation seek to avoid would evaporate, for consumers' flrst-
party insurance premiums would act as a perfect signal to apprise them of the risks posed by the 
products they consume. For a description of how price communicates information in this con-
text, see id. at 175. 
Stephen Sugarman's proposal that we adopt a universal compensation scheme would simply 
recreate a first-party insurance externality in a slightly different form - the social insurance 
externality. 
419. See VISCUS!, supra note 117, at 132-34. We assume in this section that manufacturers 
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law might be employed to serve that goal in two ways. The emerging 
consensus among products liability scholars seems to be that courts 
should adopt a penalty default approach, according to which manufac-
turers would, to avoid liability, inform consumers about product risks 
through warnings.420 If warning requirements are exculpatory, then 
manufacturers will, to avoid liability, provide warnings, and consum-
ers will, to avoid the costs of injury, read, process, and heed those 
warnings.421 
We propose an alternative approach, enterprise liability, which 
would place on manufacturers the full costs of product-caused acci-
dents. Insofar as consumers would respond to warnings, manufactur-
ers seeking to minimize their liability costs would have an incentive to 
warn consumers of residually preventable accidents. Moreover, be-
cause a product's price would reflect the product's expected accident 
costs, price would act as an independent source of risk information. 422 
In two ways, then, manufacturers will inform consumers of both 
residually preventable and unpreventable risks. Under any regime less 
strict than absolute manufacturer liability (Row 4), a manufacturer 
will not otherwise be liable for, and thus will not inform consumers of, 
residually preventable risks, while under any regime less strict than 
strict liability (Row 3), manufacturers for the same reason will not 
inform consumers of unpreventable risks. Thus, given that consumers 
are uninformed, the relevant policy choice is between mutable absolute 
have appropriate incentives to prevent initially preventable accidents and that consumers there-
fore need not be concerned about initially preventable accidents. To the extent that is not the 
case, enterprise liability seems likely to be the best means of ensuring that all initially preventable 
accidents will be prevented. That is true, first, because manufacturers are likely better informed 
than are consumers, courts, or regulators as to whether or not an accident is initially preventable, 
and, second, because enterprise liability serves as a form of performance bond, ensuring that 
manufacturers will make all cost-justified investments in identifying and preventing initially pre-
ventable accidents. 
420. See supra note 208; see also, e.g., supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text (Huber); 
Schwartz, supra note 87, at 840-43; supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (Landes and 
Posner); supra notes 245-52 and accompanying text (Viscusi); supra note 301 and accompanying 
text (Rose-Ackerman). 
421. We will assume in this section that consumers are aware of the potential injury-reducing 
benefit of warnings. If they are not so aware, warnings will have no beneficial deterrence effect. 
See supra text accompanying notes 343-45. 
422. Most products liability scholars recognize but ultimately ignore the price mechanism as 
a means of informing consumers. See, e.g., supra note 213 and accompanying text (Schwartz); 
supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text (Landes and Posner). Some scholars seem to consider 
the inefficiencies associated with overestimation beyond the reach of the price mechanism. See, 
e.g., VIScus1, supra note 117, at 64, 136. Yet price communicates risk information not only to 
consumers who otherwise underestimate risks but also to consumers who overestimate risks. 
The latter group too will adjust their consumption choices in response to the information pro-
vided by the price mechanism. To the extent that consumers know they will be compensated for 
their losses, they will disregard their own estimates of product risks. Of course, the efficacy of 
the price mechanism may be limited to the extent they will not fully recover for their nonpecu-
niary losses. 
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manufacturer liability (Box 7) and enterprise liability (Box 8). The 
choice involves several considerations. 
One important consideration is whether one approach will yield 
more effective warnings than the other. A variety of tradeoffs compli-
cates the task of designing warnings. For instance, it is difficult to 
know how substantively detailed warnings should be.423 Simple warn-
ings that describe only a product's most significant risks are less com-
plete but more easily retained by consumers: 
Detailed examination of the information that individuals retain from 
hazard warnings indicates that even with very detailed and well-designed 
warning labels, individuals can seldom recall more than six pieces of in-
formation froni a label. Much of what is retained regards aspects of the 
product other than precautions and risk levels--for example how to use 
the product. With the addition of more information, individuals eventu-
ally reach a saturation point. 
There is a fundamental trade-off in terms of the information that is 
retained by consumer[s].424 
Those designing effective warnings must make that tradeoff 
successfully. 
A similar tradeoff complicates the issue of how best to present a 
warning. On one hand, if its presentation is too bold, a warning will 
lead consumers to overestimate the product's risks.425 On the other 
hand, warnings can be so unobtrusive that consumers (like Claus Hen-
ningsen) overlook them.426 Here again, effective warnings require a 
delicate balance. 
The efficiency of warnings turns on such tradeoffs. Viscusi argues, 
in defense of a Box 7 approach, that "[t]he best practical solution to 
the problem of competing risks of labeling is pre-testing the warning 
- its language and its presentation of information - for its ability to 
accomplish the intended objective."427 But Viscusi's solution depends 
on several questionable assumptions. First, he assumes that regulators 
who author warnings know, or can discover, how to accomplish the 
intended objective of a product warning.428 Because different consum-
423. See supra notes 370-372 and accompanying text. 
424. VISCUS!, supra note 117, at 139-40. But see Schwartz, supra note 87, at 829 n.18 (ques-
tioning phenomenon of information overload). 
425. See VISCUS!, supra note 117, at 136 (presenting California cancer warning requirements 
as a "stunning example of overestimation of small risks identified in warnings"). 
426. Indeed, this is one of the concerns raised by the first generation but never addressed by 
the contractarians. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 82, 84 (N.J. 1960) (ob-
servations concerning size and type of print used in purchase order contract). 
427. VISCUS!, supra note 117, at 137; see also authorities cited supra note 370. 
428. Viscusi explains that the intended objective of warnings in general terms "should be to 
convey the risk level, appropriate precautions, and an indication of the particular risks that will 
be reduced by these precautions. The ultimate intent is to influence the individual's decisions. 
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ers will have different costs of taking precautions and different re-
sponses to risk information,429 however, it is not obvious how 
regulators are to distinguish effective from ineffective warnings. At 
one point, Viscusi suggests that a product warning has served its ob-
jective when the product's sales drop substantially after the introduc-
tion of a warning,430 but that begs the question whether sales should 
drop and, if so, by how much.431 Second, even if regulators could 
determine a warning's precise objective, it is not clear how they would 
measure its success.432 Viscusi also overlooks the fact that, where 
warnings are exculpatory, a manufacturer would have an incentive to 
minimize a warning's effects in terms of both its substance and its 
presentation. The manufacturer not only would strive to no more 
than meet the exculpatory requirements but also would strive to un-
dermine the warning's effects in its marketing of the product, for ex-
ample by overloading consumers with information through product 
advertisements or instructions. Warnings are not the exclusive means 
by which a manufacturer can "inform" consumers.433 
Manufacturer-authored warnings provided in a regime of enter-
prise liability, in contrast, would not be subject to such shortcomings. 
Because manufacturers will be liable for any accidents that their prod-
ucts cause, they will strive to minimize the total costs of product-
caused accidents. To the extent that consumers demand risk informa-
tion, manufacturers will strike the optimal balance in the substance 
and presentation of warnings: market forces will ensure that warnings 
that are just right will survive over those that are not. Not only will 
••• " VJScus1, supra note 117, at 134; see also id. at 144 (a warning is intended to "inform a 
product user of a risk and of behavior that will reduce that risk"). 
429. Id. at 138-39, 148-49. 
430. See id. at 144-45. 
431. Viscusi has criticized others for talclng the same question-begging approach that heap-
pears to take. He writes: "Reduced [sales] indicate[] a negative shift in attitudes toward a prod-
uct, but it does not tell us whether the warning has been adequate or whether it has been unduly 
alarmist." Id. at 135. 
Viscusi's recommendation that "[w]arnings assessments should be based on scientific princi-
ples rather than on conjecture of self-proclaimed expertise," id. at 144, is, by itself, oflittle practi-
cal use. He attempts to be more helpful by suggesting that 
[one] procedure for evaluating [the] impact of warning labels is to apply the principles that 
have been developed in the scientific literature. This procedure is generally the simplest to 
undertake since no new research is required, but it is important to rely upon scientifically 
established principles for label design as opposed to conjecture. 
Id. at 145. Without more, however, Viscusi's proposed procedure sheds little light on how regu-
lators should assess the efficiency of warnings. 
432. At one point, Viscusi seems to recognize this difficulty. See id. at 145 (noting that "the 
particular contribution of the warnings to changes in sales or behavior cannot be isolated"). 
433. This is another of the concerns raised by the first generation but not addressed by the 
contractarians. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
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manufacturers strive to provide effective warnings, they will also avoid 
obscuring those warnings through their marketing efforts. 
From a supply-side perspective, enterprise liability appears clearly 
superior to a Box 7 approach. Products liability scholars have ignored 
that benefit of enterprise liability, emphasizing instead what they be-
lieve to be the demand-side shortcoming of enterprise liability: under 
enterprise liability, consumers will have little or no incentive to take a 
product's risks into account because tort law will compensate them for 
their injuries regardless of the product warning.434 Under a Box 7 
approach, in contrast, consumers will take warnings seriously because 
warnings shift the burden of accident costs onto consumers. Thus, to 
choose between Boxes 7 and 8, one must determine whether the sup-
ply-side shortcomings of Box 7 outweigh the demand-side shortcom-
ings of Box 8-whether, in other words, it is worse that manufacturers 
have imperfect incentives to inform consumers or that consumers have 
imperfect incentives to respond to information. 435 Careful scrutiny 
reveals that the choice is simpler than it may seem. 
Considering first the risks of residually preventable accidents, a 
strong case can be made in favor of enterprise liability. To begin with, 
the demand-side shortcomings of enterprise liability as compared to a 
Box 7 approach are likely de minimis. That is true in part because a 
substantial component of most product-caused injuries is the nonpecu-
niary component. No scholar believes that tort damages fully com-
pensate consumers for nonpecuniary losses.436 To that extent, 
consumers are not indifferent between the state of the world in which 
they are not injured and the state of the world in which they are in-
jured but compensated for their injuries. Regardless of the liability 
regime, consumers will have significant incentives to acquire informa-
tion about a product's residually preventable nonpecuniary risks . 
. Moreover, the fact that consumers are compensated under enterprise 
434. See, e.g., supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text (describing Viscusi's proposal to 
shift accident costs onto consumers in order to affect their behavior); supra notes 153-56 and 
accompanying text (summarizing contractarians' view that the trend toward enterprise liability 
was harmful in part because it was based on the false assumption that consumers had no signill· 
cant role to play in accident prevention). 
435. This is analytically similar to the question whether the supply·side shortcomings of a 
Box 6 approach, in which manufacturers are not liable for residually preventable accidents, are 
worse than the demand-side shortcomings of enterprise liability. Recall that under a Box 6 ap-
proach manufacturers will have no incentive to warn consumers of residually preventable 
accidents. 
436. See, e.g., PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 10 (1988) ("These are irreplace-
able losses that cannot be recompensed by monetary compensation."); V1scus1, supra note 117, 
at 118 ("[C]urrent levels of products liability damages will never provide efficient levels of deter-
rence when it is life and limb at stake."); Epstein, supra note 43, at 653 ("[M]oney is an unsatis· 
factory substitute for health or wholeness."); Priest, supra note 29, at 8 ("[N)o personal injury 
can ever be fully compensated •... "). 
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liability for their residually preventable pecuniary losses does not cre-
ate a demand-side shortcoming as compared to Box 7. After all, most 
consumers have first-party insurance coverage against such risks. Re-
gardless of the liability regime, the first-party insurance externality 
substantially weakens consumers' incentive to acquire information 
about a product's residually preventable pecuµiary risks. 
Thus, it does not appear that consumer demand for information 
about a product's residually preventable risks would be significantly 
greater under a Box 7 regime than it would be under an enterprise 
liability regime. Indeed, the reverse might be true. If, under a Box 7 
regime, consumers knew that courts were applying a Box 7 approach, 
they might recognize the potential supply-side shortcomings of such 
an approach. Consumers would invest less in reading, processing, and 
heeding product warnings because the returns of doing so would be 
reduced. If instead consumers are not aware that warnings may be 
exculpatory, they may behave just as they would under an enterprise 
liability regime. 
Finally, and most important, because both approaches will fail to 
inform consumers adequately of some residually preventable acci-
dents, Box 8 is superior to Box 7. Only under an enterprise liability 
regime will manufacturers prevent l}econdarily preventable accidents. 
Moreover, as we explain below, only under an enterprise liability re-
gime will consumers adjust their activity levels to reflect the risk that 
some residually preventable accidents will not be prevented. For all of 
these reasons, enterprise liability appears to provide the most efficient 
response to the problem that consumers are imperfectly informed of 
residually preventable accidents. 
The case for enterprise liability with respect to unpreventable acci-
dents is even stronger. Ideally, consumers would purchase a product 
whenever the marginal benefits of the product exceeded its marginal 
costs. One ambition of tort law is to optimize activity levels by forcing 
consumers to take into account a product's total costs, including the 
costs of unpreventable risks, when deciding whether to buy a product 
or how many units of the product to buy. With respect to unprevent-
able risks, a Box 7 approach is subject to the same supply-side and 
demand-side problems described above: manufacturers have incen-
tives to misinform consumers, and consumers have attenuated incen-
tives to become informed of product risks. 
Enterprise liability, in contrast, circumvents such problems by sub-
stituting the price mechanism for warnings as the means of communi-
cating risk information. With respect to unpreventable losses, 
enterprise liability both internalizes the first-party insurance external-
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ity and "informs" consumers of expected nonpecuniary losses by forc-
ing manufacturers to pay for all product-caused accident costs. A 
product's nominal price will equal its true price, including its expected 
accident costs. For both pecuniary and nonpecuniary risks, therefore, 
consumers will optimize activity levels by purchasing a product only if 
its marginal benefits to the consumer exceed its price.437 Thus, even if 
consumers are not cognizant of an unpreventable risk, they will be-
have as if they were fully informed of it. With respect to unprevent-
able as well as residually preventable accidents, then, enterprise 
liability seems to offer the best response to the problems of imperfect 
consumer information. 438 
2. Empowering Consumers 
We argued in section IV.B.2 that manufacturers with market 
power may provide products that are less than optimally safe and war-
ranties that are less than optimally generous insofar as manufacturers 
seek to satisfy the preferences of marginal consumers and insofar as 
marginal consumers demand less safety and insurance than in-
framarginal consumers do. The policy implication of this new ex-
ploitation theory is that contracts between consumers and 
manufacturers cannot be presumed efficient. That is, the market can-
not be trusted - even where consumers are perfectly informed - al-
ways to ensure that manufacturers will supply the appropriate amount 
of deterrence and insurance. Consequently, the new exploitation the-
ory provides a second justification for adopting a mandatory (Column 
II) liability standard. It does not, however, provide a basis for choos-
ing among the possible liability standards (Rows 1-4). We shed light 
on that choice in the previous section about informing consumers and 
in the next section about insuring consumers, where we argue that 
absolute manufacturer liability (Row 4) is the most efficient 
standard. 439 
437. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 171. Enterprise liability also overcomes the 
problem noted by soine scholars that, even if consumers have information about a given risk, 
they may be unable to translate that risk information into monetary terms. See, e.g., W. Kip 
Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim Compensation and Risk 
Regulation, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 57-59 (1984). 
438. Where consumers are informed of a specific product's risks, none of the information 
problems described in Section IV.B.1 will emerge. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 176-
81 (explaining how enterprise liability will overcome the problems of unraveling and errors of 
omission and commission). 
439. Professor Spence suggests that some nonmarket, survey-type information may be help-
ful in assessing the demand of all consumers, including inframarginal consumers, for product 
quality. See Spence, supra note 394, at 425. Ajury may serve this purpose reasonably well. See 
generally Croley & Hanson, supra note 4, at 59-67; Croley & Hanson, supra note 9, at 64°66, 
107-12 (both describing how juries are suitable appraisers of an injured consumer's nonpecuniary 
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3. Insuring Consumers 
a. Redistributing pecuniary risks. The first generation argued 
that the dearth of first-party insurance against product-caused injuries 
justified a shift toward enterprise liability. The contractarians respond 
that the prevalence of first-party insurance against pecuniary losses 
justifies reversing the trend toward enterprise liability. In section 
IV.B.3 above, we argued that, insofar as first-party insurance does 
compensate consumers against the pecuniary costs of product-caused 
injuries, consumers, and, in turn manufacturers, externalize those 
costs. This first-party insurance extemality has clear implications for 
both dimensions of the Products Liability Matrix. 
First, this extemality provides another justification for absolute 
manufacturer liability (Row 4). Because of the extemality, consumers 
will not prevent residually preventable pecuniary losses and will not 
voluntarily adjust their activity levels to reflect the risk of pecuniary 
losses regardless of the background liability standard. The deterrence 
goal therefore becomes one of encouraging manufacturers to prevent 
secondarily preventable accidents and ensuring that activity levels re-
flect the costs of all unpreventable as well as unprevented residually 
preventable accidents. Absolute manufacturer liability is the only rule 
that will accomplish those goals.440 
Second, the first-party insurance extemality provides another justi-
fication for a mandatory liability standard (Column II). Because of 
the first-party insurance extemality, manufacturers will write one-
sided warranties and produce inefficiently unsafe products, not be-
cause consumers are ill informed or because manufacturers are ex-
ploiting consumers, but because consumers themselves do not demand 
efficient warranties or efficiently safe products. Consumers already 
have adequate insurance against those losses and are rationally unwill-
ing to pay for more.441 The first-party insurance extemality thus pro-
vides a clear justification for enterprise liability. 
Very recently, Professors Priest and Schwartz each have expressed 
doubts about the empirical significance of this market failure, while 
granting its theoretical plausibility.442 Both Priest and Schwartz argue 
that, insofar as first-party insurers pursue their rights of subrogation, 
losses and thus may overcome the market failure that may prevent the market from supplying 
insurance against such losses). 
440. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 168-73. 
441. As described above, even if manufacturers or regulators provided ideal product warn-
ings about pecuniary risks, consumers would have no incentive to take such warnings into ac-
count. See supra notes 417-18 and accompanying text. 
442. See Priest, supra note 198, at 257-58; Schwartz, supra note 87, at 834 n.31. 
794 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:683 
no first-party insurance externality will exist. But this argument is 
based on a misunderstanding of the first-party insurance externality. 
Although by exercising their subrogation rights insurers would lower 
premiums paid by all insureds, 443 they would not thereby affect any 
individual insured's consumption choices. The problem is not simply, 
as Priest and Schwartz apparently assume, that first-party insurance 
premiums are too high, but that they are not adjusted to reflect each 
insured's consumption choices.444 
Schwartz also observes that when the right of subrogation is "rou-
tinely exercised, product prices [will] reflect expected accident 
costs."445 That is of course true. But the observation merely concedes 
our point, for enterprise liability is the only liability standard to ensure 
that insurers will be able to exercise their right of subrogation success-
fully for all product-caused accidents. Thus, only under enterprise lia-
bility will product prices reflect the costs of all accidents. Where the 
liability standard is less strict, some of the costs of product-caused ac-
cidents will be externalized through first-party insurance. 446 
443. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 190 n.231 (explaining the effects of subrogation 
rights on insurance premiums under an enterprise liability regime). 
444. See supra notes 416-18 and accompanying text; see also Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, 
at 161 n.138. 
445. Schwartz, supra note 87, at 834 n.31. 
446. Schwartz wrongly implies that were the law to shift back toward Box 1, insurance com· 
panies would exercise their rights of subrogation more often than they now do. Id. Schwartz 
simply has it backwards, as is apparent from the fact that, in a Box 1 regime, insurers would 
never exercise their right of subrogation against manufacturers. Schwartz also claims that "first· 
party insurers experience rate dangerous activities and often terminate consumers who incur 
large losses." Id. at 835 n.31. This argument fails to appreciate the fact that such experience 
rating is extremely uncommon in first-party insurance (except, perhaps, in automobile insurance 
policies). See Hanson & Logue, supra note 11, at 145-53, 191-95. Perhaps that explains why the 
only authority Schwartz offers for his assertion is an article on liability insurance. See Schwartz, 
supra note 87, at 834 n.31 (citing Gary Schwartz, The Ethics and Economics of Tort Liability 
Insurance, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 313, 320 (1990)). 
Finally, Schwartz claims that the first-party insurance externality is of little significance be· 
cause "consumers can reduce their exposure to risk and thus the amount of first party insurance 
they demand by eschewing dangerous activities." Schwartz, supra note 87, at 834 n.31. For 
example, "a consumer who decides not to fly small planes has less need for disability insurance." 
Id. As a consequence, according to Schwartz, "consumers who purchase dangerous items do 
incur a loss, the additional insurance they must buy. This loss in effect reinserts accident costs in 
product prices." Id. Schwartz's argument, however, largely assumes away the first-party insur-
ance externality. That is, if a consumer already has disability insurance and the premiums for 
that insurance are not adjusted to reflect the consumer's consumption choices, then the consumer 
will not have to incur an added loss when she makes a risky consumption choice and she will 
enjoy no premium discount when she eschews a risky consumption choice. Moreover, it seems 
unlikely that consumers would sacrifice a significant amount of insurance coverage against all 
types of risks simply so that they can take advantage of the fact that they eschew certain con· 
sumption choices which pose, in the grand scheme of things, only a tiny risk. In any event, while 
consumers clearly cannot lower insurance costs under, say, a Box 1 regime by eschewing risky 
consumption choices, they clearly can do so under an enterprise liability regime: If consumers 
do not want to pay the costs of manufacturer-provided insurance under an enterprise liability 
regime, consumers could simply eschew a manufacturer's product. 
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b. Distributing nonpecuniary risks. There is no first-party insur-
ance extemality with respect to nonpecuniary losses because first-party 
insurance for such losses is relatively rare or, some say, noneXistent.447 
Thus, the question remains whether enterprise liability can be justified 
on insurance grounds for nonpecuniary losses. 44s 
Insofar as enterprise liability compensates injured consumers for 
risks that are not or cannot be deterred, it serves only an insurance 
function. According to received wisdom, consumers do not demand 
insurance for nonpecuniary losses, as evidenced by the absence of a 
significant market for such insurance.449 If correct, the conventional 
wisdom implies that the deleterious insurance effects could outweigh 
the -beneficial deterrence effects of an enterprise liability regime in 
which damages include nonpecuniary losses. In a subsequent article, 
we hope to challenge the seemingly unanimous view that consumers 
do not demand nonpecuniary-loss insurance.450 If we are correct that 
consumers do demand some nonpecuniary-loss insurance, the fact that 
the market does not meet that demand revives in original form the first 
generation's risk distribution justification for the shift toward enter-
prise liability. But even a conclusion that consumers do not demand 
such insurance would by no means undermine the case for enterprise 
liability. At most, it would imply that damages und~r such a regime 
should be reduced to cover only the pecuniary component of unpre-
ventable accidents.451 Critics of enterprise liability seem to miss this 
point.452 
CONCLUSION 
This article has sought to accomplish three general goals: (1) to 
identify and shed light on the fundamental questions of products lia-
bility law; (2) to respond to the arguments offered by, and to expose 
the tensions within, the two reformist groups of products liability 
447. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insur-
ance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 524 (1984); Priest, supra note 9, at 1553. 
448. Section IV.C.1 made the case for enterprise liability for nonpecuniary losses on deter-
rence grounds; see also Croley & Hanson, supra note 4, at 67-75 (describing the activity-level 
benefits of an enterprise liability regime in which nonpecuniary-loss damages are awarded); Han-
son & Logue, supra note 11, at 186-88 (describing the "unambiguous deterrence benefits of non-
pecuniary-loss damages under enterprise liability"). 
449. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 447. 
450. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 9; see also Croley & Hanson, supra note 4, at 59-67 
(sketching the argument that consumers may demand nonpecuniary-loss insurance). 
451. Of course, it might not imply even that much, given that the beneficial deterrence effects 
of awarding nonpecuniary-loss damages for unpreventable accidents may outweigh the deleteri-
ous insurance effects. 
452. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 9, at 1553. 
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scholars; and (3) to rescue the products liability revolution by reviving 
(in new robes) the premises of the first generation of products liability 
scholars and thereby providing an affirmative case for enterprise liabil-
ity. Part I introduced the Products Liability Matrix, a simple, two-
dimensional matrix depicting the possible products liability regimes 
and framing the debate. Part II described the evolution of products 
liability law toward enterprise liability along the matrix's two dimen-
sions. Part III reviewed the contractarian critique of the premises un-
derlying the trend toward enterprise liability and then, by attempting 
to locate several influential scholars in the Matrix, provided a critique 
of the views of members of the contractarians' and regulators' camps. 
Finally, Part IV revived the first generation's premises and, based on 
those premises, provided an affirmative argument in favor of enterprise 
liability. 
This article began with the observation that, notwithstanding their 
many differences, the contractarians and the regulators share two ba-
sic premises: (1) the products liability regime should satisfy the con-
sumer sovereignty norm, and (2) the present regime is in need of 
reform, because the products liability revolution the first generation 
began led to destructive consequences. As the analyses in Part III 
showed, however, fundamental questions remain unanswered by the 
current debate. Are there market imperfections that justify regulating 
consumer product markets? If so, what role should tort law play in 
responding to those market imperfections? What should the liability 
standard be? Should it be mutable? Until these questions are an-
swered, lawmakers lack any sound basis for products liability 
reform.453 
We have argued that at least three significant market imperfections 
seem to justify regulation and that enterprise liability may well provide 
an efficient response to those market imperfections. We can be fairly 
criticized, however, for having adopted a "tortcentric" approach: We 
have failed fully to consider the possible role of administrative regula-
tion in responding to these same market failures.454 In our view, how-
ever, it is more important now to respond to the antitort approach of 
those products liability scholars whose views on reforming tort law are 
being embraced by lawmakers but whose views on reforming adminis-
trative regulation are being ignored. 
In any event, our ambition has not been to "prove" that enterprise 
liability is the best of all possible worlds. Nor has our ambition been 
453. Contrary to the belief of some, economic analysis of products liability does not lead one 
inevitably to the conclusion that comprehensive reform is in order. 
454. See Stewart, supra note 130 (coining the term tor/centric). 
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to make an unqualified argument for enterprise liability in every case. 
(For instance, none of the market failures we have identified would be 
at work in cases of intentional self-inflicted product-related injuries.) 
Instead, we have aimed to stimulate dialogue among products liability 
scholars by showing that if indeed other tort regimes are superior to 
enterprise liability, or if indeed other regulatory institutions are supe-
rior to tort law, then that is true for reasons other than those either the 
contractarians or the regulators have so far supplied. We agree whole-
heartedly with one scholar's recent observation that some demonstra-
tion that the first generation was misguided is "a necessary prelude to 
.serious reform."455 We have argued here that the music really has not 
begun. Given the present state of the thinking among products liabil-
ity scholars, there is no compelling case for radical reform of the 
regime. 
While the changes instigated by Justice Traynor admittedly did 
not make for a perfect products liability regime, perhaps the vice of 
the first generation was not overambition but underambition: The first 
generation may not have gone far enough in its attempt to overcome 
market failures in consumer product markets. Rather than return to 
the Winterbottom or MacPherson regime, and rather than abandon 
tort law as a means of regulating the allocation of product risks, per-
haps judges and legislators should instead move products liability all 
the way to Box 8 - enterprise liability. 
455. Schwartz, supra note 87, at 819. 
